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Voorwoord 
Dit avontuur begon op een klein terrasje naast een vijver met goudvissen bij het Gustav 
Stresemann Instituut hier in Bonn. Aan het eind hiervan kan ik dit dankwoord dan ook niet 
anders beginnen dan mijn promotor Paul Hoebink hartelijk te danken voor dat eerste, 
richting gevende gesprek. De samenwerking in de maanden en jaren daarna bleef even 
prettig als nuttig, waarin ik soms emails van exotische locaties kreeg maar een andere keer 
met een Albert Heijn tas vol nuttige publicaties Nijmegen weer verliet. Omdat ik tussen 2001 
en 2004 in Nijmegen studeerde was het ook erg leuk om weer samen te werken.   
Nu ik dit proefschrift afrond bevind ik me alweer bijna twaalf jaar in de wereld van de 
‘denktanks’. Ik begon in 2005 bij het European Centre for Development Policy Management 
(ECDPM) in Maastricht, waar ik jarenlang met een andere Paul – Paul Engel – mocht werken, 
en door veel onderzoek, evaluatie en direkter adviserend werk veel mocht leren over de 
‘interne keuken’ van de Europese ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Mijn interesse voor de 
thema’s die in dit proefschrift aan de orde komen zijn met name in die beginperiode 
gevormd, en ik heb in die tijd veel kunnen leren van mijn collega’s uit Maastricht en Brussel. 
Naast Paul wil ik daarbij in het bijzonder Jean Bossuyt, Geert Laporte, James Mackie, Jeske 
van Seters, Faten Aggad en Andrew Sherriff bedanken, met wie ik door de jaren heen heb 
mogen werken.  
Sinds 2013 werk ik bij het Deutsche Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / German Development 
Institute (DIE) hier in Bonn, en ging ik me vooral na 2015 weer nadrukkelijker bezig houden 
met de Europese Unie. Dit bleek het begin van een enerverende periode, met het begin van 
de “last chance Commission”, de onderhandelingen van zowel het akkoord van Parijs als van 
de 2030 agenda voor duurzame ontwikkeling, maar ook natuurlijk het Britse referendum een 
jaar later. Het werk hier bij DIE ligt in het verlengde van ECDPM, maar staat dichter bij 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek waardoor grote conferenties inmiddels alweer vertrouwder aan 
zijn gaan voelen. In het bijzonder wil ik mijn DIE-collega’s Stephan Klingebiel, Christine 
Hackenesch, Svea Koch, Erik Lundsgaarde, Heiner Janus en Mark Furness bedanken, van wie 
ik veel heb geleerd over uitlopende zaken, van het invullen van mijn 
Dienstreisekostenabrechnung tot aan de fijne kneepjes van het schrijven van een artikel voor 
een wetenschappelijk tijdschrift.  
Het werken bij deze twee denktanks bracht en brengt me relatief dichtbij de beleidsmakers 
in Brussel en de lidstaten, en de onderwerpen waar ik op werkte en adviseerde vormden 
belangrijke uitgangspunten voor het onderzoek hier. Ik ben dan ook veel dank verschuldigd 
aan mijn collega’s met wie ik op deze verschillende onderwerpen samen mag werken. Ook 
bedank ik alle mensen met wie ik in het kader van het onderzoek gesproken heb op de 
meest uiteenlopende locaties: een diamantcentrum in Botswana, stoffige NGO kantoren in 
Zambia, prachtige ambassades in Brusselse buitenwijken, maar natuurlijk ook de van 
mintgroene vloerbedekking voorziene kantoren van de Europese Commissie.  
Een aantal van de hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift heb ik in samenwerking met anderen 
geschreven, die ik hier ook graag wil bedanken voor de prettige samenwerking. Hoofdstuk 1 
schreef ik met mijn collega Mario Negre, en hoofdstuk 3 schreef ik in samenwerking met 
Julie Héraud en Malin Frankenhaeuser van het International Centre for Migration Policy 
Development (ICMPD). Last but not least schreef ik hoofdstuk 4 met Maurizio Carbone van 
University of Glasgow, die in 2013 als gastonderzoeker een aantal weken bij het DIE was.  
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Minstens zo belangrijk als de mensen die me bij mijn werk hielpen, zijn de mensen die me 
hielpen door het niet over werk te hebben. Dat geldt allereerst en allermeest voor mijn 
vriendin Kristien en onze zoontjes Hugo en Brecht. Maar ook voor de thuisbasis in Dronten 
en Biddinghuizen: mijn ouders Arie en Jennie, Ruben & Crista, en Lianda & Martijn. En 
tenslotte ook voor oude vrienden uit Flevoland, kameraden uit Maastricht en voor nieuwe 
vrienden hier in Bonn.  
Een proefschrift is klaar als het klaar is, maar het is daarmee geen gesloten boek. Ik ben 
benieuwd waar het heen gaat met de rol van Europa in veranderende wereld, en zie er naar 
uit daar samen met anderen als wetenschapper aan bij te dragen.  
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Introduction 
 
1. From association to differentiation: the evolving EU development policy 
“l’Europe, c’est comme le vélo, si on arrête de pédaler, on tombe” (Jacques Delors, cited in 
Bué, 2011, p. 84)  
Besides being revealing of the cycling skills of an influential European Commission president, 
the above quote of Jacques Delors emphasises that the European integration process 
requires constant movement. Progress of the European Union is co-determined by a host of 
actors and by nature non-linear and incremental. The same applies to the European Union’s 
development policy, which revolves around the management of a development finance 
budget that in 2015 made the EU institutions the fourth largest donor worldwide (OECD, 
2016). Beyond its spending role, the EU is also well-placed to influence with norms and 
ideas, as well as organisationally by promoting joined-up approaches together with its 28 
Member States. Another key characteristic is its broad reach, covering all regions of the 
world and overseen by a dense network of EU Delegations. Altogether, this provides for a 
tree too large for a typical research inquiry to embrace, and as a result the bulk of the 
literature on EU development policy focuses on principal branches and aspects.  
This dissertation examines the emergence, functioning of and trade-offs between the 
three roles of the EU as a development cooperation actor: donor, federator and norm 
maker. The overarching research question investigated is as follows: to what extent does the 
EU’s donor role enable or disable its performance as federator and norm maker? The 
analytical approach guiding the answering of this question is premised on the assumption 
that analysing policy changes during the past and present decade as well as inform policy 
and scholarly discussions on the future requires a historically grounded understanding of 
how this policy area evolved over time. The dissertation is guided by a historical 
institutionalist approach and examines the extent to which EU development policy is ‘fit for 
purpose’ and what avenues may be explored to increase its effectiveness. In this dissertation 
the assessment of effectiveness was not made in relation to concrete development 
interventions, but rather focused on the organisational effectiveness of the EU to deliver on 
its development policy ambitions.1 There is no accepted common definition of organisational 
effectiveness, but in this context it can be understood as the extent to which the EU 
achieves, or is likely to achieve, the outcomes the EU set out to produce in relation to its 
development policy.2 
As per its approach to analysis and broad scope, the research findings presented do 
not provide definite judgements but instead offer more exploratory analysis to facilitate 
                                                          
1 In this dissertation, the term “EU” is used to refer to the policies administered by the EU 
institutions, principally the Commission and since 2010 the European External Action Service (EEAS). 
As per the EU’s supranational character, the research includes the engagement of the EU member 
states and the European Parliament which are required to fully understand the emergence and 
functioning of the roles of EU development cooperation that are analysed.  
2 For a discussion of different definitions and operationalisations of organizational effectiveness, 
refer to Oghojafor et al (2012).  
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future research inquiry and inform policy discussion on the EU as a development 
cooperation actor. This focus is timely in view of the adoption in September 2015 of the UN 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which places greater emphasis on non-financial 
‘means of implementation’ and raises several adjustment challenges for EU development 
policy. This new agenda challenges the EU to redefine its development policy mandate, 
which would also facilitate managing demands placed on it by other policy areas, such as in 
the context its engagement with third countries in relation to human mobility.    
The cumulative dissertation consists of five chapters that examine the EU’s 
development policy roles, each of which addressing specific research questions of their own 
and offering both theoretical and empirical insights. What links them is the focus on EU 
development cooperation with a main emphasis on the EU institutions’ engagement in 
interaction with its member states. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the 
dissertation as a whole, provide complementary analysis of the analysis of EU development 
policy since its inception in the Treaty of Rome as well as to introduce the overarching 
theoretical, methodological and epistemological approach that has guided the research 
project. It starts with a condensed overview of how the EU’s development policy has evolved 
throughout the decades and how the EU institutions have organised themselves to pursue it 
(this section). It is followed by a presentation of the dissertation’s analytical approach and 
methodology (sections 2 and 3). Section 4 presents the structure of the dissertation.    
 
1.1 European beginnings 
The roots of European development policy reach back to the establishment of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and result from the Community’s policy to develop 
special relations with its overseas countries and territories (OCTs) in Africa.3 This policy was 
first proposed for inclusion into the European project4 by French Foreign Minister Robert 
Schuman in his 1950 declaration on the creation of the European Community of Steel and 
Coal (ECSC), which he argued would enable its members to “to pursue the achievement of 
one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent” (European Issue, 
2011). During the negotiations of the Rome Treaty, France and Belgium promoted a policy 
whereby the OCTs would be integrated into the Community market, while all Member States 
would help shoulder their maintenance. Particularly Germany and the Netherlands were 
strongly opposed to this policy of ‘association’ and the French discourse of symbiosis 
between the African and European continents upon which it rested (Langan, 2015). France 
made the association policy a condition for signing the Treaty, and as a result chapter IV 
provided for a special relationship with the OCTs through providing them with better access 
to the Community market and with dedicated funds for development assistance (Hoebink, 
                                                          
3 Annex IV to the Rome Treaty listed the concerned OCTs, which apart from Africa also included 
Netherlands New Guinea, as well as various French settlements in the Southern, Oceania and 
Antarctic territories (CVCE, 2015).  
4 The term ‘European project’ is a popular expression to refer to the process of European integration. 
It can be traced to the 1948 Congress of Europe that was held in the Hague and led to the launch of 
the College of Europe as well as dedicated steps to the creation of the Council of Europe.  
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2004a; Grimm, 2003).5 The demand was accepted after Germany’s realisation that “approval 
of French Africa policies was the diplomatic price it had to pay for the latter’s acceptance of 
the European Common Market” (Van der Harts in Bué, 2010, p. 62). The Rome Treaty’s 
‘contractual approach’ to managing the relationship provided a model for subsequent 
development cooperation arrangements that continue until today (Stochetti, 2013, p. 71).  
 The decision to create what would later evolve into the EU’s development policy was 
the result of political powerplay rather than undisputed added value to the European 
project, which focused on facilitating market integration by means of guaranteeing the 
smooth functioning of its internal market and correcting market failures (Orbie, 2008, p. 
23).6 This mandate was premised on the overarching aim of furthering economic integration 
to facilitate conflict prevention in Europe (Ginsberg, 2010, p. 51). As per a common typology 
of public policy, the association policy bore the characteristics of a redistributive policy, 
whereas the European project was in essence oriented towards regulatory policy.7 The 
European project’s main orientation on regulatory policy can be linked to the absence of 
state-like budgetary power (Orbie, 2012a, p. 23) and is in line with the Commission’s self-
characterisation as “a Community which has neither the attributes nor the ambitions of a 
State but which nevertheless has great capabilities” (EC, 1982, p. 14). The absence of broad-
based ownership of the association policy among the six founding members led to the 
decision not to finance it through the EEC budget. Instead, an extra-budgetary European 
Development Fund (EDF) was created in 1958 to finance the policy through voluntary 
contributions (Frisch, 2008).  
The political landscape of the early 1960s changed rapidly, with Sub-Saharan African 
states becoming independent at a much quicker pace than Europe had anticipated (Grilli, 
1993, p. 14; Grimm, 2003, p. 79). This set the stage for the two Yaoundé Conventions 
through which Europe enabled the Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM) to 
consolidate the bilateral trade and aid benefits they received from the EEC as colonies, while 
releasing them from the requirement to open markets towards one another. The United 
Kingdom’s accession to the EEC in 1973 triggered an ‘enlargement’ of the Yaoundé 
convention as selected Commonwealth members joined the AASM members and decided to 
jointly negotiate a new cooperation agreement with Europe. Following the conclusion of the 
first Lomé Convention with the EEC in 1975, this group of 46 countries founded the Africa, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) through the adoption of the Georgetown 
agreement. While trade remained a key component of the relationship with the EEC playing 
                                                          
5 The French ultimatum should not have come as a surprise, since in 1956 the French government 
had demanded an amendment to the report of an inter-governmental committee on general union 
chaired by Paul Henri Spaak to include the commitment that a future common market should include 
colonies and overseas territories (Ginsberg, 2010, p. 52). 
6 Grilli (1993, p. 331) referred to the association policy as ‘almost a by-product’ of the establishment 
of the common market. 
7 This characterization draws on Theodore Lowi’s typology of public policy as regulatory, distributive, 
constitutive and redistributive (Johnston & McTavish, 2013, p. 17). 
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a leading role, EEC member states retained substantial power over the governance of the 
intergovernmental EDF (Grilli, 1993; Hoebink, 2004b).  
In the decades that followed, the Lomé convention was revised and renewed four 
times, while the membership of both the ACP and the EEC grew over time.8 What remained 
was the formalised and structured approach to cooperation, and its financing through the 
EDF which retained its inter-governmental character and governance structure. This, 
combined with more advantageous trade preferences granted by Europe compared to non-
ACP developing countries and ACP trade and aid relations dealt with by a dedicated 
Commission Directorate General until 2001, long kept the ACP at the top of the ‘pyramid of 
privileges’ (Carbone, 2010; Holland, 2002). In time, though, the shape of this pyramid 
evolved. The initially piecemeal approach to cooperation with countries in the 
Mediterranean region evolved to a stronger engagement during the 1970s, although its 
deepening was hampered by the direct competition between EU and Mediterranean 
agricultural producers, a complicating factor that was evidently less of an issue with ACP 
countries (Grilli, 1993, pp. 181-185). A system for financial aid to selected countries in Asia 
and Latin-America was introduced in 1967, yet remained small both in size and profile until 
the 1985 Iberian enlargement triggered the establishment of a formal dialogue and a 
regional framework towards Latin America (Holland, 2002, pp. 52-55; Hoebink, 2004b, p. 
35).9 Relations with Asia were deepened at a later stage, following the establishment of the 
Asia-Europe Meeting in 1996, a rather late timing that was surprising given the economic 
importance of Asia to Europe (Hoebink, 2004b, p. 37). The 1995 launch of the EU’s Barcelona 
Process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership led to a stronger profile and financial scope 
of the Mediterranean programme, which would later evolve into the EU’s Neighbourhood 
Policy (see Barbé, 2007). In comparison, the Asian and Latin-America programme remained 
small in terms of financial volume and visibility.  
Although ACP-EU relations may still be construed as remaining at the top of the 
pyramid of preferences, with today’s cooperation governed under the legally binding 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement, broader policy and legal reforms have led to a gradual and 
ongoing ‘normalisation’ of EU relations with the ACP. Smith (2004, p. 68) argues that 
through the EU’s enlargement, the addition of other areas of EU development policy 
responsibility as well as a lessening of French interest the EU–ACP relationship diminished in 
relative importance (see also Hewitt & Whiteman, 2004). Another key change concerned the 
introduction of the EU’s Everything But Arms initiative under its 2001 General System of 
Preferences, which ensured equal treatment of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) regardless 
of ACP membership. In February 2015, the EU offered all LDCs preferential access to 
providing services in the EU for up to six months at a time in sectors including architecture, 
engineering, research and development and management consulting, and computer 
                                                          
8 For an overview of the various changes introduced in the Lomé Accords, please refer to Frisch 
(2008).   
9 The 1981 Pisani Memorandum still referred to countries in Asia and Latin America as ‘non-
associated developing countries’, although not without declaring this jargon unfortunate in the sense 
of “putting an essentially negative label on its relations with the developing world” (EC, 1982, p. 22). 
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services.10 Other examples of normalisation concern the removal of the ACP reference from 
the Treaty on the European Union as adopted in 2007, the negotiation of Economic 
Partnership Agreements regional groups of ACP states, as well as the gradual harmonisation 
of EU budget and EDF financial rules as well as the latter’s contribution key.11 Finally, the 
recent EU decision to use EDF reserves for creating the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa 
that encompasses a strong focus on projects in North-Africa and moves away from the 
partnership principles that have come to characterise ACP-EU cooperation over time signals 
a lowering commitment on the EU’s side (Hauck, Knoll & Herrero, 2015). 
At the time of writing, the European project itself found itself under great economic, 
social and political stress, the latter following a surge of populist movements. It specifically 
faced the uncertain outcome of the Brexit, as well as current challenges stemming from the 
long-standing lack of consensus on furthering EU integration in the area of migration policy. 
All these can be seen to express a loss of cohesion and solidarity across the continent though 
not yet leading to re-nationalisation of EU competences (Falkner, 2016). This context has 
reinforced the Treaty on the European Union’s introduction of a more assertive European 
external action policy, encompassing risks for further instrumentalisation of development 
policy to serve these ends. For policy makers and scholars alike, these circumstances prompt 
a fundamental reflection on the various roles of EU development and their continuing 
relevance.  
 
1.2 The nature and evolving roles of EU development cooperation 
In its first formative decades, the EU’s development policy by and large developed in a 
reactive manner, in response to defining events such as the independence wave in Africa, as 
well as the UK accession in 1973. The content of the Lomé Conventions did not substantially 
change during the 1980s and 1990s, with the EU largely prescribing the content of the 
cooperation agreements while granting symbolical concessions to ACP countries along the 
way (Grilli, 1993, p. 37-38).12 In the same period the EU’s development policy gradually 
expanded to other parts of the developing world, yet the legally binding Lomé Conventions 
were key to ascertaining the EU’s formal mandate in development policy. It would take until 
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that the Community’s legal role and objectives in development 
policy was defined and legally confirmed. In addition to setting out the overall objectives for 
the Community’s development policy, the Maastricht Treaty’s chapter also introduced the 
concepts of coordination, complementarity and coherence as key principles for guiding the 
development policies of the EU and its member states. The Commission was not involved in 
the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty article on development policy, which had instead been 
drafted by Dutch government officials following the country’s earlier attempts to introduce 
                                                          
10 Source: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1256  
11 For details on the evolution of the EDF contribution key vis-à-vis that of the EU’s Multi-Annual 
Financial Framework, see Kilnes et al (2012).  
12 For a detailed overview of the changes introduced in the different Lomé Conventions, please refer 
to Stochetti (2013, pp. 81-88). 
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such a chapter during the 1986 negotiations of the Single European Act. It subsequently 
entered the Treaty after minor changes were made (Hoebink, 2004a, pp. 2, 3).    
At the policy level, the European Commission has at different moments sought to 
define a clear role and added value for the European development cooperation vis-à-vis 
other bilateral and multilateral actors, notably the member states themselves. The 
Commission made various attempts to assert itself as a development actor in its own right, 
starting with the publication of the 1974 ‘Fresco of the Community Action Tomorrow’. This 
policy note was published during the Lomé negotiations and presented forward-looking 
reflections on a European development policy, including by proposing to introduce financial 
aid for humanitarian aims, as well as proposing differentiated responses to cooperation with 
three types of developing countries (EC, 1974). A Memorandum published in 1981 sought to 
position the Commission as a hybrid between a bilateral and multilateral development 
cooperation actor: “The Community is not a multilateral development institution: being the 
expression of a European identity, the Community development policy embodies 
geographical preferences; although it is a manifestation of solidarity with certain developing 
countries, it also reflects the Community’s economic interests in the organization of its 
relations with countries on which it depends for the security of its supplies and its markets. 
This sets it apart from the global or multilateral institutions” (EC, 1981, p. 14). The quote 
illustrates that the Commission has typically sought to determine its identity and purpose by 
emphasising in what ways it differs from other actors.  
The first Lomé Conventions tasked the Commission to provide assistance on a non-
interference basis with strong recipient discretion.13 EDF finance was to be administered 
jointly by the two parties, with ACP states enjoying the sole right to propose development 
projects to be funded from the given portion of EDF funding contractually assigned to them 
(Brown, 2004, p. 18). Hewitt (1981, pp. 34-36) however pointed out that in this early period 
member states exerted control over the country allocation process, and that the 
Commission was strongly involved in decisions to spend the funds after the project design 
stage. The formal approach as represented in the Lomé Conventions was nonetheless often 
highlighted by the Commission as a key added value and defining feature, as illustrated by 
this quote from Development Commissioner Claude Cheysson: “It is your money! You should 
use it to meet your priorities in the best possible way. We are here to provide technical 
assistance if you need it” (Frisch, 2008, p. 13). Deteriorating human rights situations such as 
in Uganda under Idi Amin soon emerged to indicate that this defining characteristic could 
turn into a source of embarrassment, after which more conditionality gradually crept into EU 
development policy following the 1977 Council Declaration on the situation in Uganda 
(Bartels, 2007, p. 738). In the decades that followed, the development policy oriented itself 
in ways that reflect both aspects of bilateral and multilateral development policy. On the 
one hand the EU development policy came to cover almost the entire world with the 
                                                          
13 The principle of ‘non-interference’ has in earlier years been described by the EC as a defining 
element of its approach to development cooperation, as for instance shown in this press release: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-93-736_en.htm  
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Commission gaining profile as “a delivery agent in areas where size and critical mass are of 
special importance”, akin to the multilateral donors, which the Commission in 2005 
identified as among its comparative advantages (EU, 2006, p. 9). On the other hand the EU 
policy closely aligned itself to the ‘good governance’ agenda and as such adopted more 
normative and ‘bilateral’ characteristics, though remained much less inclined than some EU 
member states to exercising strong conditionality, including by suspending cooperation. 
In addition to shaping its own niche, the Commission also sought to promote further 
coordination among EU member states and increase ‘Europeanisation’ in this area of policy 
(Loquai, 1996). As per the inter-governmental EDF and the strong member state interests in 
bilateral development, even timid steps towards coordinated action by means of 
information sharing initially were limited to a largely one-directional flow from Commission 
to Member States (Grilli, 1993, p. 82). Throughout the decades, the EU has chosen both 
moments of declining EU Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets as well as periods 
of rapidly increasing ODA budgets to make its case for greater EU coordination in 
development assistance, with a main emphasis on division of labour, sectoral and country 
concentration as well as joint programming (resp. EC, 1995; 2006). External evaluations and 
academic research observe few indications of a ‘European approach’ to coordination at the 
country level (ECDPM, 2008; Delputte & Orbie, 2014) despite the potential efficiency and 
effectiveness gains (Klingebiel, Negre & Morazan, 2017). In recent years the Commission has 
opted for a less top-down approach to promoting coordination and has instead sought to 
take a more open-ended, ‘piloting’ approach to joint programming that could create a basis 
for further EU coordinated action. In May 2016, the Commission reported that such joint-
programming efforts have so far resulted in 25 countries having adopted joint EU strategies 
or being close to finalising these, yet the jury is still out as to whether the efforts to promote 
joint analysis and planning efforts create a basis for increased coordination action and 
collective EU added value (Council, 2016, p. 3).    
Preparations in the early 2000s for the EU’s enlargement also prompted a third role 
for the Commission in facilitating the emergence of development cooperation systems and 
policy frameworks in states that until recently had been ‘aid recipients’ (Lightfoot & Szent-
Iványi, 2014). The 2005 European Consensus on Development formally recognises this 
normative role of the Commission and assigned the Commission as a promoter of 
development best practice (EC, 2006, p. 9). Linked to this role, the EU was mandated in 
subsequent years to facilitate self-reporting on the performance of the EU and its member 
states in many of the areas included in the EU Consensus, including Policy Coherence for 
Development, ODA levels, Aid for Trade and aid effectiveness commitments. While it has 
managed to perform such more ‘logistical’ tasks, often outsourced to consultants, the 
literature raises considerable doubt as to the Commission’s ability to inspire and lead in 
policy development. It has instead been largely portrayed as a ‘norm taker’ (e.g. Doidge & 
Holland, 2012; Faia, 2012), with a DAC Peer Review concluding in 2002 that the Commission 
was most often “a taker of policy from other sources rather than an institution that sets the 
international agenda on contemporary problems in development” (OECD, 2002b, p. 60). The 
entering into force of the Treaty for European Union in December 2009 introduced 
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institutional changes discussed in the next section, yet also reduced the role of the rotating 
Presidency of the European Council in the field of development policy. In the past, progress 
on key dossiers were often strongly driven by member states holding the Presidency, such as 
during the preparation of the European Consensus on Development when the United 
Kingdom replaced the Commission’s proposal by its own text as a basis for negotiation (see 
Stochetti, 2013, pp. 139-147). Under the new Treaty the Commission and EEAS have a 
stronger lead, including through determining the agenda of the six-monthly Foreign Affairs 
Council meetings with a development policy focus. A key moment of this new setting under 
the new Treaty was November 2016, when the EU published its proposal for a revised 
European Consensus on Development in November 2016, which will provide the basis for 
further discussion between the member states and the EP towards its subsequent adoption 
in 2017 (EC, 2016a). The content of this proposal, which was published as a package with 
two other proposals that respectively address the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development 
and ACP-EU cooperation after 2020, are by and large oriented towards consolidating the 
status-quo (see EC, 2016b; EC, 2016c). 
As per this evolution, the EU gradually shaped and expanded its development policy 
competencies and roles, leading to today’s diverse policy framework for cooperation with 
different groups of developing countries. Orbie (2012) proposes three distinct roles of the 
EU as a development policy actor. Table 1 presents working definitions of the roles as 
applied in this dissertation, which are linked to the so-called ‘three Cs’ (coordination, 
complementarity and coherence) as a key element of the Union’s legal basis for 
development policy.  
 
Table 1: Working definitions : EU development policy roles and legal basis 
Donor EU plans and implements 
interventions financed 
through ODA and other 
financial contributions 
Coordination EU progresses in mobilising 
aid resources, or harmonising 
policies, programmes, 
procedures and practices to 
maximise development 
effectiveness 
Federator EU facilitates joint action 
among European 
development actors 
Complementarity EU optimises respective 
added value and realise 
synergies in policies and 
operations 
Norm 
Maker 
EU develops and 
promotes a distinctly 
European development 
policy 
Coherence EU takes account of 
development objectives in 
policies likely to affect 
developing countries 
Source: roles (Orbie, 2012a, pp. 23-25); three Cs (ECDPM, 2008, p. 16; complementarity 
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definition updated by Author as per Lisbon Treaty14) 
  
A few observations can be made as regards the links between the roles as defined here and 
the three principles governing the implementation of the EU’s legal basis. First of all, 
multiple linkages can be established between the roles and principles, with the main 
distinction being that the Commission’s role as a donor would not be needed for it to 
facilitate coordination, complementarity and coherence as per the Treaty’s requirements. 
Secondly, the EU’s role as a donor was established long before the other two roles emerged, 
and is evidently more established. Third, and expanded upon in the next sub-section, the 
EU’s donor role absorbs the lion’s share of the Commission’s human resources and features 
most prominently in public debates as well as in parliamentary scrutiny. Fourth, building on 
these observations one may assume the existence of trade-offs between these different 
roles and linked to this expect that contextual changes and the nature of global 
development challenges may require redefinition, reduction or increases to these roles. For 
instance, a reduction of the EU’s budget would allow the Commission to free up more 
analytical capacity to engage in its norm-making role. As suggested by Orbie and Versluys 
(2008, p. 88), this could enable a redefinition of the EU’s identity as a global development 
actor from a largely distributive to a more regulatory mandate.   
The three roles make for a potentially ambitious role of the EU’s institutions in the 
field of development policy, and all three are not short of attention in the literature on 
European studies, political science and development studies. As per the very nature of the 
European project and the reality of consensus-based decision-making across the 28 member 
states, most research tends to ‘zoom in’ on one of these roles while taking the overall 
system as a given. As a result, the interactions as well as trade-offs between these roles in 
both theory and practice do not receive adequate attention. At the present critical juncture 
of European history, as well as in global development policy through the adoption of the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, it is opportune to analyse the interaction of 
these roles so as to determine to what extent they form a stable and mutually constitutive 
core of the EU as a development actor. By analysing various aspects of the roles and their 
interaction with one another, this dissertation contributes to a more grounded 
understanding of why and how EU development policy has reached its current state of 
being, and informs future academic and policy discussions on how it could best be made fit 
for a changing purpose. The next sub-section will complete this introductory section by 
presenting the institutional set-up through which the EU articulates its three roles. 
 
1.3 Reforming the EU’s development cooperation machinery 
The evolution of the EU’s development cooperation structures can be characterised as a 
messy interplay of both consolidating and fragmenting reforms, as well as by a considerable 
                                                          
14 The Maastricht Treaty required the Community’s development policy to complement the bilateral 
policies of the member states, while the Lisbon Treaty requires the development policy of the Union 
and its member states to complement each other. 
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level of intra-institutional rivalry within the European Commission (Stochetti, 2013). 
Although today it is considered to be among the better performing international 
organisations, such as in the Multilateral Aid Review of the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID, 2016), the EU still suffers from a negative image and track 
record built up in earlier decades. Illustrated by Clare Short’s infamous characterisation of 
the EU as “the worst aid agency in the world”, EU development cooperation has been 
frequently portrayed as bureaucratic, overstretched, static as well as inefficient. 15 
Notwithstanding the progress made, the EU development cooperation system continues to 
face real constraints and limitations, which to a large degree are directly caused by member 
states that impose staff and expenditure ceilings, while simultaneously pushing new areas 
and topics (see e.g. Holland, 2002; Hoebink, 2004b).16 Although reforming rules and 
procedures are key means to improving organisational effectiveness, making these changes 
deliver ultimately depends on their interpretation and use in practice by all relevant actors 
(Bué, 2011, p. 17). To complement and inform the analysis to the specific issues explored in 
subsequent chapters, the following paragraphs describe key changes in the EU’s 
development cooperation structures over time, with a focus on reform efforts made as well 
as sources of organisational ineffectiveness and fragmentation.  
 The merger of the Commission of the EESC, the Commission of the EEC and the 
Commission of the European Atomic Energy Community in 1967 created the Commission of 
the European Communities and with it the foundation of today’s European Commission. The 
Commission’s structure expanded organically with its growing mandate, and in the mid-
1990s the Commission was organised into twenty-four Directorates General (DGs) that were 
known both for their mandate as well as by a roman number. In the case of development 
policy the responsible DG was allotted the number VIII (or ‘aid’, incidentally reflecting one of 
its core roles). The DGs were characterised by overlapping functions and mandates, as well 
as not following the European Parliament’s Committee structure (Cini, 1996, p. 102). During 
the first decades, the EU’s organisational framework for development policy was 
straightforward with one DG in charge of both trade and development cooperation with the 
ACP Group. In view of the nature of the organisational setup, however, the expanding 
geographical focus of EU development cooperation as well as the Commission’s increasing 
mandate altogether fragmented the institutional setup. At the time that the Maastricht 
Treaty entered into force, four DGs as well as the autonomous office for humanitarian aid 
covered aspects of development policy, while there was particularly strong rivalry between 
the DGs respectively in charge of ACP relations and external economic relations (Holland, 
2002, p. 85). The respective DGs also jealously guarded ‘their’ personnel in the different EU 
Delegations, which sought to play their part in managing cooperation as financed through 55 
                                                          
15 Short’s quote was reported in the Guardian in 2000: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/aug/07/patrickwintour.michaelwhite (accessed 30 Mar. 
2017). 
16 Despite their own role and strong degree of influence compared to in international organisations 
such as the  United Nations organisations and the World Bank, member states tend to assess the 
EU’s performance independently of their own involvement (e.g. DFID, 2016). 
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different budget lines (Bué, 2010, pp. 125-126). In 1995, Commission President Santer 
assumed the mandate to coordinate the development policy activities of the five DGs, yet 
was unable to prevent the highly unproductive turf wars which largely prevented concerted 
and coordinated EU external action (Grimm, 2003, pp. 202-203). 
Independent evaluations of European Commission aid programmes in all regions that 
were published in the late 1990s presented evidence of low efficiency and poor 
management, disbursement pressure, weak monitoring and discouraging results, as well as 
concerns over the sustainability of development interventions (Montes, Migliorisi & Wolfe, 
1998; Cowi, 1998; Società Italiana di Monitoraggio, 1999; ICEA/DPPC, 1999). Staffing issues 
and coordination between the different DGs featured among the key topics of an internal 
review conducted in 1998, which resulted in the creation of common implementation 
agency for European development cooperation best known under the acronym SCR (as per 
the French title “Service Commun Relex”) in 1999. The new service was tasked with 
implementing all operations, apart from humanitarian aid that remained under the existing 
autonomous agency, as well as with the promotion of key aid effectiveness principles and 
the introduction of decentralised management of EU development cooperation. The service 
was moreover expected to increase the ‘delivery speed’ of EU development cooperation. 
Grimm (2003, p. 204) noted that the Commission itself frankly admitted that despite the 
successful creation of the SCR, the new agency suffered from unclear allocation of 
responsibilities between itself and the geographic DGs, while the reforms failed to “address 
the fundamental mismatch between aid volumes and administrative resources.”  
A year later, the fall of the Santer Commission triggered another and perhaps more 
fundamental reform by the new Commission, through its response to the 1999 Committee 
of Independent Experts’ report on ‘Allegations regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and 
Nepotism in the European Commission’ (Hoebink, 2004b; Grimm, 2003). Development 
cooperation had become a centre of attention of the Santer Commission’s corruption 
scandals, as some of the fraud and mismanagement accusations were related to the EU’s 
Mediterranean programme and its humanitarian aid (Committee of Independent Experts, 
1999). The Committee’s report informed subsequent development cooperation reforms 
enacted under the new Commission President Prodi, and were part of broader EU 
governance reforms that were premised on the expectation that increasing transparency on 
decision-making would help to avoid future corruption and maladministration (EC, 2001). All 
in all, despite the recently acquired legal basis, the future of EU development cooperation 
did not seem bright at the turn of the millennium (Stochetti, 2013, p. 92; Orbie & Versluys, 
2008, p. 69). 
Through the reform, Commission President Prodi managed to reduce the number of 
Commissioners and DGs addressing development cooperation from five down to three, but 
marginalised development policy in the process. In 2000 he appointed Poul Nielson as 
development commissioner, who had just completed six years as Denmark’s development 
cooperation minister and thus seemed an appropriate and competent choice for seeing 
through the reforms. However, the control over the SCR was given to External Relations 
Commissioner Chris Patten, who also managed development cooperation relations with 
514530-L-bw-Keijzer
Processed on: 11-10-2017 PDF page: 24
24 
 
non-ACP countries. While the Trade Commissioner was tasked with all external trade 
relations, this left Nielson with the job of leading development policy towards the ACP 
states, as well as some additional competence in the area of humanitarian aid (Holland, 
2002, p. 85-91). Other key aspects of the Prodi reforms concerned the fundamental reform 
and renaming of the SCR to ‘EuropeAid Co-Operation Office’ (‘AidCO’ in EC jargon) while DG 
VIII was renamed DG Development (‘DG DEV’). Other aspects of the reform, as outlined in its 
‘Communication on the Reform of the Management of External Assistance’, concerned 
revisions to the programming process and management of the project cycle, including the 
involvement of the member states (Hoebink, 2014b, p. 54) as well as a devolution of 
responsibilities to the Delegations (Frederiksen and Baser, 2004). Despite the efforts made, 
the Commission’s attempts to streamline and simplify procedures and instruments were 
thwarted by the need to satisfy the interests of specific member states as well as the 
European Parliament that are not always easily reconciled, as well as by member state 
reluctance to increase the Commission’s human resources.  
The enlargement of the EU over time – with each member state needing an own 
European Commissioner – became a source of institutional fragmentation in itself.  This also 
affected the EU’s development policy through the appointment of a separate Commissioner 
for humanitarian aid in 2009. The Lisbon Treaty would have reduced the amount of 
Commissioners to two thirds the number of Member States and introduced a rotational 
system, yet concessions made for the second Irish Referendum included keeping the status 
quo (Miller, 2009). 17  During the first Barroso Commission, the External Relations 
commissioner’s control over AidCO increased, adding to its increasing influence on 
development cooperation ‘on the ground’ following the aforementioned devolution exercise 
(Stochetti, 2013, p. 96). Moreover, the set-up was regarded to reinforce the disconnect 
between development policy and implementation that was created through the 2000 
reforms, and the stronger role for the external relations DG suggested to some the 
subordination of the EU’s development policy to its nascent foreign policy (Bué, 2010, p. 
129). Another source of fragmentation was the continued reluctance of some member 
states to incorporate the EDF into the EU’s budget, with the result that EU development 
cooperation with ACP countries is not subject to parliamentary scrutiny (Hoebink, 2004b; 
Stochetti, 2013). Although the financial procedures between the EDF and the budget have 
been harmonised in recent years, the remaining differences in procedures, timing and 
processes contribute to the difficulty of coordinating EDF-financed cooperation 
interventions with those financed under the EU budget. 18   
Following the entering into force of the Treaty on European Union, the Barroso II 
Commission put the development commissioner in charge of AidCO and in October 2010 
decided to merge the office with DG DEV into a single DG responsible for development 
                                                          
17 It is for instance likely that if the reform was introduced that the development and humanitarian 
aid mandate would be given to a single Commissioner, as was the case before the 2007 ‘big bang’ 
enlargement.   
18 E.g. the rules of the EDF Committee were revised in 2002 in line with agreements on financial 
cooperation as set out in the Cotonou Agreement (EU, 2002),  
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policy and implementation. In previous years there was increased awareness of overlaps and 
duplications between the two DGs, as well as cases where the two DGs seemed to have 
different views on how to shape new policies and interpret current policies. One of the 
objectives driving the merger was thus to create a “‘centre of excellence’ in both the design 
and delivery of cooperation policies” (Herrero and Keijzer 2011: 6). In parallel to setting up 
this new centre of excellence, the EU was also tasked with reshaping the broader EU’s 
external policy framework that was reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty. A key role in this regard 
was to be played by a new European External Action Service (EEAS) that would assist the 
EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy/Commission Vice 
President (HRVP). President Barroso ensured a strong Commission influence over the 
creation of the new EEAS that was to be equally staffed by Commission, Council and 
Member State officials (Furness, 2013, p. 112). As the setting up of the new DG for 
Development and International Cooperation (DEVCO) required considerable office 
renovations while the EEAS’ offices opened in January 2011, for a long time people working 
for the EEAS and DEVCO worked in the same building. The current Juncker Commission 
essentially continued in this direction and moved the HRVP and her Cabinet from the EEAS 
offices to the Berlaymont Commission offices accommodating the other European 
Commissioners, while placing the development commissioner in a ‘cluster’ of commissioners 
led by the HRVP.   
 In addition to discussions on staffing, human resources and infrastructure, the modus 
operandi between the EEAS and DEVCO was also under discussion and subject to detailed 
negotiations. A key consideration here was the management of the ‘programming’ of 
development cooperation interventions under the Multi-Annual Financial Framework for the 
period 2014-2020 and under subsequent multi-annual financial frameworks. Discussions 
resulted in the adoption of a negotiated document that set out a rather heavy bureaucratic 
process on the preparation and approval of development cooperation strategies and 
strategies (Tannous, 2013; Furness, 2013). Beyond this formal layer, the development 
commissioner also presented a reform strategy in 2010, titled the ‘Agenda for Change’, 
which set out priority sectors for EU development cooperation and argued for a maximum of 
three cooperation sectors per partner country.19 After the proposal to focus on three sectors 
per country was welcomed by the member states, the agenda played a strong role in 
international negotiations between DEVCO and the EEAS, with DEVCO often having the 
upper hand in terms of the resulting focus in development cooperation programmes 
(Herrero, Knoll, Gregersen, & Kokolo, 2015).20 
                                                          
19 The goal for the member states and the Commission to each concentrate on a maximum of three 
‘focal sectors’ per developing countries, following the leadership of the country in determining these, 
was first proposed by the Commission in 2007 and enshrined in the EU’s Code of Conduct on 
Complementarity and Division of Labour (Council, 2007). 
20 Cooperation on development cooperation programming between the Development Commissioner 
and the HRVP became so tense that at one moment in January 2013 the HRVP sent a letter to 
formally protest for the choice of sectors made and to plead for a stronger focus on the transport 
sector (Personal Communication, EU Official).  
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 Another change in DEVCO under the current Juncker Commission concerned what at 
first sight appears to be a rather subtle one: the renaming of ‘DG for Development and 
International Cooperation’ into ‘DG for International Cooperation and Development’. Since 
2011 cooperation between DEVCO and DG Environment intensified, with both playing a key 
role in preparing and promoting the EU’s negotiation mandate for the process leading up to 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A stronger focus on international 
cooperation, as implied by the name-change, will be needed given the introduction of the 
‘differentiation principle’ in the Agenda for Change, in practice mostly applied by phasing out 
bilateral development cooperation with countries that reach upper-middle income status 
(Keijzer, van Seters, Lein, Krätke, & Montoute, 2012). Especially since some ACP countries 
are expected to graduate from bilateral aid after 2020 (with many seeing reducing 
allocations under the current 11th EDF, see Herrero et al., 2015), this has prompted DEVCO 
to consider how to rebalance and refocus its operations over the next years. It has pushed a 
focus on a universal and transformational 2030 Agenda over the past years, and over a 
longer period championed the concept of Policy Coherence for Development, yet the main 
issue is to what extent its past performance and results achieved in these areas makes it 
well-placed for the period ahead.  
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1 EU development cooperation: from nature to nurture? 
Faia (2012, p. 10) observes that compared to other EU policy areas its development policy 
has been under-studied as well as under-theorised, with first major pieces of work only 
appearing in the late 1980s and early 1990s and mainly focusing on ACP-EU relations (Ibid., 
pp. 12-19; Grilli, 1993, p. xiv). The authors applied varying theoretical international relations 
perspectives ranging from realism, dependency theory and liberal perspectives, yet the 
majority of these works regarded EU member states – and France in particular – as the 
principal actor in determining EU development policy (Faia, 2012, p. 11). The recent opening 
of the public archives of the first constituting decades of EU development policy allowed for 
research confirming that member state governments were indeed ‘in the lead’ in deciding 
on the foundations and scope of the European project’s development policy (see Drieghe, 
2011).21 This example illustrates that there is still much scope to broaden and deepen our 
understanding of EU development policy through additional empirical research.  
Over time, the increase in European member states from the founding six to today’s 
28, the expanding EU institutions with its own parliament in particular, and the ‘ever-closer 
Union’ in general fundamentally changed both the game and its dynamics – and so have 
theories seeking to explain these. Research on the formative decades of EU development 
                                                          
21 Interestingly, though, this research also dispelled the myth of French dominance of the policy field 
in that it concluded that the first Lomé Convention were closer to UK than French interests (Drieghe, 
2011). 
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policy applied understandings of collective action that were grounded in ideas on liberal 
intergovernmentalism and regarded key actors (mainly member states) as utility-maximising 
as well as defending their own interests (Gavas & Maxwell, 2016). In contrast to such a logic 
of ‘expected consequences’ and the assumption that member states act autonomously (Faia, 
2012, p. 16), recent scholars accentuate the importance of beliefs and ideas that actors have 
about each other. There is no inherent contradiction between the logic of expected 
consequences and that of appropriateness, since in practice cost-benefit and norm-based 
considerations both contribute to policy development (Gavas & Maxwell, 2016, p. 2). 
Although the literature argues that the EU’S uniqueness in policy discourse has not 
convincingly transcended into uniqueness in cooperation practice (e.g. Hewitt 1981; Arts & 
Dickson 2004), a recent review identified several cases where EU actors ‘nurtured’ 
approaches to development cooperation distinct from those pursued by the World Bank, 
and assumingly other multilateral organisations (Orbie, Bossuyt, Debusscher, Del Biondo, 
Delputte, Reynaert & Verschaeve, 2016).22  
As is detailed in chapters 1, 3 and 5 of this dissertation, the ‘shared competence’ of 
the EU and its member states in the field of development policy is not conducive to ensuring 
an effective development policy at the European level. Beyond its legal classification in terms 
of EU competence, EU development policy has a dual character in that it mixes an inter-
governmental (through the European Development Fund) and Community approach to 
managing EU development policy (Simon, 2003, p. 5). This duality has prevented the 
European Parliament from playing a strong role, given that its main power lies in legislative 
and budgetary processes (Stochetti, 2013, p. 61). EU development policy today offers few 
strong battlefields between member states and is a low-profile EU Commissioner post 
despite the considerable budget it encompasses.23 Development policy making often entails 
a game of ‘give and take’ between the various actors involved, with only a few taking on an 
active role in key dossiers. This leads to a heterogenous ‘tapestry’ of policy initiatives that 
contrast with vision statements such as the 2005 EU Consensus for Development that seek 
to present an image of a distinct European identity and approach to development 
cooperation (see  Lightfoot & Szent-Iványi, 2012; Orbie, 2012b).24 This implies that EU 
development policy does not necessarily involve ‘lowest common denominator’ decision 
making, but rather that decision-making and collective action processes are inclusive and 
accommodative to such an extent that the EU’s development policy ‘aquis’ as a whole 
remains less than the sum of its parts. Member states continue to be reluctant to promote a 
genuine ‘European’ approach to development policy (i.e. EU and member states), and while 
                                                          
22 The same authors have noted that the use of ‘the Brussels Consensus’ as a working-title for the 
2005 EU Consensus on Development expressed the EU’s explicit intention to do so (see also 
Stochetti, 2013). 
23 Hewitt and Whiteman (2004: 118) note that from 1958 to 1985, all Development Commissioners 
were French, whereas since the turn of the millennium the development portfolio has been assumed 
by commissioners from smaller EU member states.  
24 Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2012) further observe that member states which have joined the EU 
since 2004 have only highly superficially ‘downloaded’ EU development policy content.  
514530-L-bw-Keijzer
Processed on: 11-10-2017 PDF page: 28
28 
 
they may support the objective of collective action they do not necessarily regard the EU as 
the appropriate setting to do so (Orbie et al., 2016; Bué, 2011). The EU is often referred to as 
the largest ODA provider world-wide, with the Commission rarely missing a public 
opportunity to do so itself, yet this statistical figure has never translated to the 
corresponding level of agency and collective engagement (Bodenstein, Faust & Furness, 
2016).  
An important distinction can be made between the various types of actors that shape 
EU development policy, which has also guided the choice of methodology set out below: 
there are those who serve democratic mandates in the European Parliament or are posted 
as diplomats by the member states and only operate in Brussels for a fixed period of time. 
The other group of actors include Commission officials, researchers and consultants, NGO 
experts and lobbyists who have long ‘gone native’ and have seen their temporary colleagues 
come and go. Although one should not generalise, the different time horizons and 
backgrounds of the two groups of actors mean that what appears a ‘now or never’ moment 
to some may represent an incremental step in a longer process to others. What unites the 
two groups are the EU institutions that shape their interactions, and it is these institutions 
that form the backbone of this dissertation’s conceptual framework.   
 
 
2.2 Historical institutionalism 
As the previous section described, the evolutionary trajectory of EU development 
cooperation has been strongly influenced by initial decisions of scope and mandate. The 
starting point of this research is that analysing key trends and reforms in European 
development cooperation during the past and present decade requires a historically 
grounded understanding of how this policy area evolved over time, as well as a close focus 
on the types of processes and systems through which key decisions are made and translated 
into action. Research under the broader heading of ‘new institutionalism’ developed in 
reaction to prominent behavioural perspectives in research during the 1960s and 1970s, and 
has been sub-divided into historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism. Despite their similar interests, these three schools of thought 
developed relatively independently from one another (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 5). Although 
defining features have been assigned to the three schools of thought (Hall & Taylor, 1996), 
others suggest that the great internal diversity within these three schools complicates 
assigning concrete institutional analyses to one or them (De Ville, 2013, p. 620). 
As a relevant analytical approach that is increasingly applied in European studies (e.g. 
Pierson, 1994; Pollack, 2009), historical institutionalism (HI) was chosen to guide the analysis 
presented in the different chapters. This approach is relevant in view of the fact that the EU 
has been around for six decades, yet over this short time-span became the most densely 
institutionalised international organisation in the world (Pollack, 2009). While institutional 
theory goes back to the very start of the study of politics, the term HI was first coined during 
the 1990s following new empirical research describing how institutional structures had 
“profound effects on shaping political strategies, outcomes and, ultimately, political 
514530-L-bw-Keijzer
Processed on: 11-10-2017 PDF page: 29
29 
 
preferences” (Steinmo, 2008, p. 125). In addition to the institutional focus, HI scholarship is 
characterised by its historical orientation in that “it stresses that political development must 
be understood as a process that unfolds over time” (Pierson, 1994, p. 4). The defining 
characteristic of HI is not so much its long-term orientation, but rather its key concern with 
the order and sequencing of key moments over a longer period. HI particularly seeks to 
identify key conditions for and mechanisms by which the past affects the present and future 
(Fioretos, 2011, p. 383). HI takes a less deterministic view on institutions compared to 
rational choice institutionalism and considers how institutions interrelate with other factors 
shaping politics, such as ideas and beliefs. A known limitation of HI is that compared to the 
other two schools of thought it has lagged behind in aggregating findings into systematic 
theory on institutional development and change (Hall & Taylor, 1996).  
HI thus constitutes neither a specific theory nor a distinct method, yet is 
characterised by its historical orientation and attention to how institutions structure and 
shape both process and outcomes (Steinmo, 2008, p. 118). Given this relatively broad label, 
some recent works can and have been related to HI without explicitly being framed by the 
authors as such (see Fioretos, 2011). Bearing in mind the caveats set out above, HI scholars 
can be seen to occupy a middle ground between sociological institutionalists and rational 
choice theorists, and distinguish themselves by their central focus on the creation, evolution, 
reproduction and structuring of institutions over time (Pollack, 2009). HI moreover takes a 
more sceptical view of the concept of historical efficiency by pointing to sunk costs, i.e. costs 
that cannot be recovered once they have been incurred and other legacy effects that affect 
the evolution of designs (Fioretos, 2011; Verschaeve & Orbie, 2015; McNamara & Newman 
2009). Both HI and sociological institutionalism take as an essential starting point of analysis 
that new institutions are created or adopted in a world in which countless institutions 
already exist (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 20; McNamara & Newman, 2009).  
HI scholars regard human beings as both norm-abiding rule followers and self-
interested rational actors, with their actual behaviour depending on the individual, context 
and rules. HI naturally focuses on case study research to understand how certain processes 
lead to certain outcomes, and posits that institutional change results from changes in actor’s 
solutions to perceived collective action problems. The emphasis is on explanation, not 
prediction, with case selection being purposeful to this aim. The critique of the focus on 
single cases and small-N weaknesses associated to this fails to recognise that HI analysis 
confronts explanatory ideas at various data points (Steinmo, 2008, pp. 134-135).  
The following paragraphs will look into the evolution of HI as a theoretical approach, 
a description which to an important degree can be explained by the main concepts 
employed by HI scholars.  
 
Phase one: explaining continuity 
The study of institutions initially drew inspiration from 1980s economist literature on 
technological development, with the development and subsequent market dominance of 
the QWERTY keyboard representing a convincing case of the concept of path dependence. 
The example of QWERTY, first developed as a keyboard configuration less likely to result in 
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jammed mechanical type-writers, showed how its early availability benefited typewriter 
owners and their employees, and reduced the chances of more efficient keyboards 
introduced at a later stage (Boas, 2007, pp. 33-34). The keyboard configuration generated 
increasing returns, i.e. it generated a steady increase in returns relative to once-feasible 
alternatives (Fioretos, 2011, p. 377). These and other examples were employed by political 
science scholars to argue against dominating functionalist tendencies in earlier research on 
institutions. An influential article by Pierson (2000a) argued that the functionalist tendency 
was both cause and consequence of their focus on institutional effects and their relative 
neglect of analysing institutional origins and change. He observed three limitations of such 
rational design. First of all, the actors who designed an institution may not act 
‘instrumentally’, as considerations of appropriateness tend to be prioritised over 
considerations of effectiveness. Secondly, actors who design institutions often do so with 
short-term horizons in mind, either because they have genuinely short time horizons or 
because they consider themselves unable to influence the future. Finally, a third and last 
limitation of rational design analysis is that even if the first two limitations would not apply, 
i.e. when actors would act instrumentally and focus on long-term effects, unanticipated 
consequences are still likely to be widespread.  
Against this backdrop, influential HI scholars initially strongly focused on explaining 
the persistence of institutions, with an emphasis on lock-in effects and increasing returns 
(Pierson, 2000b), or related concepts such as self-reinforcing sequences and the 
‘mechanisms of reproduction’ (Boas, 2007, p. 34). A central role in research guided by this 
approach is played by the concept of path dependence, which Pierson (2000b: 252) defines 
as “social processes that exhibit increased returns”. Detailing this definition, he defines path 
dependence as characterised by (1) initial conditions for increasing returns allowing for 
diverse outcomes; (2) contingency created by large consequences of relatively small events 
at influential moments; (3) a critical role for timing and sequence of events; and (4) the 
inertia caused by a single equilibrium being promoted once increased returns are 
established. With emphasis on HI’s skeptical view of historical efficiency, Fioretos (2011, p. 
376) adds that path dependence refers to the process whereby a prevailing structure shapes 
the subsequent trajectory with the effect of making alternative institutional designs less 
likely to triumph, “(…) including those that would be more efficient according to a standard 
expected utility model.” Following Douglas North’s work, Pierson (2000b) argues that path 
dependent processes may be expected most powerful at a macro level where multiple 
organisations and institutions are interlinked. Institutions may create complementary 
relationships with other institutions, thus generating self-reinforcing qualities (Fioretos, 
2011, p. 377). 
HI scholars emphasise the long-term impact of initial decisions and institutional 
stickiness promoted through the making of ‘sunk costs’ that can no longer be recovered to 
help explain the nature of the trajectories that they study, as well as why other trajectories 
may have been plausible alternatives yet became out of reach (Verschaeve & Orbie, 2015, 
pp. 3-4). In the context of the EU, this implies that member states often find themselves 
unable to promote distinctive policy preferences as these are “immobilized by the dead 
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weight of past initiatives”, which in EU jargon can also be referred to as ‘acquis 
communautaire’ (Pierson, 1994, p. 5). In the EU, institutional stickiness is observed by basic 
decision-rules and treaty provisions moderating transformations in response to evolving 
policy contexts (McNamara & Newman, 2009, p. 6).  A historical institutionalist perspective 
enables understanding of European integration by means of four factors that explain the 
gaps between the direct goals motivating the creation of institutions and their long-term 
effects: (1) the member states’ focus on short-term concerns, (2) the pervasiveness of 
unintended outcomes, (3) the ‘lock in’ effect of past decisions (i.e. the acquis) that make it 
hard to move beyond incremental change as per unanimity requirement and the 
Commission’s right of initiative, and (4) the aforementioned sunk costs as well as the rising 
price of exit (Pierson, 1994, pp. 11-16).25 
 
Phase two: explaining change 
A widespread critique of HI and the centrality of path dependency in HI analysis is that it 
convincingly explains long-term inertia, but is not well-placed to explain why fundamental 
change sometimes does occur (Steinmo, 2008, p. 129; De Ville, 2013; Pollack, 2009). HI 
scholars were challenged to explain when institutions, apparently against all odds, became 
subject to change. Drawing from the same economist discourse, the initially dominant 
explanation for this occurrence was the ‘punctuated equilibrium’. As per the emphasis on 
the path dependence of institutions, a logical consequence was that the source of change 
was defined as an external shock affecting the stable equilibrium in which the institution 
(naturally) found itself (Steinmo, 2008, p. 129). In a later contribution, Pierson observed that 
through the emphasis on path dependence HI scholars had overemphasised the institutional 
and neglected the historical focus of HI. He also argued against conceptualising the dynamic 
for institutional change as originating outside the system (Blyth, 2016, p. 464). To get to a 
more balanced approach, Pierson called for a stronger focus on the concept of temporality, 
defined as “the notion that the timing and sequence of events shape political processes” 
(Fioretos, 2011, p. 371). Temporality was considered key to understanding the evolving 
constraints and opportunities that represent actors’ engagement in institutions, which 
results in fundamental changes to the political process itself over time (Ibid.). These and 
related discussions informed a ‘second phase’ in HI scholarship guided by the claim that 
institutions and policies produced both positive and negative feedback, with the latter 
creating pressure for institutional and policy change (Pollack, 2009). 
One influential concept guiding research inquiry into ‘what happened’ during periods 
of punctured equilibria concerns is that of the critical juncture. Critical junctures have been 
applied by HI scholars as constituting the starting points for path-dependent processes, yet 
similar to path dependence the concept is often applied in a rather casual and imprecise 
manner. While critical juncture has surfaced as the dominant term, such brief moments of 
                                                          
25 On the fourth factor, it should be noted that Pierson’s article was published twenty years before 
the second UK Referendum on its EU membership resulted in a narrow majority in favour of leaving, 
as well as after temporary suspension of EU membership had been suggested for Greece during the 
2014 Eurogroup discussions.  
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institutional flux have also been referred to as ‘turning point’, ‘crisis’ or ‘unsettled times’, 
with an early appearance as ‘critical periods’ in Polyanyi’s 1944 study on the rise of the 
market economy (Ibid., p. 344). The concept of critical junctures has been defined as 
“relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability 
that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 348; 
emphasis in the original).26 Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: 342) clarify that in institutional 
analysis critical junctures are characterised by “(…) a situation in which the structural (that is, 
economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political action are significantly 
relaxed for a relatively short period, with two main consequences: the range of plausible 
choices open to powerful political actors expands substantially and the consequences of their 
decision for the outcome of interest are potentially much more momentous.” These 
definitions accentuate that a historical moment may constitute a critical juncture to one 
institution, but not necessarily to another, and that a critical juncture does not automatically 
result in change (Ibid., pp. 348-349).  
Researchers applying the concept of critical junctures often retained the central 
concept of path dependence, and through it the assumption that institutions are constant 
and change-resistant until the point when they reach that juncture. More recent research 
has sought to move away from the concept and instead concentrate on explaining 
institutional change as a starting point of analysis. Contrary to the earlier works around 
punctured equilibriums, these accounts sought to endogenise change in their theoretical 
understanding of institutional development. Influential authors included Thelen (2004), 
whose work problematised the dichotomy between Rhineland and Anglo-Saxon ‘version’ of 
capitalism and detailed how institutions evolved over time as opposed to undergoing some 
sort of ‘big bang’ change during critical junctures. Her analysis showed how core elements of 
Germany’s skill system survived the enormous changes of the 20th century, yet also 
underwent functional and distributional transformation, evidence which challenged 
conceptions that world wars would somehow ‘reset’ and replaced these institutions. The 
evidence presented in her book challenged previous research that distinguished periods of 
institutional stability followed by periods in which change took place and considered that 
change to be exogenous. She challenged the idea of path dependence and deterministic 
‘lock-in’ effects and presented research evidence describing patterns of incremental change 
that reflected the result of political negotiation and alignment processes.  
Another influential scholar presenting similar ideas as Thelen was Hacker (2004), 
whose analysis of social policy in the United States neither identified periods of stability 
interrupted by brief episodes of change but instead observed a more incremental process. 
The various changes that occurred could each be characterised by one of four models of 
policy change: ‘drift’, the transformation of stable policy in response to changing 
circumstances, ‘conversion’ as the internal adaptation of existing policy, ‘layering’ as the 
                                                          
26 Relatively is defined as the juncture’s duration being brief relative to the duration of the path-
dependent process it instigates, and substantially refers to the agents’ choices probability to affect 
outcomes being higher than before and after the juncture (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 348). 
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creation of new policy without eliminating old ones, and finally ‘revision’ in terms of the 
formal reform, replacement or elimination of an existing policy. In his analysis of US social 
policy he observed that drift was most pervasive during the 1980s and 1990, which reflects 
the many possibilities for blocking reform that the American political system offers, while 
layering has often been applied by the conservative party to further its aims in this area 
(Hacker, 2004, p. 248). In an analysis of EU institutional evolution in the area of foreign and 
higher education policy, McNamara and Newman (2009: 10) present the concept of 
institutional scavenging, which is observed when “external institutional routes are taken to 
achieve IO policy trajectories difficult to achieve through more organic development.” The 
analysis identifies the use of layering as per Hacker’s definition as well as institutional 
incorporation, i.e. directly borrowing structural or normative aspects from other 
organisations, and carries the point that the EU’s efforts are often inspired by a wider 
institutional ‘ecosystem’ (ibid., pp. 10, 11). The analysis of the dynamics between the EU and 
the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee by Verschaeve and Orbie (2016) identified 
various cases of layering and incorporation of development policy in the normative sphere.  
Although the works of these and other scholars enriched the debate and presented 
important new evidence on institutional change, the strong appeal to ‘agency’ that the new 
theoretical concepts carried perhaps unintentionally de-emphasised the role played by the 
institutions themselves. This was seen by some as a potential weakening of HI as an 
approach, since it could be argued that “what begins as a strong theory of institutions that 
tries to endogenize change ends up as a weak theory of agency and coalitions that change 
institutions, as long as there is enough uncertainty, ambiguity or power for agents to do so” 
(Blythe, 2016, p. 465). A missing piece in this puzzle was where the actors’ desires for 
changing institutions came from, which lead to the reinterpreting of the purposes and aims 
of existing institutions as implied in this literature. The best way forward would be to keep 
institutions at the centre of HI analysis, while also investing in mapping the flows and ideas 
of actors so as to better understand what drives their actions in these settings (Ibid., p. 466). 
Daugbjerg (in De Ville, 2013, pp. 621) presented the concept of reactive sequencing as an 
alternative to path dependence, which conceives of policy change as “a chain of events 
linked through reactions and counter-reaction.” This alternative conceptualisation can be 
seen as a response to the critique of functionalist perspectives on institutional development 
(Pierson , 2000a), while also placing greater emphasis on the role of discourse. As De Ville 
(2013, p. 621) puts it: “While structures empower and constrain agents, this influence is 
always dependent on how agents interpret structures, which is mediated by discourse”. 
Taking an approach that does not dismiss earlier insights and concepts from HI while 
compensating for its overly structuralist orientation would have advantages over the 
‘incremental change’ scholars introduced here (i.e. Thelen, 2004; Hacker, 2004). Doing so 
would entail not fully rejecting the returns-based path dependence model but instead 
revising this approach so as to develop theoretical frameworks equally capable of analysing 
continuity and change. One contribution specifically dedicated to advance this aim returned 
to the aforementioned QWERTY case and noted that it was less appropriate to guiding 
analysis of long-term political change because it represents a simple as opposed to a 
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composite standard of technology. Whereas both simple and composite technologies 
generate network effects that encourage further adoption, the nature of the QWERTY 
technology means that the only realistic change potential is by means of an exogenous shock 
provided by a successor such as voice recognition software (Boas, 2007, p. 38). In contrast to 
the keyboard layout, the internet can be characterised as a composite standard technology: 
the technology as a whole is more flexible than its component parts and thus has a capacity 
for long-term change whereas the development trajectory may still be considered as path-
dependent. The technology was deliberately designed so as not to allow for centralised 
control, as well as to be highly flexible and capable of evolving to introduce functions that 
were originally not envisaged, such as email and streaming various media. Not all micro-
alterations of the standard can be considered increasing returns, with quasi-monopoly 
suppliers of broadband services, blockage and monitoring of sites indicating that the control-
frustrating nature of the technology may be fundamentally transformed over time (Ibid., pp. 
38-42). To take the case of the ACP-EU partnership, the description in section one shows 
that the overall aims and features of the partnership have remained concept, yet layering 
has been introduced at several points in response to unintended effects (e.g. non-
interference policies implying support to autocratic regimes) or to strengthen effectiveness 
(e.g. the move from entitlement-based aid to allocation based on needs and performance). 
Despite the fundamental changes made, the evolving partnerships shows strong continuity 
and rooting in its legally-binding basis for cooperation.  
Composite technological standards are more appropriate sources of inspiration for HI 
analysis, which typically deals with institutions that themselves are composed of individual 
rules and procedures. Drawing on the dynamics observed in composite standards, a single 
theoretical framework may be constructed that combines existing concepts of path 
dependence and increasing returns as well as concepts of layering and convergence (Boas 
2007: 45). By doing so, the theoretical framework can cater for analysing factors influencing 
change which are both endogenous and exogenous to the system, as well as describe how 
these interact with one another. This framework abandons the idea that institutional 
development will be path-dependent and reinforced by increasing returns until being 
‘punctured’ by an external force, or alternatively encountering a critical juncture. It instead 
conceptualises increasing returns, conversion and layering as three interconnected 
processes constituting continuity and change. A key element here is that the presence of 
increasing returns helps to explain why actors pursue conversion at all, or promote 
institutional layering (Ibid.: 48). Finally, a theoretical framework as constructed this way may 
be seen as representing a historical institutionalist account of HI itself, in which the ‘layering’ 
of new concepts and empirical insights stimulated in an increased concern on actor 
preferences and dynamics and a move away from overly structuralist and static approaches 
to depicting institutional change.   
 
2.3 Key working definitions applied in this dissertation 
Drawing overall guidance from the above HI principles, the dissertation examines selected 
cases that provide helpful means to interrogating the emergence and evolution of, as well as 
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trade-offs between, the three roles of the EU in the domain of development policy. A first 
conceptual challenge concerns the absence of a uniform approach in the use of the term 
‘institutions’ (Mantzavinos, 2006, p. 90), despite the term being in use since the year 1725 
(Hodgson, 2006). The lack of uniformity may tempt scholars to formulate lengthy and 
seemingly all-inclusive definitions, which tend to carry empirical statements that may erode 
the explanatory ability of the research (Mantzavinos, 2006: 91). With this in mind, this 
dissertation applies a general definition of institutions as “as systems of established and 
prevalent social rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson, 2006, p. 2), a definition 
that when applied to the EU incorporates laws, policy and organisation structure. As a 
second key research concept, the term ‘role’ is used here in the sense of an assigned 
function or task related to EU development policy that the EU is legally or otherwise formally 
mandated to deliver. Third, and in relation to these roles, the term ‘trade-off originates’ 
from economic theory and refers to the situation of losing one quality or aspect of 
something in return for gaining another quality or aspect. In view of the aims of this 
dissertation, namely to describe and understand to what extent the exercise of one role 
goes at the expense of others that have emerged over time, the following definition of a 
trade-off as applied in evolutionary biology is appropriate: “Any case in which fitness cannot 
be maximized because of competing demands on the organism, which can take the form of 
opposing selection on one trait (i.e., one-trait trade-off) or of selection to increase two or 
more traits that share a limiting resource (i.e., multiple-trait trade-off)” (Agrawal, Conner & 
Rassmann, 2010, p. 245).27 Evolutionary biology considers the concept of trade-off as part of 
broader analysis to understand factors limiting the adaptive potential of organisms (Ibid., p. 
244). Given that the EU’s donor role pre-dates its federator and norm maker roles and is 
better resourced, the five chapters of this dissertation describe the emergence of the roles 
and explore to what extent the relation resembles a multiple-trait trade-off. In the case of 
EU development policy, such traits may extend to availability of human and financial 
resources, or prominence in the political debate.   
The dissertation’s historical orientation requires a strong focus on how EU 
development cooperation evolved over time. The cases selected cover all three EU 
development cooperation roles yet place most emphasis on the EU’s norm making role, in 
line with the changing global development agenda with an increased focus on action 
‘beyond-aid’ (see Janus, Klingebiel & Paulo, 2014). The following three topics as selected are 
all high on the policy and research agenda today and allow for analysing both the evolution 
of and interaction between the EU’s respective development cooperation roles: (1) the 
evolution and functioning of ACP-EU cooperation; (2) migration and development policy; and 
(3) Policy Coherence for Development. These topics each allow for examining two of the 
three EU development policy roles, allowing for the interaction between these roles, and 
each reflect prominent aspects and areas of the EU’s development cooperation. The case 
                                                          
27 N.B. The quote was adapted by the author to phrase tradeoff (as appears in the original) as trade-
off.  
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studies were thus purposefully selected for their potential relevance in relation to the main 
research question. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
The research conducted has followed a qualitative research design. The choice for historical 
institutionalism as an analytical approach means rejecting rationalist approaches in general 
and methodological individualism in particular, since analysing the EU as a social 
phenomenon would never allow to reach an end point where there are no more than 
isolated individuals (Hodgson 2007: 217). HI does not tilt to the opposite of a purely 
reflectivist approach either, but rather stresses the influence of cultural, political and other 
factors that are not rational from an economistic perspective on long-term institutional 
development. The type of analysis associated to HI allows for better understanding key 
moments of past institutional development trajectories which facilitates a more informed 
understanding of actors’ current preferences and behaviour.  
As per its guiding analytical approach, this dissertation follows a constructivist 
approach to learning. Similar to HI’s position in the new institutionalism schools, 
constructivism is often situated at an intermediate position between rationalism and 
reflectivism and seen as helpful to the social sciences that “need to interpret an already 
interpreted world” (Guzzini 2011, p. 149). When applying the meta-theory of constructivism 
to the field of international relations and the topic of this dissertation specifically, then the 
research process described here involves constructing “worlds we know in a world we do 
not” (Onuf in Guzzini, 2000, p. 159). The process of constructing has been referred to by 
Giddens as ‘double hermenetics’, which as discussed below represents the author’s own 
professional background as a think tank researcher: the observer relies on first-hand 
interpretation, but his interpretation may also create feedback effects on the former 
(Guzzini, 2000, p. 162). More specifically on the topic of this dissertation, it has been argued 
that European scholars effectively contribute to the Europe they study. By doing so, they 
contribute to the creation of the European Union they seek to explore (Kaiser in Christiansen 
et al 2001, p. 4).28 As discussed below in relation to the methods used, this definitely applies 
to the author, since the dissertation both reflects on and draws from his work as a think tank 
researcher which by nature seeks to contribute to ongoing policy processes.   
The methodological approach chosen thus will not provide a definite (or objective) 
answer to the research question, yet is both adequate and pertinent to describing and 
analysing the interrelations between the three development cooperation roles that the 
dissertation addresses. Four research methods are applied, with process tracing through 
document analysis used in each chapter complemented by three additional methods as 
appropriate, as shown in table 1. 
                                                          
28 In this context, Grilli (1993, p. xiv) has noted that academic research on EU development 
cooperation has strongly concentrated on ACP-EU cooperation and, as a result, may have 
inadvertently contributed to the lower profile and slower development of EU policies and operations 
towards other parts of the global south.   
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The first method applied concerns process tracing, which is an important element of 
case study research and is defined as “a procedure designed to identify processes linking a 
set of initial conditions to a particular outcome” (Vennesson, 2008, p. 224). An alternative 
definition posits that process tracing can be seen as “an analytical tool for drawing 
descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as 
part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (Dollier, 2011, p. 824). By virtue of 
having to cater for different language and stakeholder groups, EU policy processes tend to 
be well-documented, while political discussions in the Council, Commission and Parliament 
result in publically available negotiated statements. Process tracing provides a means to 
reconstruct key decisions and choices producing certain outcomes and, relevant from a HI 
perspective, allowing for analysing contingency by probing what consequences may have 
resulted from other choices not taken in the process (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 355). 
There are different varieties in process tracing approaches that range from descriptive 
narratives to broad causal explanations, but process tracing can be considered as different 
from a pure narrative in three ways: it is focused in that it only deals with certain aspects of 
the phenomenon, it is structured in that it seeks to develop an analytical explanation guided 
on a theoretical framework, and its ultimate goal is to provide a narrative explanation of a 
causal path leading to a specific outcome (Vennesson, 2008, p. 235). Key document sources 
that have been analysed in the different chapters include official documents, research 
evidence and to a limited extent ‘grey’ literature when these were obtained through expert 
and semi-structured interviews or personal communication.  
Secondly, the research process strongly relied on expert interviews. There is no such 
thing as ‘the expert interview’, but instead this term covers a broad spectrum ranging from 
using experts as a source of information to a resolutely qualitative approach (Bogner, Littig & 
Menz, 2009, p. 6). They can be considered experts in the sense that they enjoy privileged 
access to information and can be (and have been) made responsible for solving problems 
relating to these. Through this combination they can be regarded as ‘performance elites’: 
“providers of socially desired or demanded services, who as a result of these services are 
granted (significant) privileges, options, resources and/or esteem” (Pfadenhauer, 2011, p. 
84).29 The popularity of expert interviews in social science can be linked to a number of 
reasons. First of all, meeting experts in an exploratory phase is more efficient compared to 
other methods of data gathering, including both qualitative and quantitative ones. They are 
particularly useful in cases when information access will be constrained. A second benefit is 
that the researcher may be offered access to the expert’s social capital and by doing so gain 
access to other experts. It may also be assumed that the interviewer and interviewee share a 
common scientific background and relevance system, thus increases the expert’s motivation 
                                                          
29 Littig (2011) observes that in the literature elite and expert interviews are often used 
interchangeably, and discussion on methodological challenges are similar to both, although certain 
differences can be observed.  
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to contribute to the study (Ibid., p. 2).30 In this study, the term expert is defined as an 
‘insider’ to the process of EU development cooperation, practically equated to being located 
in Brussels and thus having (had) direct exposure to its associated policy processes in a way 
that is quite different from visiting officials based in one of the member states or a 
developing country.31 As noted above, EU development policy is typically prepared by 
experts and dossiers that rarely get ‘escalated’ to the level of the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (see Lightfoot & Szent-Iványi, 2011).32 The space for formal political debate 
is in fact limited to two moments in the calendar year when EU ministers responsible for 
development cooperation meet in the Foreign Affairs Council, while informal ministerial 
debates are organised by the rotating EU Presidencies to help inform and prepare some of 
these debates.33   
The EU development policy making process as set out here results in a large role for 
the expert, be these based in DEVCO, in the member states’ permanent representation in 
Brussels, the Parliament’s secretariat, or many of the research and civil society organisations 
that provide advice and inputs through informal and formal channels. The expert interviews 
were conducted firstly to assist the author’s work on process tracing and guide the focus of 
the semi-structured interviews. They therefore had a ‘scoping’ function for the research and 
often involved experienced policy makers who had directly observed key events in EU 
development policy in early decades, such as the Lomé I negotiations or the appointment 
process for appointing the first Secretary General of the ACP Group. Beyond this exploratory 
focus, the expert interviews also contributed to systematisation purposes in terms of getting 
access to relevant information and research evidence (Bogner et al., 2009, p. 7).  This choice 
of method was appropriate in view of the author’s own experience as a think tank 
researcher, which brought both a familiarity with the jargon as well as the more informal 
aspects of the concerned policy processes.  
A third method concerns semi-structured interviews, which are defined as “an 
approach to interviewing by means of a pre-determined set of open questions with the aim 
to prompt discussion and create the opportunity for the interviewer to explore particular 
                                                          
30 As some of the research was conducted in the context of policy-oriented research, it can be 
assumed that experts’ willingness to contribute could be linked to their expectation to contribute to 
ongoing policy discussions through the research outputs.  
31 This also included some interviewees met in developing countries, which however could be 
considered experts by having been based in Brussels in an official capacity for a fixed period of time.  
32 The European Parliament’s Development Committee of course also represents an arena for debate 
on EU development policy, but in view of its limited legislative powers outside its co-legislative roles 
on EU legal instruments for development cooperation its role is largely limited to discussing ongoing 
developments and largely supports the European Commission’s proposals vis-à-vis the member 
states.   
33 In 2002 the Seville Council decided to reduce the number of Council formations from 16 to 9, 
which led to the abolition of the separate Council formation on Development although the Working 
Party on Development (CODEV) continues until today (Simon, 2003; Stochetti, 2013, p. 63). 
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themes or responses further” (Evaluation Toolbox, 2010).34 By defining only some of the 
questions and topics in advance (often in the form of a basic checklist), semi-structured 
interviews allow for a more conversational approach, while keeping overall structure and 
direction (Mikkelsen, 2002, p. 102). The interviews were typically held bilaterally, although 
occasionally the conversation included two respondents simultaneously – e.g. because an 
ACP ambassador brought along a direct colleague, or when interviewing in the European 
Parliament when topics cut across various the dossiers and responsibilities of different 
officials. The limitations that this type of interviewing poses include that there could be bias 
caused by selection of interviewees, which is aggravated by the conversational approach: 
those with a more critical view on the subject matter and (elements of) an agenda towards it 
may engage more openly and actively with the interviewer (Mikkelsen, 2002, p. 105).   
As is common with expert and semi-structured interviews, ‘snowball sampling’ was 
often relied on as interviewees made suggestions for those persons who could detail or 
provide additional perspectives on key issues discussed. The bulk of the interviews were 
conducted at the interviewees’ workplace as opposed to at a ‘neutral’ location, and 
telephone interviews were only used when it was not possible to meet in person, which was 
rarely the case. No recordings were made for both types, and instead written notes were 
taken during the interviews. These notes were often expanded upon later during the day 
that the interview was conducted. Although this meant that no quotes could be presented in 
the results, the familiarity of the author with both the subject matter and the jargon used 
meant that notes were adequately complete and accurate for the purpose of capturing key 
points made by the interviewees. A reasonably large number of interviews helped to 
compensate for any biases inherent to the more distant or otherwise sensitive topics, as 
interviewees may tend to over- or underemphasise their role depending on their own 
perceptions of achievement or failure. The number of interviews conducted for each chapter 
is presented in table 2. In either case this meant that interviews alone were not an adequate 
basis for analysis but that any information gathered had to be contrasted with information 
obtained through observation and process tracing.  
A fourth and final method concerns participatory observation. As noted above, the 
analysis in this dissertation strongly draws on the author’s participation in EU development 
policy events and policy processes, based on his work in two development policy think tanks: 
the European Centre for Development Policy Management (2005-2012) and the Deutsche 
Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (2013 – date). Observations made in this context were an 
aspect of the analysis of all chapters apart from the third chapter on migration and 
development. This work entails frequent informal interaction with policy makers in the 
institutions as well as in several member states, exchanges with European Parliament 
officials, as well as engagement through longer-term research and consultancy projects. The 
latter includes several independent evaluations for the European Commission, as well as 
                                                          
34 Definition adapted from: 
http://evaluationtoolbox.net.au/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=31&Itemid=137 
(visited 12 November 2015) 
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participation in the team of two editions of the European Report on Development. In 
addition to these engagements, which allowed the author reasonably close access to the 
‘internal kitchen’, the author also attended and contributed to public events or smaller 
expert-group meetings based in Brussels. While never having had a formal responsibility for 
either designing or implementing EU policies, the author’s involvement in influencing policy 
through independent research, evaluation as well as more informal exchanges means that a 
strict ‘etic perspective’ in terms of being an outside observer of EU policy processes was not 
possible. The close exposure to EU policy processes meant that the author would also bring 
an emic perspective in terms of a more interpretative approach that for instance also seeks 
to understand the influence of the ‘esprit de corps’ of the European Commission to enable 
understanding of choices and priorities (See Dimier, 2006).35   
Each of these four methods carries inherent strengths and weaknesses, while these 
can be partly compensated for by using them together. For instance, while process tracing 
will allow the dissertation to provide a detailed and structured analysis of the emergence 
and evolution of EU development policy over time, the interviews and observations allowed 
the research to complement and complete the analysis with a more detailed understanding 
of those aspects of institutional development that were not (adequately) captured in writing.  
Further details and reflections on the methodology used are presented in the different 
chapters of this dissertation.  
 
Table 2: research methods used for the chapters 
 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
Process tracing (All chapters) 
Expert 
interviews 
 X (n = 10) x  x 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
X (n = 125)36     
Participatory 
observation 
X X x X X 
 
Source: Author; X indicates a key method, x an additional source of evidence 
 
 
4. Structure of this dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation consists of five empirical chapters, followed by a 
concluding chapter analysing their findings in relation to the overarching research objective 
                                                          
35 See Morris et al (1999) for a more detailed discussion of the etic and emic perspectives as originally 
posited by Kenneth Pike in the 1950s.  
36 For this chapter a large number of interviews were conducted by a larger team of researchers. The 
author coordinated the project and conducted interviews in two of the countries covered together 
with another team member.   
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and theoretic al concepts set out in this introductory chapter. The order of the empirical 
chapters follows the three topics identified in chapter 3, which each allow to analyse the 
interplay between two of the EU’s development policy roles. Figure 1 presents an overview 
of this structure. 
 
Figure 1: EU development policy roles and research topics 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
Part 1 focuses on ACP-EU cooperation and consists of two chapters that address both the 
EU’s normative and donor roles. Chapter 1 starts off by complementing existing research 
focusing on Brussels-based stakeholders with an analysis of perceptions on and awareness of 
ACP–EU cooperation of and ACP institutions. Chapter 2 presents an analysis of the 
emergence, evolution and functioning of the ACP institutions to problematise the Group’s 
stated future ambitions.  
 Part 2 continues with a focus on migration and development policy that is dealt with 
in chapter 3. The research for this chapter compares selected European countries and the 
European Commission on their policies and practice in the area of migration and 
development. The research was carried out prior to the EU’s November 2015 Valetta 
Summit and launch of its Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, yet the findings on to what extent 
overall policies on migration and development are reflected in the policies and actions of the 
states and the EU remains relevant to the current debate. 
Finally, part 3 consists of two chapters focusing on Policy Coherence for Development 
(PCD), which similar to part 2 look into both the EU’s normative and federative norms.  
Chapter four describes the policies and initiatives at the EU level to advance PCD in relation 
to dynamics between member states and wider New Public Management and Result-Based 
Management that have influenced EU governance since the turn of the millennium. The final 
and fifth chapter looks into the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
as adopted in September 2015. This new global development agenda starts from the 
premise that global development depends equally on domestic policy action as on 
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international cooperation. The EU strongly pushed for such a ‘universal’ agenda and 
emphasised the need to review the alignment of existing policies to the new agenda, with 
the chapter analysing the efforts the EU has made in this regard. 
Following these three parts, a final concluding chapter uses the theoretical concepts 
introduced in the introduction to relate the findings as presented in the five chapters. It 
subsequently presents conclusions in relation to the overarching research question and 
presents ideas to inform policy discussions and further research.  
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1. Outsourcing a partnership? Assessing ACP-EU cooperation under the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
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1. Outsourcing a partnership? Assessing ACP-EU cooperation under the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement 
 
Abstract  
Since 2000 the cooperation between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific states has been governed through the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This article 
complements existing research that focuses on Brussels-based stakeholders with an analysis 
drawing on the existing literature and on stakeholders’ perceptions of ACP-EU cooperation 
and ACP institutions gathered via interviews in nine ACP countries. The findings presented 
observe a social disconnect between, on the one hand, the CPA’s institutions and Brussels-
based representatives, and, on the other hand, the broad-based and multi-stakeholder 
partnership they are tasked to promote. The article points to low levels of support in ACP 
countries, particularly in Africa, to continued ACP-EU cooperation in its present form, and 
stresses the need for an open and participatory process of reviewing and reshaping ACP-EU 
relations. 
 
 
Introduction 
In 2000, representatives of the European Union (EU) and the countries of Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) convened in Benin to sign the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement (CPA). The CPA governs cooperation between these regions for the period 2000-
2020 and is a comprehensive and legally binding agreement that unites well over half the 
world’s nation states. The CPA seeks to further poverty reduction alongside sustainable 
development and the integration of ACP countries into the world economy, and was 
designed to work through three complementary dimensions: political dialogue, economic 
and trade cooperation, and development cooperation. This unique configuration makes it 
today’s most comprehensive North–South partnership, especially as it involves both state 
and non-state actors (NSAs)37 and recognises these as formal actors in the partnership 
(Laporte, 2012). 
The changing global context, as well as institutional, political and socioeconomic 
developments in both the EU and the ACP, call into question whether this approach to 
cooperation will sufficiently deliver on its objectives, and require new perspectives on 
options for cooperation – if to be further pursued – after the CPA’s expiration in 2020. 
Although there are no official positions on the future of ACP–EU relations and the 
CPA after 2020, stakeholders are now entering a crucial stage of internal debate in 
preparation for discussions. During the ACP Heads of States Summit in Equatorial Guinea in 
December 2012, the ACP members adopted the Sipopo Declaration, which expressed their 
determination to ‘stay united as a Group’ and to “enhanc[e] the ACP–EU relationship as a 
                                                          
37 According to Article 6 of the CPA, non-state actors include (1) the civil society as per national 
characteristics, (2) economic and social partners, including trade unions and (3) the private sector. 
The private sector is only considered a NSA with regard to its non-profit activities, such as chambers 
of commerce, or private sector associations. 
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unique North–South development cooperation model, while developing South–South and 
other partnerships” (ACP, 2012a). Despite this stated desire, the group has made only 
tentative progress in formalising relations with other global players.  
The EU and its member states have not advanced much in formulating positions on the 
future of ACP-EU cooperation and of the ACP Group38, with no proposals for such positions 
expected to be adopted until the start of the new term of office for College of 
Commissioners’, in January 2015. In contrast, the ACP Group has been more proactive, 
initiating via the Sipopo Declaration the creation of an ACP Eminent Persons Group 
consisting of representatives from all six ACP regions, to reflect on its future. The Eminent 
Persons Group has so far convened four meetings in different ACP regions, to complement 
and inform discussions by EU and Brussels-based ACP actors that directly manage and shape 
the cooperation (see e.g, Van Reisen, 2011; Mackie, Byiers, Niznik & Laporte, 2011; Carbone, 
2013a).   
However, besides the findings of these relatively ‘Brussels-centric’ studies, relatively little 
is known about local, national and regional views in ACP countries about cooperation with 
Europe. To ameliorate this knowledge gap, this article, after an analysis of the structures and 
processes of ACP-EU cooperation and the implementation of the CPA, presents the views 
and perceptions on the future of ACP-EU Cooperation and the Group based on semi-
structured interviews carried out in ACP countries. Its objective is to contribute to an 
informed reflection on the future of ACP-EU cooperation and the ACP Group after 2020.  
Nine countries in Africa and the Caribbean were identified as representing a relevant mix 
of Low- and Middle-Income Countries, including influential members of different Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs). In Africa these were Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Tanzania and Zambia; in the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname and Guyana were 
visited.39  Four out of these nine countries accommodate REC secretariats,40 whereas 
Ethiopia was included to allow for interviews with officials in the African Union Commission 
(AUC) and representatives of its member states. Additionally, a number of interlocutors from 
the Pacific region were consulted.41 
Interviews were conducted with a total of 125 stakeholders from government, non-
governmental organisations, academia, the private sector, regional and international 
organisations and, finally EU and member state officials. The nine countries should not be 
                                                          
38 The latest position expressed formally towards the ACP was by means of a speech by Development 
Commissioner Piebalgs during the 2012, which did not go much into detail. See European 
Commission (2012)  
39 The field work in Suriname coincided with the Joint Parliamentary Assembly which allowed for 
interviews with stakeholders from the Pacific, some of whom were also interviewed in Brussels. 
40 Tanzania was included too, but the short period available for the visit only allowed for interviews in 
Dar es Salaam while the East African Community offices in Arusha could not be visited. In addition to 
the six countries, some additional interviews were conducted at the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja, 
Nigeria, in the context of a visit that was part of another research project. 
41 These interviewees included a Brussels-based Ambassador, an EU official based in the Pacific and 
members of parliament from Pacific states who were consulted during the JPA in Suriname from 26-
29 November 2012. Choices had to be made within the time and resources available for the study, 
which is why the field visits conducted for the study were limited to Africa and the Caribbean.  
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regarded as a representative sample of all 54 African states, nor should their views and 
perceptions regarding the future of ACP-EU cooperation be assumed to be supported by all, 
or by the AU.  In that the results present a detailed ‘snapshot’ of the partnership, revealing a 
rich and diverse spectrum from selected countries and regional organisations that are 
expected to wield considerable influence on future discussions, this paper nonetheless 
presents a useful addition to the scholarly and policy debates. 
The interview findings presented and discussed show a sizeable ‘social disconnect’ 
between, on the one hand, the structures and inner circles involved with the CPA’s 
functioning and, on the other hand, key stakeholders in ACP countries. Similar to the 
behaviour of EU member states, the ACP countries have effectively outsourced their 
partnership to their Brussels-based representatives and are more concerned with specific 
aspects of the partnership than with the overall objectives and cooperation framework that 
this partnership seeks to promote. This lack of a comprehensive and broad-based 
engagement puts into question the need for an overarching contractual framework, which 
may in the end prove to be less than the sum of its parts.  
The article is structured as follows:  after a presentation of the historical context of 
the partnership, discussion focuses on the main changes incorporated into the CPA since its 
adoption.  A review of the literature and assessment of Brussels-based perceptions ensues, 
after which the findings of the field research are presented and analysed before the paper 
concludes. 
 
 
ACP-EU cooperation: From ‘overseas countries and territories’ to a partnership of nations 
The Treaty of Rome, which was to serve as the legal framework for the European integration 
process from 1958 to 1975, was negotiated at the time cooperation between the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and its Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) was beginning. 
In 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed development cooperation with 
Africa as a cornerstone for European external relations: ‘With increased resources Europe 
will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the 
development of the African continent.’ (Schuman 1950) Despite initial resistance from 
Germany and the Netherlands, France managed to have the OCTs included in the Rome 
Treaty, in which ‘[M]ember countries expressed their commitment to the prosperity of their 
colonies and territories.’ (Evrensel, 2007)  The states also agreed to share commercial access 
to overseas territories that previously had been the domain of the respective colonial 
powers. This led to the creation of the first European Development Fund (EDF) (Frisch, 
2008). 
In the decades that followed, the EDF grew substantially while retaining its inter-
governmental character and governance structure, and until today remains the largest 
budgetary component of EU development cooperation. The EDF is funded by EU Member 
States (MS), based on a specific contribution key which differs from that used for the EU’s 
Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF). It has its own financial rules and management 
committee and finances cooperation at the national level, regionally through the RECs, as 
514530-L-bw-Keijzer
Processed on: 11-10-2017 PDF page: 47
47 
 
well as between regions, also referred to as ‘intra-ACP’. Because of the EDF’s history and 
unique legal status, the European Parliament (EP) has no co-decision power over it. During 
past negotiations of the MFF, the Commission has repeatedly proposed to incorporate the 
EDF into the Union’s budget (i.e. ‘budgetisation’ of the EDF). Arguments advanced include 
the reduction of transaction costs and harmonisation of EU financial procedures, but most 
prominently the strengthening of the democratic legitimacy of ACP-EU cooperation. While 
efficiency gains of budgetisation are far from guaranteed, applying existing EU financial 
regulations and budgetary procedures to the EDF would make it difficult to preserve the 
Fund’s joint-management system (discussed below) and by extension the unique nature of 
the partnership (Mackie, Frederiksen, & Rossini, 2004). Budgetisation has so far not been 
introduced as it requires a unanimous decision by EU member states. The Commission 
refrained from proposing it in 2012, which some interpreted as a strategy to avoid budget 
cuts. The discussion will likely resume in 2018 when negotiations for a new cooperation 
agreement to replace to CPA in 2020 commence. Table 3 presents an overview of the 
various EDF rounds, as well as the evolution of the ACP and EU memberships and their 
cooperation agreements.  
 
Table 3: Evolution of the ACP–EU Relationship Regulatory Framework   
Year Event No. of countries EDF funds 
(including OCTs) 
in € millions42  
ACP Europe 
1957 Association Regime   EDF 1: 569 
1963 Yaoundé I Convention 18 6 EDF 2: 730 
1969 Yaoundé II Convention 18 6 EDF 3: 887 
1975 Lomé I Convention 46 9 EDF 4: 3,053 
1980 Lomé II Convention 58 9 EDF 5: 4,207 
1985 Lomé III Convention 65 10 EDF 6: 7,883 
1990 Lomé IV Convention 68 12 EDF 7: 11,583 
1995 Lomé IV bis Convention  70 15 EDF 8: 13,151 
2000 Cotonou Agreement 77 15 EDF 9: 13,500 
2005 Cotonou Agreement Revision I 78 25 EDF 10: 22,685 
2010 Cotonou Agreement Revision II 79 27 EDF 11: 31,500 
Source: own elaboration based on David, D., ‘40 years of Europe – ACP relations’, in: 
Directorate General for Development, European Commission: The ACP-EU Courier special 
issue: ACP-EU partnership agreement signed in Cotonou, Brussels: EC, 2000; and 
information from the EU’s legislation summary website: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/african_caribbean_pacific_states/r1
2102_en.htm 
 
The political landscape of the early 1960s – when many Sub-Saharan African states gained 
their independence – set the stage for the two Yaoundé Conventions through which the 
                                                          
42 The amounts stated here for the Association Regime up till and including EDF 8 are in Euro 
equivalents. The Euro was introduced in 1999 and replaced the European Currency Account, which in 
turn replaced the European Unit of Account in 1979. 
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countries sought to consolidate their position vis-à-vis cooperation with the European 
Community. The United Kingdom’s accession to the EEC in 1973 paved the way for 
incorporating newly independent Commonwealth members that considered themselves 
developing countries into the cooperation framework. In 1975 the Georgetown Agreement 
created the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), which became these 
countries’ main vehicle for shaping relations with Europe (ACP 1975). Rather than the new 
members signing up to the existing Yaoundé agreement, they initiated negotiations of a new 
ACP-EU convention that was adopted in Lomé in 1975 (Frisch, 2008, pp. 12-13).  
Two decades later, the 1995 mid-term review of Lomé IV introduced the first legally 
binding human rights clause into the cooperation acquis43, thus substantially upgrading ACP–
EU political dialogue. The rapidly transforming international landscape following the Cold 
War, major advances in world trade regulations and the growing relevance of conflict and 
humanitarian crises made it necessary to revitalise the agreement (David, 2000, pp. 11-14). 
The European Commission initiated this process by means of a detailed green paper that put 
forward several proposals to reform and refocus ACP-EU cooperation, which provided the 
starting point for the negotiations on the next stage of the partnership (Raffer, 1998).  
The adoption of the CPA was a watershed moment in ACP-EU relations; this 
agreement strengthened the innovative and unique nature of the partnership while also 
promoting measures to make it more consistent with other international and EU policies and 
frameworks, particularly in the area of trade. The CPA is unusual in that it is legally binding, 
and provides for a range of joint institutions, from a joint parliamentary assembly and joint 
council of ministers to specialised institutions promoting research and cooperation in the 
field of agriculture and business. These joint institutions and legally binding provisions were 
designed to reinvigorate and strengthen relations under the three key pillars of political 
dialogue, trade and development cooperation.   
The EU anticipated that the unilateral trade preferences provided under the Lomé 
conventions would be challenged by other nations in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
and moreover were no longer consistent with the EU’s own preference and strategy to 
replace non-reciprocal trade preferences by reciprocal preferential trade agreements. As 
expressed in the Commission’s green paper on the future of ACP-EU cooperation of 1996, EU 
policy was moving toward the negotiation of regional free trade agreements that could be 
merged into larger Free Trade Areas (Lecomte, 1998, p. 7). The CPA thus prepared the 
ground for negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), commencing in 2002, 
in preparation for the December 2007 expiration of the WTO waiver for unilateral trade 
preferences. The result was a patchwork of (interim) Economic Partnership Agreements 
initialed between the EU and members of the ACP (regions and individual ACP countries) 
that in the case of interim agreements gave countries access to a temporary market access 
                                                          
43 The term ‘acquis’ comes from the French language and in the context of EU policy discussions is 
understood to refer to "all that which has been agreed upon." While originating from the EU, the 
term has also found its way into organisations such as the World Trade Organisation and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
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agreement44, while countries that had not concluded or initialed these agreements were 
granted preferences under the EU’s General System of Preferences and its ‘Everything But 
Arms’ (EBA) scheme.45  Although the CPA is still seen as determining the overall focus and 
objectives that the EPAs are to promote, the CPA’s trade pillar is considered to have expired 
as of January 2008 (South Centre, 2009, p. 2). 
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement includes provisions for review and revision 
every five years. So far, two revisions have been conducted. The first revision, in 2005, 
introduced amendments that emphasised the need for an effective and results-orientated 
dialogue in relation to existing provisions on good governance, human rights, democratic 
principles and the rule of law. The review also resulted in changes in the text of the CPA 
regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the inclusion of the 
Statute of Rome – establishing the International Criminal Court – as well as the imperative to 
fight terrorism. The 2010 revision in turn emphasised issues such as climate change, food 
security, regional integration, state fragility, and aid effectiveness (European Commission 
2010). The second revision also accorded greater significance to the regional integration 
process – including at the continental level, by acknowledging the African Union’s role – and 
focused on more political aspects. The EU and ACP however ‘agreed to disagree’ about 
revising the article on migration, in particular in relation to the readmission of migrants to 
ACP states (Gomes, 2013; Pape, 2013). 
While engaging in the first and second revision, the EU increasingly sought to move 
away from the CPA and its cooperation framework by means of adopting unilateral 
strategies towards Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific as separate regions. In the case of 
Africa this was followed rather swiftly by the adoption of a Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) at 
the level of heads of state during the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007.  Despite the 
ambition of the JAES to promote partnership on an equal footing, the content of the JAES is 
replete with references to a more traditional donor-recipient relationship, with Europe being 
expected to provide the bulk of the resources to finance the strategy’s realisation. In reality 
little ‘new and additional’ funding was provided.  This resulted in perceptions of an 
implementation deficit and disappointment on both sides (Helly, 2012; Bossuyt & Sherriff, 
2010).The EU’s Development Cooperation Instrument for the period 2014-2020 now 
includes a ‘Pan-African instrument’ which, although not explicitly linked to the 
implementation of the JAES, is intended to “support activities of trans-regional, continental 
and global nature in Africa and also specific initiatives for which no alternative source of 
funding can be mobilised” (EU, 2011). This instrument thus could partially substitute for the 
                                                          
44 As of 1 January 2008 the provisions of the Market Access Regulation (MAR - Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1528/2007 of 20 December 2007) entered into force as a temporary unilateral scheme 
before the conclusion and application of the revised Economic Partnership Agreements. As per a 
deadline set by the EU, ACP countries and regions that have not signed EPAs by 1st October 2014 will 
enter into the GSP scheme.    
45 The EBA scheme is part of the EU’s General System of Preferences and grants duty-free quota-free 
access to all products from LDCs, except for arms and ammunitions. More information can be found 
at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-
preferences/   
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CPA’s focus on inter-regional cooperation in the ACP, but evidently provides no remedy for 
the competition for remit between the ACP, the RECs and the AU in relation to key areas of 
cooperation which particularly in the case of the RECs have expanded over time.  
  
 
ACP-EU cooperation: academic debate on its recent past and near future  
The ACP-EU partnership is no stranger in the international relations literature, with 
particular attention paid to its trade pillar (see Busse, 2010; Slocum-Bradley & Bradley, 2010; 
Storey, 2006) as well as its approach to political dialogue and sanctions (see Del Biondo, 
2011;Laakso, 2007; Broberg, 2010; Zimelis, 2011). Other works present a ‘helicopter view’ 
and historical analysis of the partnership and its key evolutions over time as a means to 
contextualising regional or theme-specific analysis (see Bartelt, 2012; Mackie, 2008).  
In a recent review of the scholarly literature, Carbone observes a prevailing view that 
the CPA represented a fundamental break from the past of ACP-EU cooperation, albeit one 
that “largely reflected the EU’s preferences” (Carbone, 2013a, p. 745).  Scholars differ 
however in the overall motivations driving this ‘break’, suggesting a more pragmatic and 
realist approach to cooperation, an attempt of the EU to reassert itself at the global level,  or 
a drive to make the EU’s development partnerships more consistent with its overall vision 
based on liberalism and democratisation.46 Other scholars instead do not detect such a 
fundamental change, and see the CPA as a compromise between the different foreign policy 
interests of the EU member states, and a partnership arrangement that shows more 
continuity than change compared to the earlier strategies governing ACP-EU cooperation. 
Due to this strategic incrementalism, some authors detect a certain degree of ‘cognitive 
dissonance’ in the CPA, which while being branded as a legally-binding partnership 
agreement allows the EU to unilaterally change country aid allocations, a feature more 
typical of a principal-agent relationship (Carbone, 2013a). 
 Complementary to the scholarly debates, independent think tanks have sought to 
feed into the ongoing political debates with a strong focus on Brussels-based processes and 
stakeholders. As far as EU officials’ perceptions are concerned, the policy research confirms 
that although the three pillars of the CPA addressing political dialogue, development 
cooperation and trade are generally considered to have served their purpose well, there are 
clear signs that significant changes within the ACP Group, the EU and the wider international 
landscape require a different articulation of the relationship. A tacit understanding among 
Europeans is that the ball is in the ACP’s corner in terms of defining and determining their 
own future as a group and its relationship vis-à-vis the EU. At the same time, the research 
shows to a reduced involvement in the partnership on the part of the European Member 
States, and argues that the EU needs to set out its own aspirations and priorities to shape 
the cooperation (Laporte, 2012; Nickel, 2012; Mackie et al., 2011).   
 
                                                          
46 Examples identified by Carbone as representing these motives of pragmatism, global reassertion or 
normative approaches are, respectively, Farrell (2005); Arts & Dickson (2004); Elgström (2000). 
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ACP country reflections on the ACP Group and its cooperation with Europe47 
The interviews conducted in ACP countries show a wide spectrum of levels of knowledge 
about the ACP Group and its cooperation with Europe. Some stakeholders were deeply 
involved in relevant matters, very familiar with the twists and turns of Cotonou and ACP–EU 
relations. Others were poorly acquainted with the group’s basic structures and functioning, 
which says a good deal about the group’s role in ACP countries, particularly in international 
relations. The level of acquaintance with ACP–EU relations and structures varied strongly not 
only within but also between countries. The country visits revealed a generally scant interest 
in the future of the ACP Group after 2020. Most stakeholders had in fact become aware of 
the ACP group through specific policy processes and instruments, such as the EPA 
negotiations or specific development projects, all of which could be carried out without the 
CPA as an overarching cooperation framework.  
Several ACP actors active at the start of ACP–EU cooperation recall the atmosphere 
of Lomé I in 1975 as almost euphoric. Most of the group's countries had just gained 
independence and their European counterparts were genuinely interested in maintaining 
and strengthening links with them. At that time, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
seemed to be logical partners given that they had gone through similar historical processes, 
faced similar levels of development and also had some common key commercial interests, 
such as the sugar trade. These common, tangible, predominantly trade-related interests first 
motivated the ACP to cooperate as a group with Europe. Subsequently, cooperation with the 
EU was gradually eclipsed by the European Development Fund, which interacted with each 
region on its own and, as the programmes grew progressively larger, became increasingly 
demanding to manage.  
Among the actors consulted, the ACP Group was often perceived as a rather closed 
community of ambassadors and heads of state. Many stakeholders, particularly from outside 
government circles, describe a large ‘social disconnect’ between the ACP Group's discourse 
and the perception thereof at regional and national level, with the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement and the group remaining a sort of alien entity to most of its citizens. There is, 
moreover, a perception that the ACP Group has never been able to set and pursue its own 
priorities, adopting a mostly reactive attitude toward the EU’s proposals, be it on the overall 
priorities of the framework or the cooperation budgets and implementation approaches.  
With 79 members, the ACP Group is sizable and thus has the potential to play a 
significant role in international fora, but most stakeholders consider that this potential 
remains largely untapped. The G77 speak on behalf of the world’s developing countries 
while the ACP Group remains an EU-dependent entity that is scarcely heard outside of 
Brussels. The group is said to be practically invisible at the national level, while the CPA is 
familiar to only the few (mostly governmental) individuals who are more directly exposed to 
                                                          
47 Unless indicated otherwise, the analysis presented in this section is solely based on a comparative 
analysis of the interviews conducted in the nine countries visited. The interviews were conducted on 
the condition that the analysis would not make any direct relation between the findings and the 
countries and/or stakeholder group interviewed.  
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ACP-EU cooperation. The cooperation with Europe is thus driven not by the key stakeholders 
recognised in the CPA, but instead by those to whom the ACP countries have largely 
‘outsourced’ their partnership with Europe: their Brussels-based diplomatic representatives. 
Admittedly, group size inevitably presents trade-offs for group cohesion, but the prevailing 
view in ACP countries points to the group’s cultural, political and economic heterogeneity as 
a weakening factor, with ‘too heterogeneous’ and ‘too diverse’ capturing the essence of this 
perception. Inevitably, the question of what ACP countries share today in terms of heritage 
and strategic interests has inexorably become more difficult to answer as time passes.  
A key issue concerning the composition of the group is the fact that it divides sub-
Saharan Africa from North Africa. A frequent vision among African stakeholders is that the 
group poses a threat to the continent’s growing pan-African ambitions and discourse. 
Indeed, many on the continent consider that it is far more attractive and logical to cooperate 
with Europe and Egypt or Tunisia than with far-away small islands like Vanuatu or Saint Kitts 
and Nevis. This view, however, is highly contested by many stakeholders in Southern Africa, 
who feel quite sceptical of a Pan-African approach to cooperation with Europe due to what 
is perceived as strong differences between subregions within Africa, especially the existing 
big divide across the Sahara.  
The rise of new supranational actors – particularly in Africa – poses another 
existential threat to the ACP Group. With the RECs now leading on trade issues in Africa, and 
the AU slowly establishing itself as a key interlocutor on peace and security and for political 
Europe-Africa relations, the ACP Group is confronted with new actors on its turf. 
Stakeholders acknowledge that the AU and the ACP have overlapping mandates, which is 
likely to be a contributing factor for the AU not to view the ACP as a key partner. Pan-
Africanists tend to call for a redefinition and improved articulation of Africa’s ‘shared values’ 
and interests. In this respect, the discourse on African integration – particularly on 
strengthening the AU – is often ambiguous, especially since North Africans are perceived as 
clearly focusing more on the Mediterranean Rim than on the rest of the continent. At the 
level of the RECs, regional economic integration through single markets or currencies is also 
being questioned, not only because of overlapping agendas but also because the difficulties 
faced by the European integration process and highlighted by the financial crisis of the late 
2000’s has cast some doubts on its benefits and made evident some of its shortcomings.  
Some REC representatives are more upbeat about working with the ACP Group, 
which they still consider relevant. Indeed, one of them called for creation of a more formal 
relationship between RECs and the ACP Group. This could even include official 
representation of the RECs in the ACP Group’s governance structures, but is difficult to 
pursue in practice given the expiration of the CPA trade pillar in January 2008, as previously 
noted, and the fact that most REC competencies are found in this sphere. Contrastingly, 
other REC representatives are more critical and do not consider the ACP structures a key 
domain for cooperation, noting the steady decline in the level of participation of REC staff at 
ACP meetings in Brussels.  
The views surveyed from the Caribbean and Pacific regions on the importance of the 
ACP largely coincide with each other. Members of the Forum of the Caribbean Group of ACP 
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States (CARIFORUM) members generally feel more comfortable within the ACP than within 
Latin America, where they fear being overrun by economic powerhouses like Brazil and 
Chile. This appears to explain why many Caribbean states disapproved of the EU’s push in 
2009 to explore possibilities for an EU–Latin America strategy that would include the 
Caribbean states. Additionally, in terms of levels of development and cultural heritage, the 
Caribbean representatives surveyed felt closer overall to other ACP members than to their 
Latin American neighbours. Indeed, Caribbean stakeholders perceive common interests in 
the ACP as regards the EU, and see few natural or traditional allies in Latin America. At the 
WTO, for example, more support for small and vulnerable countries is deemed to have come 
from the ACP Group than from Latin America. 
Most Caribbean interlocutors continue to value the ACP Group, which helps them to 
join forces with other – mainly Pacific – states that face similar challenges such as climate 
change, overfishing, drug trafficking and criminality. The ACP Group provides them with the 
global partners needed to address such issues48 Furthermore, Caribbean stakeholders see 
themselves as potential intermediaries between Africa and powerhouses in the Americas, 
both South and North. Similarly, Pacific stakeholders feel that the ACP format allows their 
voices to be heard, and prevents them being ‘swallowed’ by regional powers such as China, 
South Korea, Australia and Japan.  
Concerning the role of the ACP vis-à-vis the EU, past ACP meetings are criticised for 
having mostly behaved in a reactive manner to EU proposals instead of taking a more 
proactive, concrete and technical focus. The group’s secretariat is criticised for having 
changed from serving the group to being active in areas that are considered too ambitious or 
beyond the secretariat’s mandate (e.g. managing development projects). Others noted that 
the ACP states have allowed the group to become dependent on EU financial support, given 
that its operating costs are partly funded through the EDF while ACP states pay relatively 
modest contributions,  partially based on the UN’s ‘capacity to pay’ formula (ACP, 2012b). 
Many ACP states moreover have developed considerable arrears in providing their 
contributions, with only 60% having provided contributions for 2013 as of December 2013 
(ACP, 2013). Respondents argued that this has further reinforced the asymmetry of the ACP–
EU partnership and the inability of the ACP Group to operate outside the ACP-EU 
cooperation framework.  
Some respondents suggest giving the secretariat a greater mandate to inform and 
raise issues at the political level, rather than to merely support them administratively. It is 
considered important to search for alternative funding – internal, external or a combination 
of both. Interviewees who are not enthusiastic about the secretariat’s mandate do not 
favour expanding it and generally criticise the secretariat’s contribution to ACP–EU relations; 
the reverse is true for respondents who value its mandate. One respondent faults the 
location of the secretariat, in Brussels instead of an ACP country.    
                                                          
48 In 2012 both the Caribbean and Pacific renewed their separate cooperation strategies with the EU, 
which feature similar priorities.   
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ACP country respondents have a wide range of views about the ACP–EU Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly (JPA): many regard it as a useful forum for stimulating discussions 
between European MPs and members of parliament from the ACP countries. Some call for 
reducing the frequency of JPA meetings, currently held twice a year. The difficulty of 
assessing an entity’s impact on democratic practice or culture at the national level is 
exacerbated by the fact that most ACP MPs who attend the JPA belong to their country’s 
ruling party (each ACP country sends only one representative). Many ACP countries send 
their EU ambassadors so that many ACP members of the JPA represent their governments, 
not their parliaments.  
The ACP country interviewees also touched on the present and future relevance of 
Cotonou’s joint institutions. Few were familiar with the Technical Centre for Agricultural and 
Rural Cooperation (CTA) and the Centre for the Development of Enterprise (CDE). The 
former was appreciated for its role as a knowledge broker in the agricultural sector, 
although dissatisfaction was voiced about its low impact on pertinent ACP–EU policy 
discussions. Many regarded the CDE as a body without vision or good organisation, further 
hampered by budgetary and human resource constraints. Given this low level of support, the 
ACP Council of Ministers decided on 18 June 2014 to close down the CDE and replace it with 
a light structure to respond to the needs of the ACP private sector (ACP, 2014). 
 
 
ACP countries’ reflections on the partnership's three pillars 
Stakeholders in the nine countries generally regard the CPA as too ambitious due to covering 
such a broad field of activities as reflected in its original three pillars, which some consider 
illustrative of the inability of both the ACP and EU to agree on and effectively promote a 
focused set of goals and objectives. The following will present specific reflections in relation 
to cooperation within the context of the original three pillars of cooperation, which provide 
helpful pointers to developments within the ACP and ACP country perceptions on the future 
of their group and its cooperation framework with the EU.  
 
Political Dialogue 
Government representatives, civil society actors and stakeholders from other affiliations 
indicate little awareness of the basics of the provisions for EU–ACP political dialogue in the 
CPA (Articles 8, 96). Article 96 can be invoked once 'essential elements’ for cooperation 
spelled out in the CPA have been breached (i.e. human rights, democratic principles and the 
rule of law), and should only be used once the regular political dialogue that is conducted 
under Article 8 is considered exhausted (Mackie & Zinke, 2005). Because the EU alone tends 
to take initiative regarding the use of Article 8, and due to Article 96’s reputation as the 
‘sanction article’, the EU is judged as being more interested in influencing ACP countries’ 
governance than in conducting a genuine political dialogue. These views resonate with 
existing research evidence that points to a lack of connection between the dialogue under 
Article 8 – which ACP countries often regard as one-directional – and Article 96 that so far 
has mainly been used by the EU to put cooperation within the scope of the CPA on hold, 
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most often in direct response to a coup d’état. The use of the article has moreover only in a 
few cases been constructive in the sense that it provided a means to restore and improve 
relations with the ACP country concerned, whereas in other cases it merely confirmed a 
‘stalemate’ situation (Laakso, 2007).  
While EU donors and foreign diplomats seem highly sceptical of the impact of 
political dialogue, many ACP national actors – who agree on the universality of the values 
and principles defended by the EU – see a tangible, albeit limited, impact. ACP national 
government officials point out that EU interpellations on governance and human rights 
issues manage to ‘slip in’ and help make a difference in the medium term. But it is generally 
agreed that this occurs within a wider political context that may prompt regressive 
measures, such as in a number of ACP countries where restrictive legislation is crippling 
NGOs and sometimes even forcing them to close.49  
One key aspect of the CPA in relation to political dialogue is that it acknowledges 
non-state actors (NSAs) as essential players in the partnership. However, regarding civil 
society’s inclusion in political dialogue – especially for defining development strategies and 
EU support – many NSAs express disappointment about how consultations are conducted. 
These interactions, in their view, have in reality been one-directional information events 
despite the fact that under the CPA, consultation with the civil society is supposed to be 
considered key for fostering participation and ownership of strategies to enhance 
development, governance and human rights. Despite this experience of exclusion from 
political dialogue, NSA interviewees do appreciate the CPA and insist that were it not for 
Cotonou’s legally binding character, their very existence would have been threatened. 
Although understandable given the intergovernmental nature of the CPA, it is 
regrettable that the broad and inclusive nature of the CPA and its partners (including 
parliaments and NSAs) is not exploited through the agreement’s review and revision options. 
Instead the reviews of 2005 and 2010 have excluded these actors and have been directly 
negotiated between the signatories, who have also put themselves solely in charge of 
reflecting on and preparing positions on the future of cooperation beyond 2020. Instead, 
given the social disconnect observed between ACP stakeholders and their Brussels-based 
representatives, the EU and ACP would be well-advised to invest in broad-based and 
participatory reflection efforts to more effectively reinvigorate the partnership and chart 
possible ways ahead.  
 
Trade 
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement was intended to gradually end the EU practice of 
granting non-reciprocal trade preferences to ACP countries and move the parties towards a 
liberalised trade regime through Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).50 As the idea of 
building towards an all-ACP EPA lacked feasibility from the start, despite being promoted by 
some ACP regions (Bilal & Rampa 2007, p. 85), the phasing out of Lomé/Cotonou 
                                                          
49 A recent overview of such measures is provided by Hayman et al. (2014). 
50 These would still be provided to Least Developed Countries under the EBA scheme. 
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preferences after December 2007 has effectively removed trade and economic cooperation 
from the ACP-EU cooperation framework. For Instance, while making reference to the CPA at 
places, the new institutional arrangements introduced in the EU-Caribbean EPA 
unambiguously showed that the CPA and its joint institutions no longer govern trade (Jessop, 
2008).  The lengthy and controversial EPA negotiations moreover created friction between 
the parties and have negatively affected ACP-EU relations and their partnership far beyond 
the EPA’s direct economic consequences (Bilal, 2014). 
Nearly all ACP interlocutors argue that although trade ‘openness’ tends to have ‘win-
win’ outcomes for countries at similar stages of development, the outcomes in the case of 
large asymmetries between the parties – as in the case of the EU and ACP countries – are 
otherwise.  For instance, opening up trade can undermine the growth of infant industries in 
non-industrialised countries whose economies often rely on a few primary commodities. 
Other sources of concern include ACP governments’ expected loss of custom revenue, which 
are not fully compensated by longer transitional periods or temporal compensatory payouts, 
and the ACP producers’ incapacity to access EU markets and compete under EU standards – 
even after EPAs are concluded. Many consider the EU position to be hypocritical since it 
pushes for liberalisation externally while heavily subsidising its own agriculture sector.  
For African least developed countries (LDCs) that benefit from the EBA agreement, 
there is little incentive to sign an EPA, since their goods are granted preferential access to 
the EU market under the EBA, which unlike the Lomé/Cotonou preferences are not 
contractual. The EBA – introduced by the EU in 2001 outside the CPA setup – is regarded 
favourably by its LDC beneficiaries but negatively by other countries; the latter see it as 
colliding with the non-LDC ACP members’ interest in the RECs and the EU reaching 
agreement on EPAs. Some studies argue that EPAs should be preferable for LDC ACP 
countries, as well, as they are more dependable than the EBA preferences, given that those 
preferences are unilaterally granted and can also be unilaterally revoked – although doing so 
would likely result in significant political costs for the EU (Frisch, 2008, p. 32). 
In the Caribbean, the only region to have signed a full EPA, the process of 
implementation is sluggish with country ratifications proceeding at snail’s pace. The looming 
expiration of unilateral preferences on 31 December 2007 caused rushed negotiations, as all 
countries apart from the LDC Haiti faced losing market access. Many interviewees believe 
that the Caribbean region would have negotiated differently if they had understood that an 
interim agreement would have been sufficient for continuing the preferences. 
While strong criticism on many aspects proposed by the EU remains widespread, 
most African interlocutors acknowledge that regional trade agreements could help foster 
regional integration and increase their bargaining power.51 Aversion to the EPA agenda does 
not indicate aversion to regional integration as such, with the prevailing view of those 
                                                          
51 Studies commissioned by RECs however also note that EPA negotiations have disrupted regional 
integration processes, see for instance Chiwandamira, D.P., A Review Of The Negotiation Of Economic 
Partnership 
Agreements (EPAS) Between The European Union & SADC And The Implication for Small Scale 
Farmers, Gaborone: SADC, 2006 
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involved in trade issues being that there is a need to boost regional integration, if possible 
along the lines of Europe. Landlocked countries in particular have vital interests in regional 
integration. Many people in regions that are undergoing processes of integration are 
monitoring the present EU crisis with interest, as the challenges are viewed as stretching 
beyond economic aspects to core issues of identity and the willingness to truly integrate.  
 
Development cooperation 
Stakeholders directly involved in or otherwise exposed to the CPA pillar of development 
cooperation, expressed high regard for the EDF for ensuring predictability in funding. The 
EDF and its aid-effectiveness avant la lettre provisions that were inserted in Cotonou and 
earlier agreements are notable, in particular the innovation of joint management by which 
decisions on the programming of EDF are to be made together by the EU and the ACP 
country concerned (represented by its national authorising officer, normally the minister of 
finance).  These were greatly appreciated, despite the lengthy procedures and onerous ‘red 
tape’.  On the other hand, many in Africa claim that the country and regional strategy papers 
that are adopted through joint management are often very vague about their priority 
sectors and that development funding is allocated with little knowledge of local contexts. 
Undoubtedly, the EDF plays an important role in maintaining ACP interest in the CPA. 
Past iterations of the EDF have particularly supported investments in ‘hardware’ sectors such 
as infrastructure (particularly roads), and were generally strongly focused on facilitating 
trade.52 From EDF 9 onwards (i.e. 2002-2007), the focus shifted from delivering discrete 
interventions to supplying budget support or direct aid to national budgets, either with pre-
defined priority setting (Sector Budget Support) or without (General Budget Support). EDF 
budget support was first introduced during the 7th EDF (1990–1995) and three iterations 
later EDF 10 earmarked 44% of the programmable money (EUR 13.5 billion) to be channelled 
through budget support (German Foundation for World Population [DWS] 2008). Although 
the EU is praised for its contributions through the use of programme-based approaches like 
budget support, in terms of visibility EU development cooperation did not feature 
prominently in the countries visited. Since much EDF funding passes through the country’s 
own systems and is spent ‘under the radar’, many interviewees were unaware of the size of 
EDF contributions.  
The EU is generally appreciated for its major long-term support to ACP RECs. But 
despite appreciating EU contributions to regional integration, African government officials 
expressed concern about whether the RECs can absorb the large funding made available in 
pace with the regional cooperation process. For instance, the EU has supported the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) through a contribution agreement under 
EDF 10, a form of budget support, yet the EU’s contribution greatly outstrips those of the 
COMESA member states, fostering dependency and raising concerns about ownership.  
                                                          
52 In the period between 1996 and 2011 a total of 7.4 billion euro of EDF funding was committed to 
supporting road transport in Sub-Saharan Africa (EU Court of Auditors), while Africa continues to be 
the largest recipient of EU funding in the area of ‘aid for trade’, a broader category support that 
significantly includes road support and other key infrastructure.      
514530-L-bw-Keijzer
Processed on: 11-10-2017 PDF page: 58
58 
 
Civil society representatives in the countries visited value EDF support. Many 
interviewees however report major shortcomings regarding NSAs’ involvement. EU 
delegations are thought to often fail to sufficiently engage NSAs due to the added time and 
human resources this requires, while NSAs are faulted for not having the capacity to handle 
large amounts of funds and thereby facilitate the EU delegations’ timely disbursements. The 
fact that EU funds are jointly managed by national authorising officers, many of whom are 
reluctant to have funds channelled through NSAs, only compounds the difficulties and 
creates the perception that despite the CPA’s provision for direct support, NSAs receive only 
a fraction of the total funds. There moreover seems to be a shared concern that EU 
tendering procedures appear to be especially oriented to the private sector, which makes it 
difficult for NSAs to engage.53 
In terms of the comparative position of the EU vis-à-vis other global players gaining a 
profile in Africa and elsewhere, many ACP government officials are discouraged by the 
cumbersome EDF procedures. These officials value the straightforward and efficient support 
from the China Development Bank’s African Development Fund, for instance, for transport 
and energy infrastructure projects. However, these officials do not manage the day-by-day 
cooperation with China – which according to government interviewees who are directly 
involved is not always straightforward. Nevertheless, long-term benefits do accrue to African 
countries from China’s cooperation, which is perceived as less paternalistic.  In addition 
China’s development arms are able to speak with one voice to African governments, in stark 
contrast to that of the EU. 
Notwithstanding these benefits, interviewees remained some concern about China’s 
typical approach of using its own companies and workforce to implement projects, thus 
creating little local employment, despite available research evidence to the contrary (e.g. 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA], 2013). Beyond this, China mainly 
issues loans, not grants, which in the current climate of low interest rates remain attractive. 
Other emerging economies like Brazil, India and Turkey are also becoming increasingly active 
in Africa. The approach of these countries, which deliver swifter, more tangible results 
relative to the EU and its member states, is generally appreciated for its uncomplicated 
character. 
The general feeling among stakeholders in Africa seems to be that the EU should 
further invest in promoting its businesses and investing in the continent. When it comes to 
recent EU policies, there is an appreciation (among most) for the blending of private sector 
investment and development finance with a political, value-driven approach, which is 
reflected in the EU’s Agenda for Change that EU ministers adopted in May 2012. Although 
these values are applied inconsistently, they are acknowledged as universal as well as 
essential for equitable and sustainable development. Another key innovation of EDF 11, 
although first proposed in a 1996 green paper and present in the CPA’s provisions for a 
                                                          
53 One example is the African CSO that was repeatedly requested to supply a non-bankruptcy act – an 
eligibility criterion for an EDF-funded tender. Such acts are common legal documents in the for-profit 
private sector, but not among non-profit CSOs. 
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‘performance-based partnership’, is the Agenda for Change’s policy on ‘differentiation’, 
which entails an allocation of development cooperation funds (including the EDF) based on 
needs, capacity, performance and potential impact. Although the CPA does not allow for 
‘graduating’ ACP countries out of the EDF, the 11th EDF (2014-2020) is expected to reduce 
allocations to middle income countries and prepare the ground for further reduction or 
graduation post-2020 (Keijzer et al., 2012).  
 
 
Conclusion  
European actors, through their actions in terms of promoting regional cooperation, free 
trade agreements as well as increased cooperation with the AU, appear to favour a more 
regional approach to EU external relations and a readiness to maintain valuable aspects of 
the present arrangement with the ACP Group (Keijzer, Lein, Negre & Tissi, 2013). While the 
ACP countries’ official representatives in Brussels support the continuation of the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement beyond its due expiration date and the upgrading of the ACP Group’s 
international profile, most stakeholders on the ground show a markedly lower level of 
enthusiasm. As noted in the previous analysis, five key reasons explain this widespread 
perception in ACP countries.  
First, a sizeable ‘social disconnect’ exists between the structures and inner circles 
involved with the CPA’s functioning, on the one hand, and other involved actors in ACP 
countries, on the other. It is telling that relevant stakeholders from government, civil society, 
the private sector, international organisations and academia do not really seem to value 
Cotonou’s scope and reach. States that are party to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
appear to have largely outsourced the management of the CPA’s implementation to a select 
group of international experts, diplomats and representatives –the ACP’s Brussels-based 
secretariat and the ACP states’ national missions to the EU. As a result, many well-informed, 
relevant stakeholders in these countries may know about EPAs or specific EDF development 
interventions, but simultaneously be unaware of their governing ACP–EU partnership. This 
lack of a comprehensive and broad-based engagement puts into question the need for the 
overarching contractual framework, which may be less than the sum of its parts. 
Second, while the ACP Group is regarded as historically relevant, there is little 
appreciation of its current value beyond securing EU development assistance through the 
CPA, as well as helping the Caribbean and Pacific regions to ‘amplify’ their messages to the 
EU and internationally. Obviously, at 79 members, the group’s size in itself could be an 
important reason to maintain it, especially if this power were used alongside the EU in 
international fora. However, since the group has little to show in this regard when it comes 
to its records, size alone does not seem to provide a convincing rationale. 
Third, the overlapping mandates, memberships and international strategies among 
the different organisations and frameworks leads to conflicting relations and a lack of clear 
direction. This involves bilateral relations vis-à-vis traditional EU partners, the rising role of 
RECs and the tensions that result from overlapping memberships confronted by EPA 
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negotiations, as well as competition for remits between the regional (RECs), continental (AU) 
and ACP level. 
Fourth, although the institutions emanating from the CPA were ambitiously designed, 
the ACP’s dependence on the EU for running its secretariat as well as failure of some ACP 
states to provide their statutory contributions is interpreted as a proof of a lack of political 
will among the ACP Group. Shortcomings of the current leadership – as compared with the 
first decades of ACP–EU cooperation – are also regarded as explanations for the ACP Group’s 
decreasing external legitimacy and diminishing importance in the eyes of the EU.  
Compounding this is the negligible intra-ACP cooperation and trade or other substantial 
links, as a group, beyond its relation to the EU.      
Fifth, EPA negotiations have tarnished the EU’s image at the country level, where 
dissatisfaction is expressed about issues of both process and content. Most ACP 
interlocutors claim that the EU has pushed its own interest-based agenda, disregarding the 
ACP countries’ key concerns and insisting on speed despite the lack of agreement.  
Cotonou’s contractual and inclusive nature is widely appreciated, despite its many 
practical problems and challenges. Its vast framework for cooperation contrasts with more 
down-to-earth agreements like those that individual ACP countries have entered into with 
emerging countries such as China and Brazil,  although they insist that the European 
approach to cooperating, along with the way practices have been shaped over decades, is 
much valued. In view of the strong interest in and potential of cooperation in areas such as 
trade, investment and knowledge exchange, it is clear that there is still much potential for 
expanding cooperation beyond development. Although viewed as important to maintaining 
ACP interest, the EDF has however grown dominant over time to such an extent that it has 
largely narrowed the CPA to a ‘development aid partnership’, which in view of the 
differentiation policy would gradually make the cooperation framework less relevant to non-
LDC ACP countries.  
It may appear that many, if not most, stakeholders in Africa and those consulted in 
the Caribbean and Pacific see little reason to maintain either an ACP structure or the CPA, 
and would rather opt for letting Cotonou expire in 2020, instead focussing on regionalising 
relations with the EU while possibly maintaining a simple and lighter ACP structure. ACP 
countries may share with their EU partners a keen interest that key elements of the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement – particularly regarding development cooperation and political 
dialogue – be preserved and improved. Regardless of the direction that ACP–EU relations 
take, the more open and participatory the process of discussing the past, present and future 
of the partnership agreement, the better the chances of achieving a meaningful outcome. 
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2. Feigned ambition. Analysing the emergence, evolution and performance of the ACP 
Group of States 
 
Abstract 
In 1975 the ACP Group of States was created after the then 46 states concluded a 
cooperation partnership with the European Economic Community. This article draws on the 
literature on international organisation independence and performance to analyse the ACP 
Group’s evolution and functioning over time. Its findings show that whereas the ACP Group 
has generally failed to deliver on its supra-national objectives, its members have used Group 
membership as a means to accessing EU benefits. This confirms recent research that 
dependent and non-performing IOs may serve important funding and patronage purposes to 
their members.   
 
 
Introduction 
In June 2015 the ACP Group of States celebrated its 40th anniversary, four decades during 
which the Group grew from 46 to 79 states and became “the largest inter-governmental 
association of developing countries with a permanent Secretariat” (ACP, 2015a, p. 1). The 
ACP Group was founded in June 1975, a few months after negotiations between the 46 
states and Europe concluded with the adoption of the Lomé Convention. As per its history 
and main constituting motivation, the ACP Group derives a large part of its identity from its 
relationship with Europe, which since 2000 is governed by the Cotonou Agreement. In 2017 
negotiations will start to determine the future of ACP-EU cooperation after the expiration of 
the Cotonou Agreement in 2020. In deliberating on its future relations with and beyond 
Europe, the ACP Group has been reflecting on its own institutional development and 
organisational structures. At their 2012 Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, the ACP 
Group conveyed its commitment to “(...) deepening and enhancing the ACP-EU relationship 
as a unique North-South Development Cooperation model, while developing diversified 
South-South and other partnerships” (ACP, 2012a, p. 13). Drawing on subsequent several 
high-level strategising processes, the 2016 ACP Summit supported and reaffirmed the 
Group’s future vision in this regard and conveyed its ambition to become “the leading 
multilateral Group of developing countries organisation” (ACP, 2016, p. 1).  
ACP-EU cooperation is no stranger to the scholarly literature on EU external action 
and until today remains a key feature of European development cooperation and Africa-EU 
relations. Key foci in the literature include the effectiveness of the EU’s long-standing 
asymmetrical trade preference scheme and subsequent Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) negotiations (e.g. Kühnhardt. 2016; Elgström, 2010), as well as the evolution of 
cooperation practice from non-interference and recipient discretion towards conditionality 
and political dialogue (e.g. Arts & Dickson, 2004; Del Biondo, 2011). As per both the aims and 
nature of this body of literature, it predominantly analyses the ACP Group from a European 
perspective, while neglecting the question as to how the ACP Group itself developed over 
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time.54 This article draws on the literature on the performance of international organisations 
to analyse the ACP Group’s evolution since the founding of the Group, with particular 
attention to its four central organs (alternatively referred to as ‘institutions’) and permanent 
secretariat.  
Available information on the inner-workings of the ACP Group is scarce, which meant 
a flexible research design was required that combines information gathering with exploring 
perceptions of ACP organisational performance. The analysis presented in this article draws 
on a review of both public and grey sources, after which ten interviews with ACP officials 
were conducted in Brussels in the period July-September 2015.55 ACP Secretariat officials 
and Ambassadors were contacted with the aim to cover all three regions and include both 
Least-Developed Countries as well as richer members. Given the interviewees’ varying 
backgrounds and positions, semi-structured interviews were used as “an approach to 
interviewing by means of a pre-determined set of open questions with the aim to prompt 
discussion and create the opportunity for the interviewer to explore particular themes or 
responses further” (Evaluation Toolbox, 2010). As per its research design, the article does not 
present conclusive evidence on the functioning of ACP institutions. Through its historical 
overview and analysis of perceived functioning of ACP Group’s structures and processes, it 
contributes to the literature on international organisation performance (e.g. Gutner & 
Thompson, 2004; Gray, 2016) as well as facilitates further research inquiry and increase 
understanding of ACP-EU relations. 
The remainder of this article is structured in four sections. The first section analyses 
the literature on the (non-)performance of international organisations as a means to 
analysing the expected interests of ACP states in Group membership. Section two describes 
the emergence of the ACP Group. Section three presents the research findings on the 
functioning of the ACP institutions. Section four further analyses the evolving mandate of 
the Group’s permanent secretariat and the effects of related EU support. Section five 
concludes. 
 
 
International Organisation independence and (non-)performance 
The social science literature on international organisations (IOs) performance can be divided 
into two strands: an economistic group revolving around instrumental rationality and 
efficiency concerns, and a sociological group focused on legitimacy and power. Recent 
research evidence confirms the latter strand of literature that IOs should be considered as 
independent agents (Dijkstra 2017). A study comparing institutional design characteristics of 
thirty regional integration arrangements identified economic interdependence and the 
passage of time as important explanatory variables for predicting IO independence, 
indicating that IOs evolve over time in a way that matches functional needs. Yet the authors 
                                                          
54 As an exception to this pattern, the author identified two dissertations completed in the 1990s 
which provided important inputs to this article’s analysis (Mgbere, 1994; Matheson, 1997).  
55 The interviewees concerned six ACP ambassadors (Interviews 1-6), three staff members of the ACP 
Secretariat (7-9), and one independent ACP consultant (10)   
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and other recent scholarly contributions recognise the need for qualitative studies to assess 
under what conditions formal design aspects promoting de jure independence are translated 
into de facto independence, and how this independence facilitates IO performance (Haftel 
and Thompson 2006; see also Lall, 2017 and Dijkstra, 2017). 
Studies have sought to analyse the performance of IOs, which can be defined as the 
extent to which they achieve stated objectives in a cost-effective and responsive manner 
(Lall, 2017). A recent analysis comparing available IO assessments shows considerable 
variation in performance across IOs with similar mandates, resources and membership 
(Ibid.). The Yearbook of International Organisations identified 1454 intercontinental 
membership organisations and 6612 regionally oriented membership organisations (UIA, 
2014). The sheer number of IOs challenges efforts to attribute specific outcomes to the 
performance of individual IOs, which is why much of the literature measures performance in 
terms of processes and the production of outputs that may or may not promote the IO’s 
formal objectives (Gutner and Thompson 2010). In view of these methodological challenges 
and the availability of information, the literature on IO performance concentrates on a 
number of ‘usual suspects’, particularly those IOs with economic mandates that make 
performance measurement more straightforward (Gray, 2016, p. 3; Haftel & Thompson 
2006).  
The literature identifies various factors internal or external to the IO concerned that 
may explain for good or bad performance. Examples of internal factors include the IO 
leadership and resourcing, while external factors include the degree of member consensus, 
as well as external support (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Gutner & Thompson, 2004). While 
earlier studies suggested that IO independence may lead to dysfunctional behaviour (Barnett 
& Finnemore, 1999), recent research argues that this finding has only been examined 
through studies of individual IOs and is not adequately supported by comparative analysis. 
While noting that only some IOs have gained sufficient independence to engage in deviant 
behaviour, recent cross-IO analysis identifies opportunistic behaviour by member states as 
the primary obstacle to IO performance. Well-performing IOs were seen to mitigate this 
challenge by means of adequate independence, promoted through institutionalised non-
state alliances and the technical complexity of their activities (Lall, 2017). This is 
complemented by recent case studies describing how selected members collude with the IO 
secretariat to achieve outcomes at the expense of other members, moving beyond the 
conceptualisation of a binary IO-membership relation (Dijkstra, 2017).    
 Like other developing countries, the 79 ACP States are party to a multitude of 
regional and international organisations with frequently overlapping mandates and 
membership. As membership costs can be substantial and many such organisations are 
considered ineffective, the literature has sought to analyse what drives states to continue 
membership of ineffective IOs (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). Examples of such IOs include 
various Regional Economic Communities, which feature considerable bureaucracies and 
formalised meeting structures yet generally have made only limited progress in delivering on 
their mandates. These IOs are typically strongly dependent on their members, while not 
featuring strong multi-stakeholder linkages or delivering technical substance so as to enable 
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progress (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Gray, 2016)).  Recent research has looked into what 
drives states to support non-performing IOs by means of membership fees and ‘transaction 
costs’ of their officials. The research suggests that non-performing or even dysfunctional IOs 
may still benefit members by producing two interlinked benefits: facilitating access to 
external funding, and creating opportunities for private gain including employment and 
travel (Gray, 2016). This implies that IOs may also serve to promote aims for which they 
were not formally created. IOs may be favoured even when they may not be the most 
efficient or effective ones, but may instead serve normative ends and be “created not for 
what they do but for what they are” (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 703).  
 Throughout the past decades, group membership has enabled ACP states to access 
and consolidate EU development cooperation and trade on better terms than non-ACP 
countries. The ACP Group’s image and supra-national goals, regardless of whether the ACP 
Group performed in pursuing these, also served the EU’s interests by justifying this ‘special 
relationship’ with the ACP vis-à-vis non-ACP developing countries. Its partnership with 
Europe has been characterised as ‘collective clientelism’, “a relationship in which a group of 
weak states combine in an effort to exploit the special ties that link them to a more powerful 
state or group of states” (Ravenhill, 1980, p. 22). This has in turn supported the EU’s own 
financial and political support to ACP institutions which represented a key factor in its 
development during the past and present decade. Gray’s second assumed IO benefit of 
patronage would particularly relate to the special interests of the diplomatic officials of 
those of the 79 countries based in Brussels, the staff of the permanent secretariat, visiting 
officials of ACP countries as well as other direct beneficiaries. Both benefits are explored in 
the next sections.  
Guided by the literature on IO independence and (non)performance, this article will 
analyse perceptions of the performance of the ACP Group against its stated objectives, but 
also further analyse to what extent it delivers on the two types of benefits associated to 
non-performing IOs.  
 
 
The emergence of the ACP Group 
The ACP Group’s nature and identity is highly intertwined with the European project, and 
rooted in the association policy of the European Economic Community (EEC) towards its 
overseas countries and territories as set out in the 1957 Treaty of Rome (Slocum-Bradley, 
2007). Amidst its preparations for joining the EEC during the early 1970s, the United 
Kingdom had encouraged Commonwealth countries to join the existing former French and 
Belgian African colonies’ association to the European project (Mut Bosque, 2014, p. 287). 
Instead of choosing from what they perceived as a set of European offers, the group of 
countries resolved to jointly negotiate a new cooperation agreement with Europe (Green, 
1980, p. 6). Although it was their decision to negotiate together, Europe largely prescribed 
the composition of the ACP Group through the 1973 United Kingdom’s EEC accession treaty 
that defined which Commonwealth states were ‘associable’ to the existing EEC-Africa 
cooperation framework (Hewitt, 1980, pp. 24, 25).  
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The sequence of first concluding the convention and subsequently creating the Group 
meant that the first Lomé Convention was agreed between the EEC and the states of the 
ACP Group. Article 1 of the Group’s constitutive Georgetown Agreement in fact required 
aspiring members of the Group to first accede to the Lomé Convention. Another example of 
the links between the ACP Group and its partnership with Europe was that the term in office 
of the Group’s Secretary General coincided with the duration of the Lomé I Convention 
(Matheson, 1997, p. 142). Frey-Wouters (1980, p. 260) observed that at the time of the 
Group’s creation, “the ACP countries share very little economic and commercial 
organization” and were vulnerable in their isolated economic and political cooperation with 
the EEC. Article 2 of the Georgetown Agreement sets out a total of seven objectives for the 
Group, of which the first three are related to the implementation of the Lomé Convention 
and the remaining four present broad objectives on solidarity, as well as promoting 
individual and group cooperation interests. The latter include the supra-national aims “to 
contribute to the development of greater and closer trade, economic and cultural relations 
amongst the ACP States and amongst developing countries in general, and to this end to 
develop the exchange of information amongst the ACP States in the fields of trade, 
technology, industry and human resources” (ACP, 1975, p. 1). Conferences were held in the 
late 1970s to operationalise and advance these ambitions failed to go beyond generic 
statements of intent (Ravenhill, 1980, p. 315). Revisions to the Georgetown Agreement were 
made in 1992 and 2003 and mainly sought to ‘catch up’ with the substance of EU-ACP 
cooperation agreements. 
The Georgetown Agreement provides the ACP Group with legal personality, while its 
Headquarters Agreement with the Belgian Kingdom gives diplomatic immunity to senior 
personnel of its permanent secretariat, as well as documentary and communications 
immunity. The ACP Group has since 1981 held Observer Status at the UN, which recognises 
the Group as an international organisation (Babb & Babb 2006, p. 71). Although in a legal 
sense it exhibits the characteristics of an international organisation, i.e. “being associations 
of more than one state, undertaking common tasks and fulfilling concrete ends and 
objectives for which they were created”, it has been argued that it cannot be convincingly 
established that the ACP Group has “a legal existence distinct from the sum of the states that 
form it” (Mut Bosque, 2014, p. 304). Already at an early stage it was instead argued that “the 
ACP was brought into existence primarily to receive special favours from the EEC” (Hewitt, 
1980, p. 25). 
The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World typifies the Lomé Conventions and 
the Cotonou Agreement as a “legally binding contractual agreement based on partnership, 
reciprocity, and equal benefits between the EU and the ACP states” (Krieger, 2001, p. 507). 
This characterisation underlines that it is not just the broad cooperation agenda and broad 
membership that sets the partnership apart from others, but also the approach to governing 
the partnership. Given its historical rooting in the EEC’s association policy, the introduction 
of joint ACP-EEC structures and new discourse around ‘partnership’ in Lomé I sought to bring 
balance to an otherwise asymmetrical relationship (Drieghe, 2011, p. 223; Kühnhardt, 2016, 
p. 240). Although much of the literature presents Lomé as a conceptual and rhetorical break 
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with the idea of association, archival analysis of the Lomé I negotiations concludes that the 
three largest EEC members were instrumental in shaping the Lomé accord and that the 
essence of the post-colonial Yaoundé relationship remained unchanged. The resulting Lomé I 
Convention would reflect the concept of collective clientelism, yet the archival analysis 
nuances the ACP states’ negotiation strength implied in that concept by showing that ACP 
preferences were only influential when they reflected those of the influential EEC members 
(Drieghe, 2011). 
Following the four Lomé Conventions covering the period 1975-2000, EU-ACP 
relations are presently governed under the Cotonou Agreement. The legally binding 
agreement confirmed the special status of the relationship, yet also sought to fundamentally 
reform it in response to the disappointing results of the Lomé Conventions, and the need to 
phase out trade preferences that were non-compliant with WTO rules. As a means to 
reforming relations, the Cotonou Agreement introduced the principle of differentiation to 
reform all three cooperation pillars. Direct European Development Fund (EDF) contributions 
were progressively reduced for those ACP states that classify as Upper Middle and High-
Income Countries. Trade relations also became increasingly differentiated as per the 
outcomes of trade negotiations with six regional groups, with the Caribbean agreeing to a 
more comprehensive trade agenda and other sub-regions pursuing trade in goods 
agreements. Finally, political dialogue at the national level was strengthened and 
governance reform incentivised through additional aid, while the EU further invested in its 
political partnership at the regional level, particularly with Africa.56 As is described below, 
even though the ACP Group’s structures and processes have poorly performed throughout 
their lifetime, the Cotonou Agreement’s differentiation policy has aggravated this 
underperformance by reducing direct EU benefits to several of its members.  
 
 
The organisation of the ACP 
The Georgetown agreement created two organisational structures that it refers to as the 
Group’s ‘organs’: the ACP Council of Ministers and the ACP Committee of Ambassadors 
(COA). In terms of composition and procedures these largely mirrored the joint EEC-ACP 
Council of Ministers and Committee of Ambassadors that were set up in 1975 under Lomé I, 
which in turn were based on structures created by the first Yaoundé Convention in 1962 
(Drieghe, 2011, p. 33). Article 3 of the Agreement further states that the ACP organs were to 
be assisted by a General Secretariat. Shridath Ramphal of Guyana played an instrumental 
role in the realisation of the Group’s Brussels-based secretariat by persuading the European 
partners to use EDF reserves to help co-finance the building (Miller, 2010, p. 3). In 2003 the 
Revised Georgetown Agreement formalised the Summit of ACP heads of state as the third 
organ of the group and announced plans to establish an ACP Parliamentary assembly. Figure 
2 gives an overview of the current setup. 
                                                          
56 For a detailed discussion of the reforms introduced under Cotonou, see Arts and Dickson, EU 
Development Cooperation. 
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Figure 2: Organisational structure of the ACP Group 
 
Source: own elaboration based on ACP 2012c, p. 15 
 
The following paragraphs present findings from the analysis of the literature and interviews 
with regard to the performance of the Group’s four organs, following an analysis of the 
Group’s secretariat and the effects of EU support.  
 
The Council of Ministers 
The Council of ACP Ministers is the main decision-making body of the ACP Group. Working 
under the Summit of the Heads of State, the Council defines the broad outlines of the work 
to be undertaken to achieve the Group’s objectives. It consists of a member of the 
Government of each of the ACP States or its designated representative, and meets twice a 
year in regular session. Its agenda is prepared by the Brussels-based Committee of ACP 
Ambassadors (COA) (ACP, 2012a, p. 17). Although Article 10 of the Georgetown agreement 
allows for the Council to adopt decisions by a two-thirds majority, in practice decisions are 
made by consensus.57 Absence of consensus typically leads to additional consultations in 
search of a compromise, as in practice ACP states would choose to vote only in exceptional 
cases (Mgbere, 1994, p. 178).   
Council meetings typically produce a set of agreements and decisions, yet no precise 
instructions are made to ensure follow-up. ACP ministerial attendance in Council meetings 
has been poor for a long time, with ACP states frequently choosing to delegate lower ranking 
officials or the head of their Brussels mission (Matheson, 1997; Mgbere, 1994; Babb & Babb, 
2006). This is indeed no recent phenomenon, since already in 1981 only 18 of the then 46 
sent their minister to the 13th ACP Council of Ministers (Ravenhill, 1980, p. 319). A recent 
                                                          
57 Interview 1 
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COA chair acknowledged that there is broad awareness among Ambassadors that their 
committee is failing to organise and prepare Council meetings in a way that would allow 
ministers to engage and make decisions, which discouraged their participation (Mahase-
Moiloa, 2015, p. 8). This awareness has however to date not translated into reform.  
 
The Committee of Ambassadors 
In the course of the negotiations for Lomé I, a group of Brussels-based Ambassadors of ACP 
states regularly met to prepare its negotiation sessions with the EEC (Ramphal, 2011). The 
Georgetown Agreement transformed this ad-hoc coordination process into a formal meeting 
structure, and through Article 17 required the COA to adopt its own rules of procedure. The 
COA subsequently prepared and adopted its ‘guidelines on working methods’ on 27 January 
1981 to guide its plenary meetings as well as its various sub-committees and working groups 
(ACP 1981). As per its formal mandate, the COA assists the Council of Ministers in its 
functions and carrying out any mandate assigned and monitors the implementation of the 
ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. Similar to the Council of Ministers, the work of the 
Committee is coordinated by the Bureau of the Committee of Ambassadors that consists of 
nine members: one for each of the six ACP regions, the current chairperson as well the 
incoming and previous chairs (ACP, 1981). The chairperson’s term is limited to six months.  
The COA is widely regarded as the leading organ of the group (Mailafia, 2014). Since 
it is the only organ that meets on a regular basis, as it convenes twice a month, the 
Committee’s role has moved beyond its ‘decision preparing’ mandate to effectively making 
such decisions. The low frequency of Council meetings has led to the COA de-facto 
furthering the Group’s objectives between Council sessions (Mgbere, 1994, p. 181), so that 
“in practice, the Committee of Ambassadors plays the role of decision-maker, and even 
during a Council of Ministers meeting, the majority of delegates are actually ambassadors” 
(Babb & Babb, 2006, p. 74). The Committee’s strong position does not mean that it asserts 
itself in an effective and goal-oriented manner. The current rules were adopted at a time 
when the Group had 46 members, and the requirement of decision by consensus is in 
practice interpreted as requiring unanimity.58 This need for unanimity has frequently 
delayed decisions for months or even years, such as in cases where previously absent states 
require discussions to be reopened, or by small minorities of ACP states blocking decisions 
(Mgbere, 1994, p. 177). A key factor to explain the frequent absence of ambassadors at 
regular meetings is that many have demanding mandates, which may include the full 
Benelux group of countries as well as UN and international organisations based in Geneva 
and Rome.59 Others nonetheless observed that embassies were starting to send staff of 
lower level of seniority to sub-committees and working groups, suggesting a more recent 
downward trend.60 Several examples of cumbersome decision-making were presented by 
the interviewees. These included a proposed trip to Vanuatu by some ACP Ambassadors 
                                                          
58 Interview 1, 3 
59 Interview 3, 9 
60 Interview 5 
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after the cyclone Pam in April 2015, as well as the EU’s suggestion to prepare a joint ACP-EU 
position for the 2015 Addis Ababa UN Financing for Development conference, both of which 
were blocked by a small minority of ACP states.61 Whereas the latter case lead to an all-ACP 
position being adopted instead, the former case was an example of how ACP Ambassadors 
failed to agree on how to use the Secretariat’s budget. 
Beyond these specific examples, interviewees described Committee meetings as 
formalistic, inefficient and ego-centered as opposed to results-oriented. Meetings can last as 
long as two days, in part due to the fact that ambassadors may address their colleagues 
during meetings for excessive amounts of time, not shying away from restating points 
already made. This happened in spite of the the COA guidelines allowing the Chairman to 
propose a time limit on interventions, which as one interviewee put it was symptomatic of 
the ACP Group’s ‘culture of rule-breaking’.62 Mailafia (2014, p. 236) argues that the low 
effectiveness of the COA is due to the ambassadors’ mandates of promoting and protecting 
national interests, so that progress can only be made on a lowest common denominator 
basis. Interviewees added that because of the nature of their mandates, ambassadors are 
unlikely to openly criticise or plead for COA reform as this may have a negative bearing on 
their bilateral relations with other states.63 
 
The ACP Summit 
Article 9 of the revised Georgetown Agreement states that the Summit of ACP Heads of 
State and Government “shall lay down the general policy of the ACP Group and issue the 
Council of Ministers with the directives relative to its implementation” (ACP, 2003, p. 6). ACP 
Summits have so far been held in 1997, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016. The first 
three Summits took place before the second revision of the Georgetown agreement formally 
adopted the Summit as an Organ of the group, with the 1997 and 1999 summits playing a 
key role in preparing and firming up ACP positions during the negotiation of Cotonou. The 
most recent four summits focused on the Group’s future development and its future beyond 
2020. Each Summit leads to the adoption of a negotiated document addressing various 
international developments, own initiatives as well as reactions to European actions and 
plans. Although the revised Georgetown agreement states otherwise, interviewees and 
studies confirm that the Summit-hosting country does not play a role in connecting the 
Summits or representing the Group in international fora, thus weakening its strategising 
function (Babb & Babb, 2006, p. 70).64  
While there is no direct role for the EU, the ACP has strongly relied on EDF funding 
for organising summits. The EU Court of Auditors launched investigations into the 
management of EDF support to the 2008 Accra summit, and pending these investigations the 
EU was unable to provide funding for the 2012 summit.65 The hosting country of Equatorial 
                                                          
61 Interview 2, 5 
62 Interview 1, 3, 5, 6 
63 Interview 2, 3, 5, 8 
64 Interview 5 
65 Interview 7 
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Guinea stepped in by providing additional financing equivalent to euro 249,879 (EC, 2014). 
Although no official records are available, media reporting indicates that recent ACP 
Summits performed poorly in terms of attracting Heads of State presence. A total of 15 
heads of state attended the 2012 summit, with lower-level participation from other ACP 
States and 13 states sending no delegation whatsoever.66 The hosting government of 
Suriname was unable to host the ACP summit foreseen for 2014, with the Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa stated as the reason for the cancellation. Following a long search for an ACP 
state willing to take over, the summit was finally held in Papua New Guinea June 2016, yet 
attendance levels were again poor.67 
 
The ACP Parliamentary Assembly 
The ACP Parliamentary Assembly first convened back to back with the ACP-EU Joint-
Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) in Mali of 2005 when its founding charter was adopted (ACP, 
2005). This charter clarifies that the Assembly is not new but formalises and reaffirms the 
existing inter-parliamentary cooperation mechanism within the ACP Group, as provided for 
in Article 18 of the 1992 Georgetown Agreement (ACP, 1992, p. 3). The ACP Parliamentary 
Assembly was created after the JPA’s image with similar aims, objectives and procedures. 
The Assembly is currently not financed out of the ACP secretariat’s budget but is instead 
financed by the EDF and ‘piggybacks’ on JPA sessions (ACP 2012a: 39). There is no publicly 
available reporting on its proceedings and effectiveness, but the ACP Council of Ministers is 
informed on the Assembly’s activities through the Secretary General’s annual report. In view 
of the low profile of the Assembly in current discussions on the future of the Group, its 
existence seems to mainly depend on continued EU funding of the JPA.  
 
The ACP Secretariat 
The 1975 Georgetown Agreement defined the Secretariat’s role as assisting the Committee 
of Ambassadors and the Council of Ministers. The Council was tasked to determine its 
organisational structure and staffing based on a proposal from the COA. The amended 
Georgetown Agreement of 1992 clarified that the Secretariat is an administrative body (ACP, 
1992). The most recent Georgetown agreement defines four roles for the Secretariat: (1) 
carrying out tasks assigned by the four principal organs, (2) contribute to the 
implementation of their decisions, (3) monitor the implementation of the ACP-EC 
Partnership Agreement; and (4) service the organs of the ACP Group and, as appropriate, the 
joint institutions established under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (ACP 2003: 10). The 
Secretariat’s senior personnel is appointed by the COA, while the secondary staff, secretaries 
and local agents, as well as the chief of cabinet are appointed by the Secretary General (SG). 
Changes to the organisational structure can be agreed by the Council of Ministers meeting 
                                                          
66 Source: http://www.modernghana.com/news/436349/1/acp-leaders-send-out-strong-message-to-
partners-at.html  
67 Source: http://www.chronicle.co.zw/president-arrives-in-papua-new-guinea-for-acp-summit/  
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during one of its regular sessions and are prepared by the COA (Mgbere, 1994, p. 186). 
Figure 3 depicts the institutional setup of the ACP Secretariat during the 1990s.  
 
Figure 3: The organisational structure of the ACP Secretariat: pre-Cotonou 
 
Source: adapted from Mailafia (1997, p. 78) 
 
 
In earlier decades the organisation was structured differently as no Deputy Secretary 
General (DSG) was appointed in that period. The main reason was lack of resources as well 
disagreement over other appointments among ACP states, notably that of the SG (Mgbere, 
1994; Matheson, 1997). Following the adoption of the Cotonou Agreement, the Group 
agreed to abolish the DSG post and formalise the creation of the four ASG posts as reflected 
in the 2003 revised Georgetown Agreement (ACP 2003). This was facilitated by an increase 
in the EU’s financial contribution to the Secretariat and its change to a fixed-rate funding 
system (ECA, 2000, p. 444). The secretariat’s structure was subsequently split into four 
pillars, one for each ASG (see Figure 4). Another important change was the opening of an 
ACP Secretariat office in Geneva, which was established in December 2001 as a project 
funded by the European Union to assist the ACP Group in WTO negotiations and which has 
since become a formal part of the secretariat. As of May 2015, a total of 92 posts were 
available at the secretariat, of which 75 are currently filled (ACP SG, 2015).  
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Figure 4: The organisational structure of the ACP Secretariat: since Cotonou 
 
Source: adapted from EPG (2014) 
 
Although it is a well-known and definitely the most visible feature of the ACP, the Group’s 
permanent Secretariat was deliberately designed with a low profile and enjoys a subordinate 
position to the ACP diplomatic representatives (Matheson, 1997, pp. 142-143). This 
contrasts with some of the earlier literature suggesting that the Secretariat could play a 
crucial role in supporting the countries in managing the demanding EEC-ACP relationship 
(Frey-Wouters, 1980, p. 260). In reality, the Secretariat and its Secretary General (SG) has no 
right of initiative but are confined to responding to specific requests from the states. 
Interviewees confirmed that it is not straightforward for the ACP SG to put anything on the 
agenda of the Council meeting in an independent manner because the agenda is controlled 
by the COA.68 Malaifia (2014, p. 236) argued that “the status of the Secretary-General is, in 
truth, more that of Secretary than General.” Despite this limited formal mandate the SG 
remains the central figure in the ACP Group. This explains why the process of electing a new 
SG has been a recurring source of tension between ACP regions (Matheson, 1997, p. 132; 
Mgbere, 1994, p. 185). These tensions were referred to be interviewees as reflecting a low 
level of trust between different sub-regions, which one interviewee illustrated by the 
absence of information exchange between the regional groups during the EPA 
negotiations.69 Interviewees further noted that the introduction of the ASGs had further 
politicised the Secretariat as they had no specific job profiles and mainly served patronage 
functions towards the ACP sub-regions who they represent.70 
                                                          
68 Interview 8 
69 Interview 10 
70 Interview 3, 5 
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As for its technical tasks, the Secretariat is frequently unable to compile good quality 
reports in a timely manner due to the refusal of ACP states to share information on areas 
they consider sensitive, or because they view the Secretariat as lacking the authority to 
effectively advance their interests (Matheson, 1997, p. 181; Ravenhill, 1980, p. 316). There 
were also issues of available human resource capacity, with interviewees describing the 
secretariat as greying, static with many having been in the same position for decades and 
largely consisting of administrators rather than technicians.71 These internal factors affecting 
performance interacted with the external influence of the Group’s members through the 
COA. Interviewees noted that micro-management of the secretariat by the COA, for instance 
requiring the SG to seek COA agreement before using the secretariat’s travel budget, was 
needed because the Secretariat would otherwise not use it in an effective manner.72 The 
Secretariat’s problems are not of a recent nature, as evidenced by the fact that a first ad-hoc 
committee of ambassadors to investigate secretariat’s problems completed its work as early 
as 1981 (Mailafia, 1997, p. 77). Despite its long-standing challenges and subordinate 
position, interviewees did stress that the Secretariat was far from powerless and could act 
autonomously. It was specifically noted that the secretariat avails of several sources and 
networks that the ambassadors do not, including its direct lines of communication with the 
EU. One ambassador noted not having access to memoranda of understanding between the 
Group and other IOs, which mainly serve to enable EDF funding to these IOs.73  
The ACP states’ financial contributions to the secretariat’s running costs have always 
been erratic (Mgbere, 1994, p. 189). More fundamentally, essentially from day one many 
ACP states were unwilling to invest more resources in the institutionalisation of the Group as 
few perceived it as viable in the long term (Ravenhill, 1980, p. 315). Since 1977, the running 
costs of the ACP Secretariat are co-financed by the EU. Today’s EDF rules allow for a 
maximum of 50% of the budgeted running costs of the Secretariat to be financed by the EU, 
while it provides additional funding for operational activities such as studies, institutional 
meetings, conference or seminars organised by the Secretariat (EC, 2015, p. 10). It has been 
observed that despite its own co-financing, the EU has never cut EDF funding to ACP states 
that failed to timely make their financial contributions to the Secretariat (1997: 143-144). In 
2015 the Secretariat operated with a total budget of 15.3 million euro, and a total of 43 ACP 
states had developed arrears in payment. In May that same year a total of eleven ACP 
countries had accumulated such long-standing arrears that they were placed under formal 
sanctions. This group ranged all the way from Least-Developed Country the Central African 
Republic to High-Income Country Antigua and Barbuda. Interviewees noted that sanctions 
are in practice not enforced since Ambassadors of ACP states with arrears generally continue 
to come to the Secretariat, pick up documents, take the floor during meetings, etc.74  
As a result of the differentiation of development finance under the Cotonou 
Agreement, many ACP states in the Upper Middle and High-Income Country categories 
                                                          
71 Interview 7, 8, 10 
72 Interview 5, 8 
73 Interview 5 
74 Interview 8 
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witnessed their direct development finance benefits eroding, thus also reducing the returns 
of their Group membership contribution. One example concerns Mauritius which received 
90 million euros during the period 2007-2013, which was reduced to 9 million euros for the 
period 2014-2020. Similar cuts were made in richer Caribbean states, with the balance 
moved to the regional programmes.75 One interviewee had been asked by the President’s 
office for an assessment of the benefits of membership, while another wondered whether 
the small grant was a good deal in exchange for an intrusive political dialogue with the EU.76 
Evidence supporting ACP states’ declining Group support included pressure by some to close 
down the ACP Secretariat’s satellite office in Geneva, which in the end led to the 
compromise of a study on its past performance, as well as the launch of a study to 
investigate the contribution key for determining ACP states’ financial contribution to the 
Secretariat.77  
 
 
The ACP Secretariat’s development cooperation mandate 
The 2012 & 2016 Summit and various ACP strategising processes of recent years consistently 
included statements on the ACP Group’s desire of taking an ambitious ‘next step’ and 
diversify relations beyond Europe, plans which imply a greater role for the Secretariat. In 
contrast, during the past four decades the Secretariat remained a largely subordinate and 
dependent body whose available resources and capacity failed to grow at a pace that was 
commensurate to the Group’s increasing membership and its widening cooperation agenda. 
In the absence of ACP reforms of their own Secretariat, EDF- financed programmes have 
particularly since the adoption of Cotonou supported the Secretariat’s changing role and 
capacity. Through its support, the EU helps implement the Secretariat’s strategy under the 
following overall objective: “transforming the Secretariat into a modern organisation which 
is adapted to the current priorities of the ACP Group of States and which is an effective and 
efficient organisation in terms of internal business processes” (EC, 2015, p. 6). The 
formulation lacks precision as to what these ACP priorities may be, whilst drawing on private 
sector terminology to describe an envisaged organisation that is capable in a managerial 
sense. The support can be regarded as encompassing both social and material external 
factors influencing the Secretariat’s performance.  
Although the Secretariat was created to support the ACP organs, the Group has also 
allowed its Secretariat to enter into direct responsibilities for the implementation of the EDF. 
Through the Cotonou Agreement, the Secretariat was designated as ‘Regional Authorising 
Officer’ for the component of the EDF that finances intra-ACP cooperation (EC, 2014). The 
intra-ACP budget amounted to 20% of the total budget of the 9th EDF, as well as 12% of the 
budgets for EDF10 and EDF11. Parts of these funds are channelled through other IOs, such as 
UN agencies and the African Union, while others fund specific intra-ACP cooperation 
                                                          
75 Interview 6 
76 Interview 1, 5 
77 Interview 2, 6 
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programmes that are managed by separate Project Implementation Units (PIUs), while 
administered by the Secretariat. Many of these PIUs organise meetings or commission 
studies, thus creating additional patronage opportunities for ACP states.78 As per its 
increased responsibilities, the Secretariat considers to fulfil a ‘double mandate’: “(1) its 
institutional mandate, i.e. to serve the Organs of the ACP Group of States, the ACP-EU Joint 
Institutions and the ACP Member States, and (2) its role of implementing institution of some 
important “all ACP” projects funded under the intra-ACP resources” (ACP, 2012c, p. 9).   
Assessment of the Secretariat’s functioning in recent years shows that the two sides 
of its mandate do not easily co-exist: its human resources are largely absorbed by the need 
to organise meetings that are estimated at 300 per year, and expenditures under the intra-
ACP budget are insufficiently linked to ACP Group’s own objectives (SACO, 2013, p. 5). The 
intra-ACP budget also acts as a legal ‘loophole’ for EU financing of the African Peace Facility 
that EU law prevents from being financed through the EU’s budget. An independent 
evaluation observed a mismatch between the Group’s ambition and the objectives of the 
intra-ACP budget: “There is currently no example of an ACP state being mandated to 
represent the interest of the ACP Group of States in the governance structure of an 
international organisation or fund receiving Intra-ACP funding” (SACO, 2013, p. 46). The 
Secretariat further observed in its 2012 strategy that its increased EDF management tasks 
may have contributed to “the fact that the ACP may sometimes be misperceived as a 
creation of the EU, and that its organizational and institutional provisions do not advance 
these activities/actions” (ACP, 2012c, p. 40).  
Since the signing of the Cotonou Agreement the EU has funded several studies, 
trainings and technical assistance measures to strengthen the Secretariat’s roles in the area 
of EDF management and to ensure its compliance with international standards. The 
assistance thus predominantly focused on the second aspect of the Secretariat’s mandate as 
presented above. Although it observes certain challenges such as posts remaining vacant 
and declining ACP state contributions, the EU argues that critical aspects of the Secretariat’s 
procedures have been strengthened through its support, such as the introduction of 
programme budgeting and an accrual accounting system (EC, 2015, pp. 5-6). Interviewees 
confirmed this and observed that Secretariat staff no longer use individual approaches to 
managing intra-ACP projects, but that procedures are becoming more streamlined and 
standardised. 79  Although this strengthened capacity internal factors would support 
implementation of future EU financed projects, they are less relevant to supporting the 
supra-national ambitions of the ACP Group. 
 
 
Conclusions 
Drawing on the literature on IO independence and (non-)performance, this article has 
analysed the emergence of the ACP Group’s institutions and their evolution and 
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79 Interview 7, 8 
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performance over the past decades. Its starting observation is that since the Group’s 
creation its institutional design and rhythm have been closely tuned to its cooperation 
partnership with Europe. When viewed from the objectives set out in the Georgetown 
Agreement, the ACP Group has performed at a suboptimal level and is characterised by a 
dominant yet ineffective COA and a subordinated as well as under-resourced Secretariat. 
The findings nonetheless indicate that ACP states differ in the extent to which they engage in 
the Group, while the Secretariat’s role has evolved through its EDF-implementation 
responsibilities. Although the EU has formally chosen not to directly involve itself in the ACP 
Group’s internal affairs, the EU implicitly does so by providing support to the Secretariat’s 
expanding aid management mandate. The article’s findings detect further potential for 
future research on how IO mandate and strategies are interlinked with external support, and 
in the process may affect the IO’s independence and its relations with its members. 
How then to explain the persistence of the Group and continued (though erratic) 
member state financial support and transaction costs in terms of attending and contributing 
to meetings? This article’s findings confirm recent research that dependent and non-
performing IOs may serve important funding and patronage purposes to their members. The 
existence of the ACP Group and its supra-national ambitions has allowed the EU to legitimise 
its different treatment of ACP versus non-ACP developing countries. The absence of clear 
intra-ACP benefits and the indications of non-performance suggest that the continuing 
relevance of the ACP Group as an IO to its members is more related to its effective provision 
of patronage and EU funding benefits, than to its performance in relation to the Group’s 
formal mandate. The findings show parallels with the concept of collective clientelism used 
to analyse ACP-EEC negotiations and outcomes, yet specify that the ACP states’ engagement 
in the Group is largely confined to their Brussels-based Secretariat and diplomatic 
representatives and moreover strongly differs from one ACP state to the next. The findings 
also suggest a linkage between the ACP states’ individual returns from their cooperation 
partnership with the EU and their investment in and engagement with the ACP Group as an 
IO. This is confirmed by eroding support to the Group by those richer ACP states that in 
recent years have seen their direct benefits decline as a result of Cotonou’s differentiation 
policy, while the ‘regionalisation’ of trade preferences has further reduced the direct 
benefits of ACP Group membership. In conclusion, the Group’s future is more likely to be 
shaped by the outcome of the upcoming post-Cotonou negotiations with Europe than by its 
own independent actions. 
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3. Theory and practice? A comparative analysis of migration and development policies in 
eleven European countries and the European Commission 
 
Abstract  
This paper analyses international policy discussions on migration and development (M&D) 
since the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, and 
contrasts these with the actual M&D policies and practices of 11 European countries who 
were among the main proponents of this international discourse. Desk research of public 
documents and accompanying information sought from these 11 governments as well as in 
the European Commission (EC) provide the basis for a comparative analysis of their overall 
M&D policies and strategies, institutional settings for formulating and implementing these, 
opportunities and challenges in terms of promoting policy coherence, and targeted 
interventions financed through the development cooperation budget and other means. This 
comparison shows that M&D policy and practice remains in a tentative and experimental 
phase, and that countries experience difficulties reflecting their international positions in 
their own policies, as well as in learning from their own efforts and those of others. While 
stressing the developmental potential of migration in international discussions, most of the 
countries’ policies still reflect an understanding of migration as a problem and a 
preoccupation with short-term domestic interests.  
 
 
Introduction 
Migration and its inter-linkages with sustainable development currently features 
prominently on the international agenda, as evidenced most recently by the publication of 
the Outcome Document of the Open Working Group (OWG) for Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), which includes migration-related targets under several development goals. 
Given the increasing attention to migration and development (M&D) at international level 
and the centrality of migration concerns in domestic political discussions among members of 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the question arises to 
what extent these international discussions are informed by – or themselves inform – 
concrete state action in terms of promoting effective M&D policies. This question is 
particularly topical for European countries, given the important role they have been playing 
in these international discussions and additional policy initiatives pursued at the level of the 
European Union (EU).  
This article presents a comparative analysis of the policies and practices in the field of 
M&D in 11 countries in Europe (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) as well as the EC. The analysis focuses 
on the policies adopted by these countries, underlying concepts and principles, the 
institutional framework in which M&D policies are implemented, concrete activities as well 
as their engagement in regional and international fora. It analyses the evolution of 
international policy discussions on migration and the emergence of the concept of M&D, and 
contrasts these with the actual M&D policies and practices of some of the countries who 
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were among the main proponents of this international discourse. The article’s analysis is 
based on a desk review that involved a review of available public documentation, with 
additional information and documents sourced by means of email and telephone exchanges 
with government and EC officials. 
The remainder of this article is structured in three sections. Section 2 presents a brief 
overview of international M&D and summarises the main achievements as well as critiques 
of this agenda. Section 3 presents the key findings of the comparative analysis based on the 
mappings of the eleven countries and the EU. Section 4 presents overall conclusions. 
 
 
The evolving international Migration & Development policy Discourse 
M&D broadly refers to the particular area of research and policy-making which is concerned 
with inter-linkages between migration and development. The term M&D immediately raises 
definitional issues, as any further characterisation of the concept requires an explicit 
definition of the two terms involved. In the absence of a unique definition of either 
migration or development, it is impossible to single out an M&D concept as such. The policy 
field of M&D, as it has been framed in recent international policy discourses, remains 
contested and constantly evolving. 
Within the research community, M&D has been debated for several decades, with 
discussions alternating like a ‘pendulum’ between phases of optimism, pessimism or neglect 
(De Haas, 2012). At the policy level, the ‘migration-development nexus’ – the expression was 
first coined in 2002 by Nyberg-Sørensen et al (2002) and subsequently made its way into 
policy discussions – started attracting considerable attention at the turn of the 21st century. 
At the heart of this recent upsurge of interest in this topic was a particular understanding of 
M&D, namely “that migration from the developing to the developed world [could] play an 
important role in the development of the poorer countries of origin” (Skeldon, 2008). This 
contrasted sharply with the previous trend in development thinking and practice which had 
been either indifferent – with M&D considered as distinct, separate areas of concern – or 
negative – with migration seen as indicating development failure (Bakewell, 2008). 
The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo 
constituted a first milestone in a series of international events and reports shaping the M&D 
international policy discourse80, yet reluctance of key destination countries prevented the 
planning of a follow-up conference for over a decade. Dialogue and cooperation on 
migration was instead moved to the regional or inter-regional level in the framework of a 
series of state-led, non binding, regional migration dialogues or consultative processes, with 
the so-called ‘Berne Initiative’ attempting to identify common understandings and effective 
practices from these processes (IOM & FOM, 2005). Throughout his term, then UN-Secretary 
General Kofi Annan pushed for the integration of migration in the international community 
agenda. In December 2003, the UN General Assembly resolved to organise a High-Level 
                                                          
80 See IOM and UNFPA (2012) for a more in-depth review of early policy development steps on M&D 
at international level. 
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Dialogue on International Migration and Development (UNHLD) in 2006. In 2003, a UN 
working group on international migration proposed the creation of an independent 
commission to look into how to strengthen national, regional, and global governance of 
international migration. In response, Sweden and Switzerland, together with the 
governments of Brazil, Morocco, and the Philippines, decided to establish the Global 
Commission on International Migration (GCIM) which published its final report in October 
2005 (GCIM, 2005). 2006 saw the organisation of the first UNHLD, the appointment of a 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Migration and the establishment 
of the Global Migration Group (GMG), an inter-agency coordination group which currently 
comprises 16 entities. The UNHLD led to the creation of the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development (GFMD), a state-led forum deliberately established outside the UN system, yet 
connected to it through both the GMG and the SRSG.  
These early milestones – until the mid-2000s – are characterised by a relatively 
consistent conceptualisation of M&D and its use in international policy discussions, geared 
towards maximising development benefits and minimising negative impacts of migration. At 
the heart of this conceptualisation are efforts to build on potentially beneficial effects of 
international migration cast as “tools” for promoting development in poorer countries of 
origin (Skeldon, 2008). This particular conceptualisation of M&D initially tended to focus on a 
number of migrants’ “resources” or “assets” to be “mobilised”, “harnessed”, “leveraged” or 
“tapped into” for the benefit of their country of origin. Linked to this understanding, 
international policy discussions focused on a limited set of specific issues, most notably 
remittances, skilled workers and brain drain, and diaspora for development.  
Beyond their thematic focus, M&D discussions brought profound changes in the 
overall approach to migration issues. With migration cast as a source of mutual 
developmental benefits for sending and receiving countries, as well as for migrants, a new 
space opened for inter-state cooperation as well as for dialogue and consultation with a 
broad range of non-state actors, such as migrant associations and civil society at large, the 
private sector or local authorities. Migration became an object of dialogue and partnership. 
The need to reinforce consistency between migration, development and other inter-related 
policies also brought to the fore the concept of policy coherence. Both approaches clearly 
broke with earlier understandings essentially centred on migration control as a sovereign 
prerogative of individual states. Therefore, the issue of capacity-building emerged as a third 
key element of the M&D nexus: the capacity of states and other stakeholders needed to be 
strengthened in order to enable them to design and implement mutually-reinforcing M&D 
strategies. The 2005 GCIM report subsumed this wider re-conceptualisation under the “3 
Cs”: capacity, coherence and cooperation. 
The shifts in approach captured in the “3 Cs” motto were influenced by the 
emergence of the notion of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). While policy 
coherence on M&D requires factoring migration into development policies and development 
into migration policies, the concept of PCD became popularised through discussions in the 
European Union since the late 1980s, was reflected in the 8th Millennium Development Goal 
and features in the discussions on a post-2015 framework on global development. The 
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concept of PCD refers to as representing and promoting the needs and interests of 
developing countries in all policies of developed countries, including those policy areas that 
concern themselves with migration (Keijzer, 2010). 
M&D policy discourses and practice soon attracted criticism, inter alia from civil 
society and academic research, not least because they appeared to promote an overly 
optimistic view tending to leave aside the less positive impacts of migration, in spite of a 
discourse purporting to both maximise the development benefits and mitigate the costs of 
human mobility. The remittance field provides a good illustration of this imbalance in 
approaches to M&D as they developed until the mid-2000s. Increased awareness of the 
magnitude of remittance flows and their potential for poverty-reduction promptly sustained 
a policy agenda aiming at increasing the volume of remittances, particularly through transfer 
cost reduction. Yet this agenda paid little attention to potential detrimental effects of 
remittances such as increased inequality linked to the geographic and social selectivity of 
migration or the entrenchment of a long-term dependency on emigration and remittances in 
countries and communities of origin. Nor was the transformational impact resource 
transfers can have on communities’ socio-cultural concepts of gender or wellbeing fully 
understood.  In addition, the private nature of remittance flows was not always adequately 
reflected in policies aiming at promoting the ‘productive use’ of remittances. Critical 
reviewers of this debate (e.g. De Haas 2007 and Carling 2008) have argued that one of the 
reasons for this imbalance in the policy discourse lies in in its over-reliance on economic 
approaches, leaving aside the essential role of socio-cultural dynamics shaping the sending, 
reception and use of remittances. 
Similarly the enthusiastic diaspora engagement policy discourse originally paid 
limited attention to challenges such as diaspora heterogeneity and conflicting agendas 
within the diaspora and among diaspora groups and their home country governments. This 
includes the potentially differing notions of development between transnational diaspora 
communities and the ultimate local stakeholders: those ‘at home’ (Faist, 2008). In addition, 
the existing literature points to a rather instrumental understanding of the diasporas that is 
reflected in public policies. This understanding tends to ignore the academic distinction 
between transnational community and diasporas by assigning all transnational traits and 
characteristics to the latter, requiring diasporas to first and foremost have an economic 
benefit and ignoring the socio-cultural dimensions that sustain them (Weinar 2010, p. 86). 
Other articles similarly observe that comprehensive and multi-dimensional understandings 
of the diasporas for development present in international discussions are yet to be reflected 
fully in EU member states’ policy frameworks (Spaan, van Naerssen & Hillman, 2005), and 
confirm an instrumentalisation of the diasporas as mere ‘channels’ for implementing 
development cooperation budgets that negates the opportunity to use diaspora 
organisations to innovate development (Sinatti & Horst, 2014).  
Overall, the early M&D policy discourse was criticised for failing to acknowledge the 
complex and context-specific nature of M&D inter-linkages as well as the centrality of 
broader development conditions in shaping them (De Haas, 2012) and for adopting a narrow 
focus on a relatively small subset of migration movements – namely international migration 
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from developing to developed countries – and on a predominantly economic understanding 
of development.. In addition, despite the proclaimed “triple win” objective (for migrants, 
sending and receiving countries), attention mainly concentrated on the situation of 
developing countries of origin, and there was much less consideration of destination 
countries, either in terms of positive effects for them or in terms of conditions at destination 
necessary to foster benefits at origin. Hence, migrant treatment and integration issues were 
largely ignored and the M&D area was criticised for not integrating a rights-based approach. 
This stands in contradiction with research findings demonstrating that integration and 
transnational engagement can be mutually reinforcing processes (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013). 
Economic integration in the destination country and ties to the country of origin are, for 
example, positively associated with sending remittances (Carling & Hoescher, 2013).  
Generally speaking, the difficulties faced by migrants in receiving countries were left aside, 
as attention concentrated on a rather idealised vision of the economic migrant as a relatively 
wealthy and educated individual, whose multi-faceted resources could be tapped into. 
Furthermore, and despite calls for policy coherence between migration and development 
policies, critics pointed out that discussion on the nature of destination countries’ migration 
policies were largely left out. Critics considered the M&D discourse a discursive façade for 
Northern receiving countries preference for temporary migration – re-branded for the 
occasion as circular migration – and called for greater consideration of “perspectives from 
the South” (Castles & Wise, 2008). Finally, M&D policy discourses were criticised for their 
persisting reliance on a “root causes approach” through which migration was reduced to a 
consequence of poverty and under-development, in contradiction with research findings 
suggesting that successful development processes in poorer countries initially tend to 
increase rather than decrease migration, a phenomenon popularised by Martin and Taylor 
(1996) as the ‘migration hump’. 
The publication of the 2009 Human Development Report (UNDP, 2009) contributed 
to the popularisation of a more refined understanding of M&D. The report reflected the 
state of the art in academic discussions on M&D, disseminating key research findings and 
addressing several of the above-mentioned criticisms. Calls for broadening and 
reconceptualising the M&D nexus have certainly influenced policy discussions, as can be 
seen for instance in the evolution of thematic priorities selected for successive GFMDs. 
Some of the emerging topics in the nexus have progressively been taken on board, including 
for instance gender and family implications, global care chains, migrant domestic work and 
the issue of South-South migration. Most recently, the second UNHLD and the 2014 GFMD 
Summit, which both resulted in calls for including human mobility in the post-2015 
development agenda, and the Outcome Document of the OWG for SDGs, which incorporates 
these reflections, have contributed to the evolution of the M&D international discourse in at 
least two major ways. First, the issue of migrant freedoms and rights was given a more 
prominent status than had previously been the case, and second more attention was given 
to the inter-linkages between migration and all three pillars of sustainable development, 
including the social and environmental dimensions. 
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States have shown less enthusiasm for proposals concerning admission policies such 
as ‘opening up existing entry channels so that more workers can emigrate’, including at 
lower levels of the skill ladder, as recommended by the 2009 Human Development report. 
This is hardly surprising since in many instances, policy discourses and practices in the M&D 
field remain characterised by fundamental ambiguities as to the objectives pursued. The 
“root causes approach” still prevails in the government circles of many countries. For 
destination countries in particular, the erroneous belief that migration can be stemmed 
through development often remains a key motivation for engaging in the M&D area. Return, 
reintegration and circular migration rank high on the agenda of many destination countries 
as vehicles for skill and knowledge transfers. However, they also clearly respond to domestic 
migration management objectives, in a period marked by increasingly restrictive migration 
policies in many destination countries. In this context, concerns over the possible 
instrumentalisation of the M&D nexus for migration control are certainly not unfounded. 
 Against this international policy backdrop81, the next section will present the results 
of the mapping of the 11 countries and the European Commission, with a focus on overall 
M&D policies, their respective institutional frameworks and efforts to promote policy 
coherence, and efforts made to operationalise M&D policies, with a key focus on specific 
interventions. 
 
 
Comparing M&D policy and practice in European countries and the EU 
 
Overall M&D policy developments in Europe  
Interest in M&D has grown rapidly among European countries in comparison to global 
developments. Precursors started working in this area in the late 1990s (Sweden, France and 
the UK) and by 2006, all 11 countries had engaged in M&D in one form or another. However, 
few have adopted policy papers specifically addressing M&D and laying out their overarching 
strategy in this area (France, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland). European countries 
have instead more commonly developed communications or documents that select and 
prioritise particular aspects pertaining to the wider M&D field, with a predominant focus on 
remittances, skilled migration and diaspora engagement. Early M&D initiatives have been ad 
hoc in nature rather than the result of consistent national strategies and policies. 
M&D remains a contested area at the international level and Europe is no exception. 
The 11 countries generally acknowledge the inter-linkages between M&D and the role to be 
                                                          
81 Since 2013-2014 international policy developments are posterior to the period when data 
informing this analysis was collected at European State and EU level, they are not reflected in the 
subsequent analysis. It is acknowledged however that they will have had important impacts in a 
number of instances. This is the case for instance at the EU level where a new Communication on 
‘Maximising the Development Impact of Migration’ and subsequent Council Conclusions adopted in 
2013 in the run-up the UN HLD put forward a significantly renewed approach to the M&D nexus. The 
extent to which the latest international developments will further affect the European policy and 
practice at EU and Member State level in the coming years remains to be seen. 
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played by policy to promote positive outcomes for development. However, they have not 
yet reached a consensus on the exact nature of these inter-linkages and the policies 
necessary to bring about these positive impacts. This is due to reasons linked both to data 
and knowledge constraints – the evidence base on M&D is still under construction in many 
areas – and to conflicting visions of the objectives to be pursued through M&D policies. 
Most countries have attempted to create opportunities for synergies in the M&D field, by 
progressively integrating migration aspects in their development policies and – to a much 
lesser extent – development in their migration policies. In some cases, this has led to the 
elaboration of an M&D policy, but in others M&D has not been considered a separate policy 
area and the focus has been placed on synergies and coherence between various policy 
areas. Domestic and European political evolutions play a key role in shaping discourses and 
practices on M&D. European approaches are also influenced by the evolving nature of global 
debates on M&D. Conversely, international discussions and particularly major milestones 
regularly prompt European governments and the EU to re-position themselves vis-à-vis 
debates and emerging issues, and shaping them in return.  
At the EU level, the first official reference to the developmental dimension of 
migration dates back to the conclusions of the 1999 Tampere European Council, but 
effective engagement with M&D issues really started in 2005 with the adoption of the Global 
Approach to Migration (GAM), which provides the framework for EU’s dialogue and 
cooperation with third countries on migration issues (Council, 2005a). An overarching policy 
framework on M&D has been developed as a pillar of the GAM. The GAM was revised in 
2012 and rebranded as the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) (Council, 
2012a). The GAMM is often seen as a good reflection of the state of thinking among EU 
member states, and a ‘safer’ place to articulate a broader M&D nexus compared to the 
national policies and debates. The GAMM’s understanding indeed often goes beyond that of 
some of the countries’ national policies. Despite the existence of an overall strategic 
framework as part of the GAMM, EU institutions are affected by the same tensions as 
European countries, with clear differences in the policy perspectives of the various 
stakeholders involved in M&D issues.  
Mirroring M&D discussions at the global level, many European countries have tended 
to focus on the archetypal figure of a relatively successful “voluntary” or “economic” migrant 
holding valuable resources, including skills, to be mobilised for the benefit of his/her country 
of origin. This focus on contributions to development by specific categories of supposedly 
well-off migrants has mainly been framed in economic terms, contrasting with a human 
development approach going beyond the advancement of economic wealth to focus on 
people’s overall well-being, including personal safety, political and economic freedom, and 
respect for human rights.  
However, a number of countries go beyond this restrictive focus and address the 
situation and treatment of migrants. Migrant rights are acknowledged in the policy 
documents of Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, with Germany and 
Spain both aiming to support and protect migrants throughout the migration cycle. In 
addition, in countries where local authorities have been involved in M&D activities (e.g. 
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Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and Spain) integration is perceived as a way to enhance 
migrants’ capacity to contribute to the development of their country of origin, a policy area 
that resonates with recent research on transnationalism and has largely been absent so far 
in the international M&D conceptualisation. Acknowledging that in many contexts migration 
is prompted by a combination of factors, making it difficult to distinguish between forced 
and voluntary/economic migrants, some countries have taken a more holistic perspective, 
considering all categories of migrants as part of their approach to M&D (e.g. Sweden and 
Switzerland).  
Other European countries have tended to link forced migration and M&D in a more 
ambiguous way. Several mapped countries consider the return and reintegration of failed 
asylum seekers, among other migrants, as part of their approach to M&D (e.g. Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands and Spain). Consequently they include programmes such as the 
Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programmes as part of their M&D portfolio. 
Irrespective of the acknowledgement of a policy link between this type of programme and 
development objectives under the M&D heading, Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
budgets are used to varying extents for such purposes in most countries. The Netherlands, 
where cooperation on these issues now directly conditions the levels of bilateral aid, 
appears as the most extreme case. Readmission issues are clearly high on the EU agenda and 
constitute a central element of EU dialogue with third countries. In this context, return and 
reintegration objectives are clearly to manage migration to the advantage of countries of 
destination rather than to leverage migration for the benefit of the country of origin. This 
type of return should however be distinguished from what could be termed “returning 
experts” programmes and interventions targeting skilled migrants, such as the RQN, MIDA 
and TOKTEN programmes run by IOM and UNDP respectively (Melde and Ndiaye-Coïc, 
2009).  
Circular migration has been promoted by the EU as a particularly promising avenue 
for benefiting all parties involved. However, only a few of the 11 countries have really 
included circular migration as part of their policy reflections, and even fewer have attempted 
to translate this policy interest into concrete measures. A central difficulty is that most 
governments do not clearly distinguish between circular and temporary migration, since it is 
argued that circular migration should be distinguished from temporary migration in that it 
implies both “flexibility” and “regularity” (Skeldon, 2012). Flexibility allows migrants to freely 
circulate and regularity refers to the recurrence of movements back and forth. Recent 
programmes purporting to foster circular migration which do not meet these two criteria, 
for instance in the Netherlands and Spain, have therefore been considered “de facto 
temporary migration programmes” (McLoughlin et al, 2011). 
Approaches to policy coherence are also an integral part of M&D conceptualisations 
in Europe and therefore also deserve attention from a conceptual point of view. Confirming 
the general literature reviewed above, the 11 countries have generally found it easier to 
integrate migration issues into development policies – mainly via the standard issues of 
remittances, skilled migration, and diaspora engagement – than vice versa. Discussions on 
integrating development concerns into migration policies have mainly revolved around 
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return, reintegration and circular, in practice temporary, migration, ambiguously cast as 
vehicles for development – in many cases independently from any reference to policy 
coherence.  
Few countries refer to labour markets and their labour migration policy in a 
comprehensive way as part of their M&D policy framework, indicating reluctance to link 
labour migration policies with the M&D discussion beyond attracting highly-skilled migrants. 
This is a major immigration policy concern for the EU and many European countries. 
Concrete steps have been taken at EU level with the adoption of the “Blue card directive” in 
2009, first proposed as part of the 2005 Policy Plan on legal migration. Although Member 
States can apply their own highly-skilled admission policies parallel to this EU Directive and 
its intended incentive effects ware watered down, it still constitutes the first European 
instrument for facilitating legal labour migration (Eisele, 2010). Admission provisions for 
lower-skilled migrants have proved more conflictual and less of a priority as evidenced by 
the slow progress of discussions at EU level on the seasonal workers’ directive. Beyond the 
focus on highly-skilled migrants, policies in the majority of the 11 countries do not associate 
M&D with the development in and of destination countries. The result is that protection and 
the socio-economic inclusion of migrants, such as the right to work, the right to family 
reunification, portability of work permits or access to social security protection, fall into 
domestic policy domains that are disconnected from international development 
engagements and commitments to the M&D discourse.  
The difficulties encountered in integrating migration issues in development policies 
and development concerns in migration policy frameworks in various areas reflect a central 
ambiguity in the way M&D has been framed: despite the “triple win” discourse, the focus is 
mainly placed on developing countries and the situation of destination countries tends to be 
left aside. The “challenges” are visible through, as previously emphasized, return and 
reintegration ranking high on the agenda of many of the mapped countries. References to 
tackling the “root”, “structural” or “underlying” causes of migration can be found in the 
policy frameworks of most mapped countries as part of the rationale or stated objectives. 
Migration thus often appears as a challenge rather than an opportunity. 
 
 
Institutional Framework and Policy Coherence for Development 
All countries, as well as the EC, operate in an institutional setting where different ministries 
and agencies are responsible for different policy aspects of the M&D nexus. The prevailing 
mandate of the Ministry in the lead – Development, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs or 
Justice – influences the direction of the M&D policy. Moving the portfolio or designated unit 
from one ministry to another has frequently resulted in M&D policy changes, usually linked 
to political changes and accompanying ideological shifts. Nevertheless, each government 
operates in its own political and institutional culture (e.g. consensus-oriented or 
majoritarian), making it difficult to draw solid conclusions on any direct effects of 
institutional set-ups and hierarchies on M&D policy development.  
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An M&D institutional set-up within a Ministry for Development, for example, seems 
to facilitate its anchoring in the development policy at ministerial level, preventing the 
internal affairs’ agenda taking priority over development concerns in discussions on M&D. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be taken for granted that having a Ministry and/or Minister for 
Development in the lead of M&D increases the potential for a development-friendly M&D 
approach. Ministries or ministers responsible for development cooperation often have a 
junior or a portfolio status (i.e. not having a separate ministry but being part of the foreign 
ministry) that results in a relatively lower political standing of development policy vis-à-vis 
the minister(s) leading on migration policy. This lower standing can result in an approach to 
policy coherence that – contrary to stated intentions – limits the role of development policy 
(and ODA in particular) to one of facilitating migration policy.   
The Ministry of Interior is involved in shaping the M&D approach in all countries, with 
other ministry involvement depending on the topic at hand, e.g. the Ministry of Finance in 
remittances related debates or the Ministry for Employment or Labour in discussions 
regarding circular migration. Also, most countries have established focal points that are 
responsible for coordinating the M&D policy and/or the strategic approach. A strict 
separation between those ministries tasked with ‘national’ migration policy and those taking 
care of the ‘external dimension’ of migration policy is not easily discernible. Migration policy 
cannot by definition only be concerned with the national dimension, which is why ministries 
charged with migration management are increasingly involved in the external dimension of 
migration policy and hence influence the line taken by Foreign Affairs when they are in the 
lead of M&D. In most of countries, inter-ministerial meetings feature among the means to 
promote policy coherence between migration and development priorities. Regular inter-
ministerial meeting structures have been established in practically all countries, mainly 
bringing together the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for Development Cooperation, 
the Ministry of Interior or Justice, and sometimes the national development agency, the 
Ministry of Employment or the Ministry of Finance, depending on the thematic area that is 
discussed.  
After the EU’s commitment to PCD was politically reinforced through the European 
Consensus on Development adopted in December 2005, all countries indicate that policy 
coherence discussions among government and other actors on strengthening the impact of 
development cooperation in general and the links between M&D in particular have 
intensified, and countries use a variety of approaches to attain policy coherence between 
these two areas. Denmark and Sweden, who are considered pioneers in the reflection on 
PCD, increasingly include migration as a pivotal area. At the time of data collection, PCD did 
not rank particularly high on the national political agenda in countries such as Belgium, Italy, 
the Netherlands or the UK. Migration was often either not considered as an area which is 
crucial for attaining PCD, or one where the level of political sensitivity does not allow for 
much progress to be made. This has lead to more pragmatic and instrumental approaches 
towards integrating migration and development policies, such as in the case of the 
Netherlands which only addresses overlaps between its migration and development policies 
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where mutually positive policy outcomes can be achieved, thus excluding its immigration 
policy.  
M&D policy coherence does not necessarily lead to more development-friendly 
policies. Whereas in principle M&D policy coherence can be complementary to efforts at 
promoting PCD, many countries showed approaches to and followed recent trends in M&D 
policy coherence that were skewed towards migration policy, thus de facto resulting in 
trade-offs with further progress made towards promoting PCD. Belgium and the Netherlands 
have increased the formal or informal use of migration-related conditionality in 
development programmes. This can also be found in the EU’s “more for more” approach in 
the negotiations on mobility partnerships with partner countries.  
For a variety of reasons, it is difficult to compare the different countries regarding the 
volume of funding they make available to promote M&D by means of specific projects. 
Whereas the EC, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland have a 
dedicated budget that takes up the bulk of their M&D portfolio, the other countries 
mainstream migration into their development projects or apply a mixed approach, i.e. 
integrating migration components into development activities and making funding dedicated 
to M&D available. The decision to establish specific budget lines for M&D projects seems 
closely linked to whether the implementing agency or ministry in the respective country has 
been given a specific mandate for M&D. A hybrid approach that makes dedicated funding for 
M&D projects available and integrates migration components into development projects 
and programmes, might be a good stepping stone in moving towards the longer term 
objectives of mainstreaming migration into development.  
Projects on M&D are often implemented either by the government’s own 
(development cooperation) implementing agency or through international organisations or 
migrant associations under the lead of either a ministry or the government’s implementing 
agency. In contrast, Belgium, the EC, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland mainly 
‘outsource’ the implementation of their M&D projects to international organisations or well 
established NGOs having strong project management and delivery skills and a relatively long 
track record. Other key implementing partners are diaspora organisations.  
The number of partner countries covered by M&D projects is wide-ranging and for 
most countries goes far beyond the ‘traditional’ development cooperation partner countries. 
Italy, the Netherlands and Spain increasingly channel their M&D funding towards the main 
countries of immigrants’ origin, a choice which again raises questions about whether 
projects seek optimal effectiveness of the ODA budget in terms of promoting sustainable 
development, or instead seek to mainly serve domestic or migration policy interests. 
Thematically, the mapped countries have concentrated their activities on remittances, 
skilled migration and diaspora engagement, with the latter appearing prominently in 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the UK. 
Switzerland has, exceptionally, an explicit focus on labour migration as a development issue 
in relation to the migrant’s region of origin as part of the M&D approach, while the other 
countries that implement projects in this area do not put it at the forefront of their strategic 
approach towards M&D (e.g. Germany).  
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The findings point to an overall lack of cooperation and coordination between the 
mapped countries. Although countries have made general commitments to strengthen 
coordination in development cooperation, M&D projects are still carried out in a mainly 
national framework and logic. Due to the inconsistent nature of planning M&D projects in 
the absence of overarching policies and strategies, as well as the differing levels of priority 
attached to this issue in partner countries’ national development plans, development 
interventions in this area can be said to perform less well than other sectors, such as health 
or education, in terms of respecting internationally agreed principles of development 
effectiveness.  
 
 
Conclusions: comparing M&D policy and practice in European countries and the EU 
At the time of the 2006 UNHLD, all mapped countries had engaged in one form or another in 
M&D, yet none of them pursued a clear and consistent approach. Those countries that have 
adopted specific policies or strategies on M&D acknowledge the inter-linkages between 
development and migration and the role to be played by policy to promote positive 
outcomes for development, but limited evidence on the exact nature of these inter-linkages 
and conflicting visions of the objectives to be pursued through M&D policies has hampered 
PCD. At the heart of this is the migration policy component of the nexus, which is easily 
steered by domestic concerns and has proven influential in shaping discourses and practices 
on M&D in many of the mapped countries. Migration is also typically portrayed as a 
challenge rather than an opportunity for the countries of destination.  
Countries that have issued new policy documents on M&D in recent years have 
generally reflected global and EC transformations in their understanding of the M&D nexus. 
While some of the countries are indeed moving into a broader understanding of migration as 
a development issue and beyond the traditional themes – remittances, diaspora, circular 
migration and brain drain – others are still focusing on migrants’ “resources” to be 
“harnessed” for the benefit of their country of origin. The prevalent approach still designates 
M&D as a tool for poverty reduction. This has led to an overemphasis on economic 
development at the expense of human development, which is linked to people’s 
entitlements and not to their income. A narrow understanding of poverty reduction ignores 
socio-political elements that measure the quality of life, like social well-being, income 
inequality, gender equality, universal access to primary education, health care and 
meaningful employment.  
Most of the mapped countries seem to have found it difficult to translate PCD 
commitments into concrete results at the level of migration policies. Some M&D practices 
point towards asymmetry in policy coherence skewed towards migration policy, which, while 
reinforcing links between migration and development policy in certain cases, limits 
opportunities to promote PCD. Specific projects on M&D can help catalyse results of 
development-friendly migration policies, but they cannot ‘repair’ policies that are not. In this 
regard, from the perspective of development, there are discouraging trends in some 
countries where development cooperation is subordinated to migration interests, e.g. in the 
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debate on and increasing applications of migration-related conditionality (such as 
readmission) in development cooperation. Notwithstanding proposals to facilitate circular 
migration, there are still few or no possibilities for migrants to establish their ‘locus’ of 
circularity in the host-country itself.  
There are also still a number of instances where the practices of European receiving 
countries lead to the deterioration of the human rights situation of migrants and asylum 
seekers. Socio-economic rights, such as the right to work, the right to family reunification, 
portability of work permits or access to social security protection, are often restricted. A 
better balance should be sought between the receiving countries’ interests in restricting 
certain rights and granting others that contribute to the developmental effect on migrants as 
well as on their countries of origin. This is particularly important given the interconnections 
between integration in destination countries and transnational engagement for 
development in countries of origin. M&D policies adopted by the mapped countries, 
however, are far from fully reflecting the linkages between the integration, social inclusion 
and protection of migrants and their development activities. 
As a final observation, the findings show that in all countries an exchange of practices 
and experiences between the central and local level is lacking, which hampers the 
promotion of policy coherence on M&D. As a first step, cooperation between the 
government actors working on M&D and those working with integration could enrich the 
understanding of these inter-linkages and may serve to better reflect the transnational 
realities migrants face and migrant associations work in. Improving cooperation within and 
between countries is a precondition for promoting PCD. Cooperation and coordination 
between countries could probably be best enhanced by means of concrete operational 
activities, as opposed to more general policy level discussions. Independent research on the 
implementation of M&D policies, beyond a preoccupation with the effectiveness of 
individual ODA-financed interventions, would be key to inform further progress. 
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4. The European Union and Policy Coherence for Development: Reforms, Results, 
Resistance 
Abstract 
This article discusses the trajectory of policy coherence for development (PCD) in the 
European Union (EU). In particular, it argues that the strong focus on institutional 
mechanisms, conceived as a way of overcoming different types of resistance, has had the 
effect that results achieved have by no means been commensurate with the expectations 
raised by the various reforms launched over the years. EU Member States have paid lip-
service to the importance of PCD without translating commitments into more coherent 
(national and supranational) policies. Moreover, through an analysis of the Impact 
Assessment (IA) – the principal mechanism to promote PCD at EU level – prepared for the 
reform of the EU’s agricultural and fisheries policies in 2011-2013 it shows how bureaucratic 
arrangements have substantially failed to clarify the real impact of EU policies on (different 
types of) developing countries. The conclusion is that successful promotion of PCD is more 
than just having the right arguments and ensuring sufficient technical support, but is first 
and foremost a political undertaking. 
 
 
Introduction 
The concept of policy coherence for development (PCD), which refers to the synergic 
interaction between foreign aid and all other development-related policy areas, has received 
significant attention at both academic and policy levels since the early 1990s. Much scholarly 
work has concentrated on the theoretical significance of PCD, the factors that enable or 
hinder its promotion, and the pernicious effects it has on developing countries (Forster & 
Stokke, 1999; Ashoff, 2005; Picciotto, 2005; Carbone, 2009; Sianes, 2013). Less attention has 
been attracted by the gradual evolution of PCD from being a donor responsibility, along a 
North-South division, into becoming a shared responsibility, with both emerging and 
developing countries playing a more assertive role in relation to actors in the North (Janus et 
al., 2015). At the policy level, efforts to improve PCD have not been framed as a political 
endeavour of managing trade-offs between policy interests but instead as a largely technical 
and managerial process (Adelle and Jordan, 2014; Prontera, 2014). The European Union 
(EU), recognised as one of the forerunners in PCD discourses (Hoebink, 2004c; Carbone, 
2012), has also pursued this type of approach. True, PCD has been institutionalised since the 
1993 Maastricht Treaty, which provided a first legal basis eventually strengthened by the 
2009 Lisbon Treaty, and has taken a prominent place in the 2005 European Consensus on 
Development and other politically relevant documents. However, the strong focus on 
institutional mechanisms, conceived as a way of overcoming different types of resistance, 
has had the effect that results achieved have by no means been commensurate with the 
expectations raised by the various reforms launched over the years. In fact, most EU 
Member States have paid lip-service to the importance of PCD without translating 
commitments into more coherent (national and supranational) policies.  
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To make this argument, this paper first revisits the trajectory of PCD in the EU, 
discussing the reforms proposed, the results achieved, and the resistance encountered. 
Then, it illustrates the clash of the technocratic approach with the political reality through an 
analysis of the Impact Assessment (IA) – the principal mechanism to promote PCD at EU level 
– prepared for the reform of the EU’s agricultural and fisheries policies in 2011-2013. The 
final section concludes, reiterating the fact that the successful promotion of PCD is more 
than just having the right arguments and ensuring sufficient technical support, but is first 
and foremost a political undertaking. 
 
 
Adopting reforms 
The origin of discussions on how public policies of advanced economies contribute or 
undermine development goes back to the creation of development cooperation itself. 
Initiatives between the 1950s and 1980s saw the application of re-adapted versions of 
technocratic approaches to development, generally imposed by the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (BWIs), and with the burden placed mostly on developing countries (Forster & 
Stokke, 1999; Winters, 2004; Picciotto, 2005).82 It was only in the early 1990s that the 
concept of PCD took off in official policy discourses. The initial concern was that of increasing 
the returns of official development assistance (ODA) in the face of decreasing aid volumes – 
PCD was thus seen as complementing aid efforts – whilst reducing the negative impacts of 
‘non-aid’ policies on broader development processes through ‘do-not-harm’ approaches. 
These views were crystallised in the Millennium Declaration and its associated Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Various donors used the MDGs, most specifically the first 
seven, as a framework for increased ODA spending. At the same time, through MDG-8, it 
was universally accepted that foreign aid would have to be supplemented with additional 
efforts in a number of development-related policy areas, particularly trade, debt relief, and 
access to medicines and new technologies (Grieg-Gran, 2003; Ashoff, 2005; Picciotto, 2005). 
By the end of the 2000s, PCD became one of the main components of the ‘beyond aid’ 
discourse, as evidenced by the 2011 Busan Global Partnership for Development 
Effectiveness and the negotiations of the post-2015 agenda: at least at the rhetorical level, 
there seemed to be a shift from ‘do-not-harm’ approaches towards more proactive, 
concerted approaches engaging actors beyond traditional donors and traditional 
development means (Carbone, 2013b; ERD, 2013; Janus et al., 2015). 
                                                          
82 PCD was in disguise in the concepts of ‘comprehensive planning’ in the 1960s; ‘integrated 
development’ in the 1970s; ‘structural adjustment’ programmes in the 1980s; and ‘poverty reduction 
strategy papers’ in the 1990s. The domination of the BWIs in setting the international agenda on 
development was only partially questioned by the creation of UNCTAD and the demands of the 
Global South on economically advanced states to avoid undoing the gains of development assistance 
through adverse public policy measures. These discussions led to the commitment by developed 
countries in a historical UN General Assembly resolution not only to provide 0.7% of their Gross 
National Income as Official Development Assistance but also to refrain from increasing or creating 
(non-)tariff trade barriers to developing countries (Forster & Stokke, 1999; Winters, 2004; Picciotto, 
2005). 
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The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has certainly represented an important 
arena for various PCD discussions over the years. The DAC Secretariat, in particular, has 
sponsored the publication of policy studies and has attempted to elevate the political profile 
of PCD by supporting ministerial level meetings and declarations, though in vain (Picciotto, 
2005; Carbone, 2012).83 But there is little doubt that the EU has been at the forefront of 
discussions, owing to inputs from the European Commission and some like-minded Member 
States (e.g. Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, and Sweden). The Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, 
innovatively, provided a legal basis for PCD (though it did not mention the term itself), 
requiring that the European Community, in its supranational policies, ‘take account of the 
objectives [of development cooperation] in the policies that it implements which are likely to 
affect developing countries’. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty extended this obligation to the whole of 
the EU, thus including also inter-governmental policies. Treaty provisions confirm the 
importance the EU attaches to PCD, but that alone has not been sufficient to guide further 
action and promote results.  
It was then in the mid-2000s that the EU shifted gear, considering that between 1993 
and 2005 very little progress could be recorded, partly because of lack of interest of most 
Member States and partly because of clashes within the European Commission itself 
(Hoebink, 2004c; Carbone, 2008). In the context of an ambitious project to federate the 
policies of the Member States, not only on ‘more and better aid’, the European Commission 
proposed ‘coherence for development commitments’ in 12 policy areas: trade; environment; 
climate change; security; agriculture; fisheries; social dimension of globalisation, 
employment and decent work; migration, research and innovation; information society; 
transport; energy (European Commission, 2005). These commitments were ardently 
endorsed by the (External Relations) Council in May 2005 (Council, 2005b) and were also 
incorporated in the European Consensus on Development in December 2005 (European 
Union, 2006). In that context, it was also decided to assign the monitoring process, centred 
on biennial reports, to the European Commission – though on the basis of information 
submitted directly by the Member States. The first two biennial reports highlighted 
significant variations between Member States in how they sought to promote PCD 
domestically and at the EU level (European Commission, 2007, 2009c). These reports, which 
acted as a soft version of a ‘naming and shaming’ strategy highlighting failures and negative 
effects of non-aid policies, stimulated intense debates in the Council, but not much else. 
Interestingly, this strategy may have even been counterproductive for engaging policy 
communities and actors beyond those in development (Keijzer, 2010; OECD, 2014). 
                                                          
83 The discussion in the DAC involves different levels: (1) important strategic documents, from the 
1996 strategy document Shaping the 21st Century: The Contributions of Development Co-operation 
to the 2012 OECD Strategy on Development; (2) numerous research publications highlighting the 
‘development dimension’ across a number of different policy areas; (3) various compendiums 
identifying tools and mechanisms for the successful promotion of PCD (Carbone, 2012). 
Nevertheless, a recent review, based on expert interviews, has concluded that PCD has gradually 
become more important at the OECD level, yet it has never been a central priority (King et al., 2012).  
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Unsurprisingly, subsequent reports did not have the same level of ambition or prominence 
(European Commission, 2011d; 2013). 
Different types of resistance combined with lack of evident results (as we will see 
below) led the European Commission, and some willing Member States, to make some 
attempts to further specify the EU’s aspirations in this area. A first example is the 2009 
proposal to concentrate on five global challenges – intellectual property rights, food security, 
climate change, migration, and security – so that the EU could more proactively contribute 
to reaching the MDGs by the agreed deadline and could more easily pursue a ‘whole-of-the-
Union’ approach (European Commission, 2009b). The reduction from 12 policy areas to five 
global challenges received mixed reactions. On the one hand, it was endorsed by the 
(External Relations) Council, which not only supported the allegedly more focused approach 
(it also expanded the first area to ‘trade and finance’), but also invited the European 
Commission to ‘establish a clear set of objectives, targets and gender-disaggregated 
indicators to measure progress in the selected priority areas’, whilst making better use of 
the IA procedure, for ‘a more focused, operational and results-oriented approach’ (Council, 
2009, p. 2). On the other hand, it was criticised by the European Parliament’s Development 
Committee, which saw in it a sort of scale-down in ambition from the EU (European 
Parliament, 2010).84 A second example, which was affected by the commitment of different 
EU rotating presidencies, is the so-called ‘rolling work programme on PCD’, detailing 
concrete steps through which EU Member States and supranational institutions could deliver 
on the aspirations expressed in EU legal and political commitments. This initiative, which 
favoured processes over outcomes, did not have much effect besides promoting new, at 
times heated, debates in the Council (Keijzer, 2012). An ambiguous pattern thus emerged 
whereby the EU does not speak with one voice but seemingly reaffirms and undermines its 
own ambitions on PCD. 
The overall emphasis on bureaucratic arrangements reflected the popularity that new 
public management (NPM) and results-based management (RBM) concepts gained in Europe 
in the 1990s and 2000s (Di Francesco, 2001; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011; Peters, 2015). The 
promotion of PCD, in theory, benefited from the combined efforts to, on the one hand, 
improve accountability and transparency of EU policy processes, with the effect of 
representing policy processes as technocratic problem-solving exercises (in line with NPM 
thinking), and, on the other hand, draw on performance information to make informed 
choices, with the view to bringing management improvement and performance reporting (in 
line with RBM thinking). A key indication of this trend, and certainly one of the main 
innovations in EU governance over the past decade, is the introduction of the IA procedure 
in 2003 as part of the process of formulating new policies. The push for IAs was shaped both 
by the 2001 Sustainable Development Strategy and by the Commission’s ‘Better Regulation’ 
agenda, eventually replaced by the ‘Smart Regulation’ agenda (Rowe, 2006; Franz and 
                                                          
84 One key result of this report was the call for a standing rapporteur on PCD, a position that since 
rotates between the different political groups represented in the Committee (European Parliament, 
2010). 
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Kirkpatrick, 2007). By outlining potential positive and negative effects of proposed policy 
actions, including synergies and trade-offs between competing objectives, IAs represent a 
tool for the exchange of technical information between interested parties (Bäcklund, 2009). 
At the same time, they may be used by consensus-seeking actors to de-politicise complex 
issues (Radaelli & Meuwese, 2010) or may represent the position of some stakeholders at 
the expense of others (Torriti, 2010). Despite comprising a highly fragmented setup, partly 
due to the expanding EU legislative competencies and partly as a result of the enlargement 
process, the European Commission argued that its ‘Smart Regulation’ agenda would be 
suitable for effectively promoting and pursuing all horizontal objectives that transcended 
particular sectors and areas, including PCD. But as we will see below, the pursuit of PCD 
through managerial means has turned out to be an elusive one.  
 
 
Achieving results 
One of the central challenges that advocates of the PCD agenda face is related to the 
difficulty to measure results, particularly because they are convinced that evidence-based 
analyses could help generate significant political support (Carbone, 2012; Barder et al., 
2013). The most practicable way to show progress – and the one that has prevailed in official 
discourses – is that of concentrating on processes (i.e., how things are done) rather than 
outcomes (i.e., what is achieved) (Di Francesco, 2001). The EU is no exception to this trend: 
much emphasis has been placed on efforts made by EU Member States and supranational 
institutions to set up bureaucratic arrangements, often implying a positive correlation 
between mechanisms and results. Interestingly, the European Commission (2007, 2009c) has 
noted that the use of various types of mechanisms has produced an increased awareness on 
PCD across Europe, but only modest results  – findings which have been corroborated by 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) reports (Concord, 2011; 2013) and independent 
research (Egenhofer et al., 2006; Stroß, 2014). Mechanisms for promoting PCD comprise 
different features and vary from one country to another, depending on national political and 
administrative contexts. They range from ‘whole-of-government’ approaches, such as the 
one pursued by Sweden, requiring all policies to contribute to achieving the government’s 
development goals, to dedicated PCD units, such as the one operating within the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2001 and 2012.85 In other cases more flexible forms of 
coordination are in place bringing together interested parties, such as inter-ministerial 
arrangements with PCD mandates, like those in Finland and Ireland (Galeazzi et al., 2013; 
van Seters et al., 2015).86 This emphasis on bureaucratic arrangements has also been at the 
                                                          
85 The unit was discontinued in December 2012 following a reorganisation of the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The consequence is that the capacity of the ministry in this area has greatly 
diminished (Galeazzi et al., 2013). 
86 An important point is that EU Member States make reference towards achieving more coherence 
at EU level and, generally, have a specific department or unit dealing with EU development 
cooperation. Yet, awareness of commitments made in the EU context has remained low in ministries 
beyond those dealing directly with international development (Galeazzi et al., 2013).  
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heart of DAC discussions, where it was concluded that the successful implementation of PCD 
depends on the willingness of countries to cater for three essential ‘building blocks’, which 
make up a ‘PCD cycle’: policy statements setting and prioritising objectives; coordination 
mechanisms; monitoring and reporting (Hudson and Johnson, 2008). An analysis of the peer 
reviews of all DAC members since 2000, however, reveals that the three building blocks have 
proven important to raising awareness across different government departments and 
ministries, but have not translated into greater PCD (OECD, 2014). 
Clearly, the role played by all types of mechanisms in facilitating results remains 
ambiguous at best, but one fact seems to be widely accepted: ‘their impact should not be 
overstated’ (Prontera, 2014, p. 17). In fact, an evaluation commissioned by a group of EU 
Member States has noted that there is not even a common understanding as to what impact 
is sought through these mechanisms (Mackie, 2007). Measuring results is complicated not 
only by a conceptual confusion on how to define development, but also by the absence of a 
significant body of empirical evidence that can more precisely map the extent to which EU 
policies affect developing countries. This is the result of a widespread underinvestment in 
the production of such evidence, and curiously the same countries that have expressed 
strong commitment to PCD have been reluctant to make available adequate research 
funding in this area (Hudson & Jonnson, 2008; Galeazzi et al., 2013).87 Moreover, the reports 
published by European NGOs, while playing an important role in public discourses, have 
mostly relied on anecdotal evidence or on suggestive case studies (Concord, 2011; 2013). 
The consequence of the dearth of evidence-based analysis is that of turning discussions 
about mechanisms into a largely symbolical exercise (Keijzer, 2012). 
Another obstacle to measuring progress in PCD is the absence of either a clear baseline 
that shows how coherent EU policies are at a given point in time, or any agreement on how 
coherent such policies should become by a given deadline. This means that assessing 
progress cannot even result in a debate about whether ‘the glass is half-full or half-empty’, 
and instead tends to produce disagreement both on the size of the glass and its contents. 
Thus, when some (for instance the European Commission) claim that the EU has made 
substantial progress and others (for instance European NGOs) describe progress as 
disappointing, both of them may be making valid points. This uncertainty has severely 
hampered the generation of a results-based approach in the promotion of PCD – in an era in 
which showing the actual impact of policies has become a matter of public accountability – 
and has allowed EU Member States and the European Commission to determine their own 
pace and move the goal-posts along the way (Keijzer, 2010). An attempt to introduce PCD 
indicators, within both the DAC (in 2009) and the EU (in 2010) was resisted by various 
countries – including several EU Member States – highlighting the fact that there seemed to 
be a widespread preference among countries to stay at a general level, rather than being 
tied to anything that could constrain their freedom or being exposed to public shaming in 
                                                          
87 Examples of important exceptions to this pattern are recent pilot studies commissioned by the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Operations and Evaluation Department (IOB, 2014), as well 
as the inclusion of a specific research call on PCD in the EU’s Horizon 2020 research work 
programme. 
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case of poor performance (King et al., 2012; van Seters et al., 2015). Unsurprisingly, a recent 
study commissioned by a group of EU Member States has concluded that many countries 
appear to be, in principle, receptive of the idea of a ‘development friendliness index’, but at 
the same time there has been ‘insufficient political support for an internationally recognised 
and institutionalised approach’ (King et al., 2012, p. 49). 
Thus, the only proxy that could be used to measure outcomes remains the 
Commitment to Development Index (CDI), published every year since 2003 by an American 
think-tank, the Centre for Global Development, which compares countries across a range of 
policies. Notwithstanding its various limitations (Picciotto, 2005), the CDI serves to highlight 
two points. Firstly, Europe’s collective commitment to development is average (i.e. better 
than Japan and the USA, but behind Canada and New Zealand) and does not improve as fast 
as in other parts of the world. More generally, Europe’s approach to development can be 
characterised as ‘energetically tackling the symptoms of limited economic opportunities for 
developing countries by providing substantial and effective aid but doing less to tackle the 
underlying structural causes of poverty’ (Barder et al., 2013, p. 848). Secondly, there is 
considerable variation between EU countries: the highest ranked nations are small, mainly 
Nordic countries (i.e. Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg), whereas some of the larger and 
richer countries (especially France, Germany, and Italy) perform relatively poorly overall. 
More importantly, ‘the results suggest that every country could improve its score 
considerably if it did no more than implement policies that have been proved to be 
politically feasible elsewhere … even without stretching the envelope of possibilities’ (Barder 
et al., 2013, pp. 837-8). 
 
 
Facing resistance 
Even the most reluctant actors acknowledge the importance of PCD, but problems exist in 
translating commitments into results. The overall meagre record by the EU, in spite of the 
various reforms proposed and adopted over the years, is due to three interlinked types of 
resistance; so much so that the pursuit of PCD has been portrayed as a ‘mission impossible’ 
for whoever attempts it (Carbone, 2008) – not to mention the fact that the number of PCD 
champions has decreased over the years. But before we examine each of them in turn, one 
general observation must be made: the EU is good at setting normative frameworks, but its 
compliance record generally does not match its ambitions. This rhetoric-reality gap does 
characterise other international actors, but ‘they have not exposed themselves to it in quite 
the same way as the EU has due to its proclamations of its distinctiveness in this area and its 
commitment to a norms-based model of development’ (Smith, 2013, p. 526). 
The first type of resistance, which has attracted most attention in existing studies, is 
linked to the ‘compartmentalisation’ of public policy (Forster & Stokke, 1999; Ashoff, 2005; 
Adelle and Jordan, 2014; Prontera, 2014). Decisions affecting the developing world involve 
several policy fields – each characterised by a different set of interests, institutions, and 
ideas. In the past there was a clear division of labour between those who dealt with 
international development, and thus defended the interests of poor countries, and those 
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who dealt with domestic development, and thus protected the interests of producers and 
consumers at home (Grieg-Gran, 2003). Clearly, this old dividing line has lost relevance, not 
least because the development agenda has substantially widened (Janus et al, 2015). The 
problem is that not only do different policy communities not necessarily share the same 
goals – and, of course, in a pluralistic system certain degrees of incoherence are unavoidable 
– but also that clashes occur with the development domain itself, most notably on the 
concept of development and its policy implications (Forster and Stokke, 1999; Ashoff, 2005; 
Carbone, 2008). Policy coherence resonates with the more established concept of 
coordination, but while coordination is necessary for tackling complex problems, coherence 
is not an automatic product of coordination (Di Francesco, 2001; May et al., 2005; Peters, 
2015). Politicians and policy-makers face difficult choices. It is not surprising that, for 
instance, they are reluctant to consider the consequences of agriculture and trade 
protectionism for developing countries. The argument that making public policies more 
development-friendly serves the EU’s own interest in the long-term offers little consolation 
at times in which the EU’s socio-economic model is under considerable stress. The fact that 
the direct beneficiaries of PCD are located in foreign countries and that the development 
constituency – mainly consisting of committed politicians and bureaucrats and some NGOs – 
is far too weak in relation to other interest groups mean that the needs and interests of 
developing countries tend to succumb (Ashoff, 2005; Carbone, 2008).88  
The second type of resistance is linked to the EU architecture, most notably the co-
existence of intergovernmental and supranational policies. Most studies on PCD tend mainly 
to highlight the opposition from Member States (Egenhofer et al., 2006; Hoebink, 2004c; 
Carbone, 2008; Stroß, 2014). Their different views on what international development 
means and implies affects the way in which they deal with intergovernmental (e.g. security, 
migration) policies. Member States that joined the EU after 2004 are known not to be highly 
committed in this area (Horký, 2012; Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, 2014), but neither are 
founding Member States such as Italy or France (Carbone and Quartapelle, 2015; Cumming, 
2015). Thus, the PCD agenda at the EU level primarily moves forward through the 
involvement and commitment of a selected group of like-minded countries, most notably 
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and partly the UK, who does not use the term PCD 
(van Seters et al., 2015). But not only do some EU Member States find it difficult to advance 
the PCD agenda at home, they also block progress on supranational policies (e.g. trade, 
agriculture, fisheries). By contrast, EU institutions show a more positive, or at least mixed, 
picture with an increasingly strong, but not always predictable, role played by the European 
Parliament (Egenhofer et al., 2006; Mackie, 2007; Stoß, 2014). While generally recognised as 
a key promoter of PCD within the EU, the European Commission is not a monolith, with 
different types of clashes occurring between its various Directorate Generals (DGs), some 
territorial and others of an ideological nature (Carbone, 2007). For instance, in the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) there were clear differences in approach between DG Trade 
                                                          
88 NGOs have been particularly active in the promotion of PCD in numerous countries, for instance in 
Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland, Netherlands, and Sweden.  
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and DG Devco (Young and Peterson, 2013). It is also interesting to note that (at least 
indirect) resistance to PCD comes from those who are eager to strengthen the impact of the 
EU globally: the argument following that a more coherent EU external action generally 
entails the subordination of development to foreign policy (Carbone, 2013b). The Treaty of 
Lisbon was meant to bring different policy communities closer together, yet the promotion 
of different nexuses has resulted in retrenchment and reinforcement of traditional habits 
(Keukeleire and Raube, 2013).  
The third type of resistance comes from (parts of) the developing world, owing to the 
increased heterogeneity between and within countries (Barry et al., 2010). First, the 
tremendous growth recorded by some countries in the developing world means that, on the 
one hand, the separation between developed and developing countries has become blurred 
and therefore PCD has become a shared responsibility (Janus et al., 2015). On the other 
hand, it entails that the EU can no longer take for granted that developing countries simply 
accept what is on offer (Smith, 2013). For instance, the reform of the EU’s common 
agricultural policy (CAP) would benefit middle-income countries who could compete with 
the EU in global markets, but would lead to preference erosion for low-income countries; it 
would hurt net food exporters, but would have a more ambiguous effect on net food 
importers. It is along these lines that there has been opposition by some countries in the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group to reforms of the sugar and bananas protocols, 
which had brought them significant benefits for many years (Matthews, 2008). Secondly, 
inequality and uneven access to power and resources within developing countries has 
increasingly become a reality. Elite interest groups, as it happens in developed countries, 
seek to preserve their influence over specific policy areas to the detriment of the rest of 
society (Barry et al., 2010). An important example comes from the common fisheries policy 
(CFP): fees paid by the EU to access waters in developing countries constitute an important 
source of revenue for central governments, but would not necessarily be welcomed by 
coastal communities who would feel penalised in terms of both economic development and 
food security (Bretherton and Vogler, 2008). Interestingly, developing countries have rarely 
been involved in policy discussions on PCD. For instance, the Cotonou Agreement, governing 
the relations between the EU and the ACP group, includes an article allowing ACP countries 
to question any EU policy which could likely have an impact on their development. They 
have seldom invoked such provision, and when they did it they seemed happy with a simple 
reassurance by the European Commission that their concerns would be taken into account in 
the preparation and implementation of future policy measures (European Commission, 
2009c; Keijzer, 2010). Of course ACP countries may not receive adequate information or may 
not have the necessary expertise to engage with the EU. A more plausible explanation, 
however, is that they do not manage to act as a cohesive group and, therefore, their ability 
to shape EU policies is necessarily lowered.  
 
 
PCD in practice: reforming agricultural and fisheries policies 
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Although the EU has for a long time acknowledged the importance of avoiding incoherence 
between policies, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that the use of the term ‘PCD’ 
owes much to the CAP. Using the analogy of ‘giving with one hand and taking away with the 
other’, NGOs have been pursuing and exposing cases of incoherent policy-making for more 
than 20 years. Many of these cases demonstrated that countries receiving EU aid for 
agricultural development were at the same time flooded with heavily subsidised agricultural 
produce from Europe. The other area that historically has received significant attention from 
development practitioners is the CFP, which already in the 1980s was seen as constituting a 
major threat not only to the marine environment but also to the life of coastal communities 
in developing countries. Both CAP and CFP have over the years gone through a number of 
reforms which have brought tangible benefits to developing countries, particularly to African 
farmers in terms of market access and to coastal communities with the adoption of the 
Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) (Matthews, 2013). At the same time, a number of 
incoherencies have survived, such as the EU’s resort to export subsidies, the increased 
number of non-tariff barriers, the strict rules of origin, the disappearance of the commodity 
protocols and the potential negative impact that preference erosion in both agricultural and 
fisheries policies may have on food security (Matthews, 2013). In line with the purpose of 
this paper, to illustrate the natural limits of the EU’s technocratic and process-oriented 
approach to promoting PCD, this section limits its scope to one aspect of the recent reforms 
of the CAP and the CFP, most specifically their effects on developing countries as seen 
through the two IAs launched in 2011. 
The IA procedure was set up by the European Commission (2002) to improve policy-
making and advance quality in regulation. Replacing the previous single-sector type 
assessments, the new system was created to perform an ex-ante integrated assessment of 
the most important initiatives and those with the most far-reaching impacts across a range 
of economic, environmental and social criteria. In terms of the actual procedure, it was 
established that the lead DG would be in charge of preparing and submitting a ‘preliminary’ 
IA to the College of Commissioners, which could ask for an ‘extended’ IA. It was also stated 
that Commission DGs would be guided by a series of guidelines, published in 2003 and 
revised in 2005 and 2009. To improve the quality of IAs, a five-member Impact Assessment 
Board was created in 2006: its main functions are that of examining the quality of all draft 
assessments and recommending potential improvements (Bäcklund, 2009). Thus, the 
primary attraction of IAs, which obviously have a strong rationalistic appeal, would be that of 
making governments and regulatory agencies rely more on evidence-based analysis and of 
making them more accountable (Radaelli and Meuwese, 2010). However, the execution of 
IAs has not met initial expectations: numerous concerns have been raised on their overall 
quality, particularly the quantification of costs and benefits of alternative proposals and the 
effective involvement of stakeholders (Kirkpatrick and Franz, 2007; Pollack and Hafner-
Burton, 2010; Torriti, 2010). The IA procedure was originally seen by the European 
Commission as a ‘a powerful mechanism’ to further advance the promotion of PCD – and 
was further stressed by the 2009 revised guidelines, stating explicitly that more attention 
would have to be paid to assessing the impact of all EU policies on developing countries 
514530-L-bw-Keijzer
Processed on: 11-10-2017 PDF page: 103
103 
 
(European Commission, 2009a) – and corresponds to the political commitment expressed by 
the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, which called for an ‘evidence-based and result-oriented 
approach to promoting PCD’ (Council, 2012b). 
The CAP takes up more than a third of the EU’s budget and is frequently cited for its 
negative consequences for developing countries (Klavert et al., 2011). Despite formally 
complying with World Trade Organisation requirements, EU-subsidised agricultural products 
compete unfairly with developing country exports; moreover the presence of high tariffs 
prevents developing countries from exporting their products to the EU (Te Velde et al., 
2013). The CAP has been subject to a series of reforms since its inception which have 
substantially reduced some of the distortions that it has been generating on world markets 
as well as its role in the EU budget. Nevertheless, it remains a central component of the EU’s 
internal social and development policy, and its primary stakeholders (farmers and the agri-
industry) have exercised strong pressure on EU decision makers to preserve its role as a 
redistributive, albeit mostly inefficient, instrument (Klavert and Keijzer, 2012). The latest 
reform of the CAP, started in 2011, was informed by an IA, with DG Agriculture in the lead. 
The main IA report failed to spell out the effects of the CAP on third countries and instead 
stated that the effects on developing world markets would be limited under all scenarios 
considered under the proposed change (European Commission, 2011b, p. 77). Only one of 
the 12 annexes, which was drafted by DG Devco, contained some references to developing 
countries. In particular, this annex simply stated that ‘impacts [of the CAP] would differ 
according to the trade profile of the country, i.e. the country’s trade balance, whether it is a 
net exporter or importer of the product in question, relative trade with the EU, the country’s 
level of development and trade regime, or the country’s possible preferential status’ 
(European Commission, 2011c, p. 4). Moreover, whilst highlighting the lack of relevant data, 
it curiously concluded that the CAP has gradually become more coherent with development 
objectives and that all negative effects on agriculture in developing countries would be 
further reduced – though the absence of a clear baseline and/or targets in relation to how 
coherent EU agricultural policy should be made the final recommendations rather vague 
(European Commission, 2011c). 
The CFP constitutes a rather marginal component of the EU budget, yet it is strongly 
criticised, mainly because it subsidises activities to an extent that in several Member States 
the estimated costs of fishing exceeds the total value of catches (Engel et al., 2013). The EU 
is the world’s largest importer of fish and fisheries products, of which a substantial part is 
caught in the territorial waters of developing countries (Keijzer, 2011). The adoption of FPAs 
in the early 2000s, meant to demonstrate the EU’s commitment to both the environment 
and development, has resulted in a gap between intentions and reality. Structural problems 
in the fishing sector of developing countries, combined with a number of restrictions limiting 
access to the EU market, have exposed a number of unresolved contradictions between 
fisheries and development policies (Bretherton and Vogler, 2008). Also in this case, the 
proposed reform was preceded by an IA (European Commission, 2011a). Contrary to the 
CAP, an important PCD-relevant role was played by the IA Board, which explicitly required 
the main report to address the likely effects of all policy scenarios on third countries. The 
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final IA report, however, largely restricted the analysis to FPAs and Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations (RFMOs), and excluded the majority of EU vessels that fish 
outside EU waters under private agreements or joint ventures, making it difficult to judge 
the full impact of the changes on developing countries. This was especially problematic for 
FPAs, given that their nature and operation were analysed without looking at the 
implications that any changes in FPAs could have for third countries and the ability of EU 
fishermen to make use of them. Making FPAs stricter could lead to more fishermen no 
longer fishing under FPAs, and instead using private agreements and joint ventures. By 
failing to explore how the EU could ensure that its fishing vessels operating in developing 
countries’ national waters outside FPAs act in keeping with the CFP, the IA failed to make an 
adequate assessment of the likely effects of the CFP reform on development (Keijzer, 2011).  
Both the CAP and CFP reform processes indicate that IAs are inherently political 
processes and that the promotion of PCD is not a matter of solving problems but more one 
of managing different interest groups, with the more powerful ones generally prevailing. The 
two IAs did not function as neutral technocratic tools but instead largely served to support 
the reforms proposed by the European Commission in view of its primary objectives and 
preferred stakeholder groups. The preparation process of both IAs also shows that there was 
a low level of demand articulation from developing countries – and European NGOs did not 
manage to effectively represent their voice either.89 Moreover, the two reports reveal a 
serious lack of data on the effect of current and possible future policy reforms on developing 
countries, resulting from low investments in research related to PCD. More generally, 
independent analyses (Adelle and Jordan, 2014) and the European Commission (2011d) in 
one of its biennial reports have noted that IAs have failed to clearly determine the impact of 
EU policies on developing countries. In 2011, an NGO (Concord Denmark) conducted a 
screening of IAs from 2009 to mid-2011 and showed that only seven of the 77 relevant IAs 
actually devoted some attention to developing countries. In 2013, it repeated the same 
exercise and of the 177 relevant IAs only 33 assessed or mentioned the potential impact for 
developing countries (Concord, 2011, 2013). There is another point to underline: IAs do not 
generally distinguish developing countries, thus under-estimating the fact that these are not 
a homogenous group, and that the same initiative may affect different countries in different 
ways. 
 
 
Conclusions 
Few examples capture the EU’s reputation and credibility in the international arena as well 
as the concept of policy coherence for development. By providing over half of the global aid, 
the EU is praised for its high level of ambition in international development, but at the same 
time is sanctioned for the contradictions of its policies and for its relatively unsuccessful 
                                                          
89 It should be noted that the ACP group did choose to submit a contribution to the public 
consultation organised in preparation of the CFP impact assessment (Keijzer, 2011), while no 
developing country contribution was received in the case of the CAP (Keijzer and King, 2012). 
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efforts in fundamentally reforming some of its more obviously incoherent policies. This 
article has shown how discussions on promoting PCD in the EU have evolved from a political 
and issue-driven agenda to a discussion that promotes a more generalist and horizontal 
treatment with a major emphasis on institutional arrangements for policy making. This 
attention should be seen not only as indicative of an evolving understanding of the concept, 
but more importantly as a compromise that presents a common ground between leading 
and resistant Member States. Many efforts made in past and present decades have 
concentrated on efforts to put in place adequate institutional arrangements and 
mechanisms that are assumed to help improve performance in promoting PCD – in line with 
the popularity of NPM and RBM concepts that have strongly influenced EU governance since 
the early 2000s. While providing some hints and guides as far as the EU’s ambition and 
priorities are concerned, they do not adequately address wider conceptual and political 
challenges associated with the concept, thus hampering further discussion and progress. As 
illustrated by the recent reforms of the EU’s agricultural and fisheries policies, little to no 
relevant analysis is produced through such processes and the effects in terms of promoting 
PCD are negligible.   
Despite likely being the only way of keeping PCD on the EU’s agenda in light of 
significant Member State resistance, the technocratic focus chosen has prevented a clear 
management of expectations. Whereas the EU has over the years invested considerable 
political capital in reporting processes and carefully formulated Council Conclusions, it 
recently recognised that much work remains to be done and that ‘PCD is essential for the 
credibility of the EU as a global actor’ (Council, 2012b, p. 1). The EU has under-invested in 
evaluating the effects of its policies in developing countries, and has not acted on the 
demand, albeit timid, for more PCD that has been expressed by developing countries. The 
negotiations towards a post-2015 framework on global development has provided such 
opportunity, but once again this has resulted in the use of general language arguing for 
closer collaboration in areas including technology transfer, migration, raw materials and 
transparent business practices (ERD, 2013; OECD, 2014). Tasking the EU’s diplomatic corps 
with entering into dialogue with developing countries on such contentious issues cannot be 
adequate. The EU has managed to fill many technical and institutional gaps since enshrining 
its PCD ambition in EU treaties and in political documents, yet its legitimacy hinges on its 
ability and willingness to breathe political life into these structures.    
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5. Expectation management? Contrasting the EU’s 2030 Agenda discourse with its 
performance in evaluating Policy Coherence for Development 
 
Abstract 
The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development starts from the premise that 
global development depends equally on domestic policy action as on international 
cooperation. The EU strongly pushed for such a ‘universal’ agenda and called for reviewing 
the alignment of existing policies to the new agenda in reference to its legal commitment to 
promoting Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). This article analyses key trends in 
development evaluation since the 1980s, operationalises the concept of PCD for evaluation 
purposes, and assesses the EU’s evaluation performance. The findings show a discrepancy 
between the Union’s ambitious 2030 Agenda position and its sub-optimal performance in 
evaluating PCD. Instrumental use of PCD  in international negotiations to push for burden-
sharing in development cooperation, an evaluation function focused on defending spending, 
diverging member state support, as well as sheer methodological challenges explain this 
discontinuity that affects the EU’s credibility as a norm maker. 
 
 
Introduction 
The challenging mandate of international development cooperation, which can be defined as 
facilitating third country stakeholders’ developmental actions by means of targeted external 
inputs, has given rise to a strong demand for independent scrutiny to facilitate learning from 
the past and informing future actions. In 1962, the very first report of the Chairman of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) urged member governments to “devote more attention to critical 
evaluations of the results of their aid operations and exchange experience in this field” 
(OECD, 2013, p. 6). The DAC defines an evaluation as the “systematic and objective 
assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, 
implementation and results” (OECD, 2002a, p. 21).  
Development evaluation gained prominence towards the end of the 1990s, both in 
response to an influx of ‘aid-sceptic’ publications as well as the growing influence of Result-
Based Management principles originating from the private sector. This led to increased 
pressure on evaluation systems to find conclusive ‘proof’ of successful development 
interventions. While the search for certainty continues, the absolute and relative influence 
of development cooperation reduces as per the entry and consolidation of various new 
stakeholders and influences. Development cooperation will remain focused on aid-
dependent and fragile countries, yet also faces challenges as to how to engage effectively 
with middle-income countries that enjoy the financial scope to tackle poverty within their 
own borders (Picciotto, 2014). 
September 2015 saw the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), through which the global development 
agenda advanced even further (UNGA, 2015a). This agenda reflects the consensus view of all 
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UN members and as such presents a marriage of convenience between the unfinished 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agenda (e.g. aid commitments, direct poverty 
alleviation) and new priorities emphasising collective action and policy adjustment for 
sustainable development. The EU’s negotiation position strongly emphasised the latter 
component by spearheading the notion of ‘universality’ (Council, 2014).  
Two key evaluation implications can be gleaned from the new agenda: a need for 
external support to help strengthening the evaluation capacity of UN members (see UNGA, 
2015b), as well as a need to broaden the scope and reach of evaluation practice in response 
to the expanding agenda. The latter agenda increases demand for more iterative ‘learning-
by-evaluating’ approaches, moving beyond simple models of causality and increase focus on 
the trade-offs between the social, economic and environmental dimensions of sustainable 
development (Heider, 2015). The EU is challenged to invest in new approaches to evaluate 
development cooperation interventions, yet also needs to evaluate the effects of policies 
other than development policy on the SDGs at home as well as abroad. Dedicated efforts to 
strengthen the positive contribution of this wide spectrum of public policies are captured by 
the concept of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which the Union has politically and 
legally obliged itself to pursue through taking account of the EU’s development policy across 
the full spectrum of EU policy making (Brown 2015). In recent years the EU has increasingly 
called for an ‘evidence-based’ approach to promoting PCD, with its position for the 
negotiation of the 2030 agenda specifically calling for countries to review their policies in 
light of this objective (Council, 2012b; Council, 2014).   
The investment that the EU and its member states have made into strengthening 
development evaluation systems in general, as well as specifically in relation to evaluating 
PCD, constitutes a key indicator of the EU’s and readiness for and commitment to the new 
agenda. Beyond providing an assessment of the EU’s ‘SDG readiness’, this analysis also 
provides a means to understand the EU’s role as a norm-maker in the area of development 
policy. While recent academic contributions have explored dynamics within the EU from the 
perspective of Europeanisation theory (see Carbone & Orbie 2016), this article applies the 
concept of the EU as maker and taker of norms to account for (in)consistency within and 
between the EU’s positions and actions in this field. Through its focus, the article should 
appeal to both scholars of European Studies interested in the Union’s development policy, as 
well as development studies scholars who interrogate the roles and added value of the EU as 
a special development cooperation actor. Its analysis draws on a structured literature 
review, complemented by informal discussions and personal communication with evaluation 
officials in the European Commission and two EU member states.  
The article is structured as follows. The first section discusses the concept of the EU 
as a norm maker and applies it to the specific area of development policy. Section two 
describes the evolution of development evaluation systems in the OECD since the 1980s, 
followed by a section that further analyses the content and implications of the 2030 Agenda. 
Section 3 subsequently takes the EU Treaty as a starting point for defining the concept of 
coherence for evaluation purposes. Section 4 subsequently describes and analyses the actual 
efforts made by the EU to evaluate PCD. The final section concludes.  
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The EU as a norm maker in development policy 
The literature portrays the European Union as a maker of its own norms as well as a taker of 
norms set by others, including by its member states. International Relations research 
considers norms a key explanatory factor for influence in world politics and regards the EU 
as a norm community, consisting of “actors that share expectations about appropriate 
behaviour as well as norms that define this understanding of ‘appropriateness’” (Björkdahl, 
2012, p. 83). The Union’s effectiveness as a norm maker depends on its own adherence to 
these norms, as well as by its efforts to promote these norms abroad so as to influence what 
is considered ‘normal‘ in the world (Van Schaik & Schunz, 2012).  
Orbie (2012a, pp. 24-25) argues that “the EU, in particular the Commission, claims to 
have a distinctive view on development issues, inspired by European values”. Commission-
driven initiatives to project a distinct European vision on development policy and assert its 
role as a norm-maker include the annual European Development Days and the discontinued 
European Report on Development initiative (Orbie, 2012a), yet research evidence indicates 
that the Commission has predominantly been a norm-taker by adjusting its development 
policy to international development policy trends (Doidge & Holland, 2012). Beyond its 
external ambition, the Commission was also assigned a role in development policy norm-
making within the Union. In the European Consensus on Development, the Commission 
formally tasked itself with promoting development best practice and serving as an 
intellectual centre in certain development issues (EU, 2006, p. 9). This mandate was strongly 
linked to its role to facilitate the development policy ‘learning curve’ of member states that 
joined the EU since 2004 had committed themselves to as part of the EU accession package 
(Lightfoot & Szent-Ivány, 2014), yet also reflected a period during which the Commission 
experimented with innovative cooperation approaches such as budget support. Although 
the Consensus did not explicitly give the Commission such a role in relation to PCD, non-
legislative actions of recent years reflect its ambition as a norm maker in this area (Carbone 
& Keijzer, 2016).  
As an area of shared competence, development cooperation remains subject to 
strong control by EU member states, with a significant part of EU development cooperation 
being financed through the extra-budgetary European Development Fund that remains 
outside the European Parliament’s democratic scrutiny. In this context, EU development 
policy may also incorporate norms advanced by influential member states or by the 
Commission advancing its own ideas, in both cases without due consideration of 
Commission institutional resources that are negotiated separately and as a sub-set of the 
EU’s multi-annual financial framework. A key role in shaping EU development policy is played 
by the EU member state officials through relevant working parties of the Council. A recent 
analysis of Brussels-based EU development policy processes observes that development 
policy dossiers rarely go undecided to the Committee of Permanent Representatives and 
that decision-making in the Working Party on Development Cooperation is instead 
characterized as consensus-driven ‘give and take’. Depending on the issue, Member States 
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can be divided into three groups: a group of passive observers, a second group driving the 
discussion given their strong interest and expertise on the topic, and a third group with some 
interest and red lines, but who do not strongly engage (Lightfoot & Szent-Ivány, 2014, pp. 
1264-1265). This pragmatic and inclusive approach carries a risk that EU development policy 
simultaneously moves in different, not necessarily consistent, directions. Its pragmatic and 
inclusive approach to decision-making is moreover more suitable to incremental change 
through (re)distribution of resources as opposed to more fundamental and wholesale 
change.   
 
 
Key trends in development evaluation  
Formal exchanges between OECD members on the topic of evaluation started in 1979, when 
a Group of Correspondents on Aid Evaluation was formed and tasked to submit a report to 
the 1982 High Level Meeting of the DAC. During the preparation of this report it became 
clear that at the political level OECD countries had unrealistic expectations about 
evaluations, such as that these would gather evidence to convince the public that ODA was 
important and effective. In the 1982 report, evaluation officials instead called for reforming 
and strengthening the evaluation function and moving from a reactive ‘proving the worth of 
aid’ orientation towards a pro-active and inquiring focus on assessing how the impact of 
ODA could be strengthened. The High Level Meeting subsequently created the DAC Expert 
Group on Aid Evaluation (in 2003 renamed DAC Network on Development Evaluation) to 
further discussions to this end (OECD, 2013, pp. 6, 7). 
Given that they are tasked with managing relatively high amounts of public finance at 
distant locations, ministries or agencies tasked with development cooperation were often 
ahead of other government departments in developing their evaluation capacity (OECD, 
2013, p. 8). Most European DAC members set up formal systems for evaluation in the 
second half of the 1970s to early 1980s (Hoebink 1995). The European Commission’s 
Directorate General for Development was among the first Commission services to develop 
its evaluation function (Bossuyt et al., 2014, p. 9), yet already required fundamental reform 
in 1992 following fundamental critique from its former head of evaluation, the European 
Parliament and Court of Auditors (Hoebink, 1995, p. 8). These problems were fundamentally 
due to retrofitting an evaluation function into a Directorate General whose ‘esprit de corps’ 
was characterised by “obscure, anti-bureaucratic, pragmatic methods founded on personal 
relationships, mutual trust and compromise” (Dimier, 2006, p. 278). The institutional 
foundations were given shape by a team of French former colonial administrators that 
supported the first EU Commissioner for Development in 1958 and who maintained close 
personal relations with African elites. It would take more than thirty years for subsequent EU 
enlargement processes to diversify the Directorate General’s geographic reach and 
dominant coalitions, which prompted a gradual process of ‘bureaucratization’ and the 
introduction of more structured planning, implementation and evaluation processes (Dimier, 
2006). Member States also made increasing evaluation investments as their ODA budgets 
expanded. A survey of OECD members published in 1998 described the increased focus of 
514530-L-bw-Keijzer
Processed on: 11-10-2017 PDF page: 111
111 
 
central evaluation functions on evaluations highly broad in scope, and the concurrent 
‘decentralisation’ of evaluations covering individual interventions to operational units and 
implementing agencies (OECD 1998a: 7). 
In the late 1990s the idea that performance information on development 
interventions is needed to adapt cooperation practice to development context and make 
informed choices gained prominence, following broader public governance trends under the 
heading of Result-Based Management (RBM). The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness captured this idea under the principle of ‘managing for results’ and argued that 
development practice should be guided by the desired results and that information through 
dedicated monitoring should inform decision-making. A key political implication of the RBM 
trend for development policy is that OECD governments are challenged to achieve and 
demonstrate tangible success of development cooperation (Holzapfel, 2014, p. 15). An 
increased investment in impact evaluations provided a key element of the response to the 
increased demand for performance evidence. These evaluations were seen as carrying 
strong potential for generating rigorous evidence by determining the net impact of an 
intervention typically not measured through programme monitoring or process evaluations, 
or not with the same level of rigour (Levine & Savedoff, 2015). The call to increase impact 
evaluation rested on the diagnosis that methodological shortcomings prevented rigorous 
and unambiguous evaluation findings of development cooperation results, while proposed 
treatment initially largely involved the increased use of randomised control trials (see Duflo 
& Banerjee, 2011). Crucially, because of their exclusive focus by measuring the effectiveness 
of interventions, impact evaluations have been criticised for failing to factor in wider social, 
political and institutional effects (Dijkstra, 2013, p. 24). Recent efforts at impact evaluation 
involve more iterative approaches that test competing theories on development cooperation 
and its ability to support changes, while their focus on introducing some form of 
randomisation in the analysis requires willing and able in-country partners. This promotes 
more learning-oriented evaluations and may largely counter earlier critique on impact 
evaluations that largely concentrated on randomised control trials and could be 
characterised as context-blind ‘laboratory’ like approaches to identifying effective 
development ‘treatments’.    
A 2004 DAC survey observed that calls for scaling up development evaluation, 
notably for investing in larger evaluations jointly managed out by different OECD members 
as well as impact evaluations, were not accompanied with commensurate increases in the 
resources and institutional position of evaluation systems (OECD, 2004). A 2010 follow-up 
survey revealed a situation where most OECD evaluation offices had successfully adjusted to 
the new challenges of the development agenda, often with tight budgets and limited human 
resources. The information for the 2010 survey was gathered just after the start of the 
financial and economic crisis, and subsequent wider development cooperation reforms and 
ODA cuts in some OECD countries would also put their evaluation units under stress in terms 
of budgets and institutional positioning. In late 2012, the European Commission also 
‘demoted’ its evaluation unit from an independent position reporting directly to the Director 
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General to a common line unit. Contrasting this pattern, in recent years both the United 
Kingdom and Germany created independent evaluation agencies.  
Recent meetings of the DAC evaluation network mainly continue the RBM-inspired 
path of reform and remain focused on the evaluation of ODA-financed interventions and 
programmes. In addition to corresponding to main preoccupations of media coverage and 
political debate (i.e. “does aid work?”), this focus also largely reflects the general public’s 
perception of development cooperation. The latter was confirmed by a survey on ‘EU 
development aid’ conducted in December 2015, which registered general support for its role 
in ‘helping people in developing countries’ (89%) and saw poverty reduction in developing 
countries as also in the EU’s interest (80%), with over half of respondents in each country 
backing efforts to increase ODA efforts (EC, 2016d, p. 4). At the same time, new initiatives 
and trends emphasising adaptive development programming have begun influencing 
evaluation agendas and practices (e.g. WDR, 2015). In its June 2015 meeting, a proposal 
from the Netherlands on evaluating global public goods was discussed, and two follow-up 
studies proposed were agreed to (De Berg, 2015). This focus is promoted further in the new 
UN global development agenda, as well as in the EU’s own PCD agenda, which are 
introduced in turn in the next sections.  
 
 
The 2030 Agenda and the EU’s interest in its universal nature 
The period 2000-2015 will enter the books as a defining period in which the international 
community adopted an influential global development compact. In a key departure from the 
Washington Consensus, which influenced development policy and operations in the previous 
two decades and assumes that countries develop through applying ten generic economic 
policy prescriptions, the MDG framework featured poverty reduction as its central objective 
with a set of associated indicators emphasising human development. The MDG framework 
moreover raised the profile and public awareness of global development policy, as well as 
reoriented development cooperation towards a stronger human development focus (ERD, 
2013). The MDGs featured seven thematic goals and one overarching eighth goal presenting 
means and priorities to ensure that, as the Millennium Declaration put it, make globalisation 
a positive force for all the world’s people. In 2012, the UN’s MDG Gap Task Force observed a 
waning commitment of the international community’s to realising MDG8, and the ‘global 
partnership for development’ that it envisioned (UN, 2012). Although only three of the goals 
were considered on track by the time 2015 approached, global economic and political shifts 
prompted calls for a radical departure from the MDGs towards a new global development 
framework. At the basis of this was the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development, 
which resulted in an agreement to develop Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in close 
association with the so-called post-2015 negotiations towards renewing the global 
development framework. 
During its special summit in September 2015, a high-level plenary of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with 
the SDGs at its centre. Paragraph 5 of the Declaration describes the essence of the new 
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agenda as one that is “accepted by all countries and is applicable to all, taking into account 
different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national 
policies and priorities. These are universal goals and targets which involve the entire world, 
developed and developing countries alike. They are integrated and indivisible and balance 
the three dimensions of sustainable development” (UNGA, 2015a). This highlights that the 
new agenda differs from the previous MDGs framework in three fundamental ways.  
First of all, whereas the MDGs assumed high-income countries to have reached the 
‘end-stage’ of development and presented priorities for their support to developing 
countries, Agenda 2030 emphasises that all countries face the challenge of pursuing the new 
SDGs at home, regionally and globally. The EU strongly pushed for a ‘universality’ agenda, 
propelled by the early decision of the Barroso II Commission to prioritise “coherent EU 
positions bringing together the Millennium Development Goals, the post-2015 development 
agenda and Rio+20” (EC, 2013, p. 11). The EU’s position stressed that “the EU and its 
Member States recognise that advancing sustainable development also  depends on our own 
domestic action and on developing our own set of implementation measures” (Council, 2014, 
p. 7). 
Secondly, while the MDGs were to be attained by all countries – regardless of their 
relative starting points – Agenda 2030 emphasises the need to be translated and transposed 
to the specific context of each individual UN member state and the different regions in 
which it is promoted. Paragraph 63 explains that “cohesive nationally owned sustainable 
development strategies, supported by integrated national financing frameworks, will be at 
the heart of our efforts” (UN, 2015). Knoll et al (2015, p. 3) argue that the key means to 
achieving the universal agenda is a well-managed process of differentiation to ensure that all 
national-level actions add up to global development ambition and priorities. They distinguish 
three different types of targets in Agenda 2030: (1) domestic development outcomes under 
each government’s responsibility; (2) assistance provided to other countries’ domestic 
efforts; and (3) contributions to progress towards global common goods, e.g. sustainable 
consumption, curbing of CO2 emissions, peace and security.  
The third and last shift from the MDGs to the SDGs framework concerns its 
transformative character. If the MDGs could be framed as a business as usual agenda, with a 
main emphasis on the need for increasing political will through providing funding and 
domestic implementation efforts, the starting point of the 2030 agenda is that continuing 
business as usual means that sustainable development remains out of reach. The new 
agenda instead calls for fundamental changes to ensure that economic, social and 
technological progress occurs in harmony with nature, and that this progress leaves no one 
behind. The basis of this transformative approach was proposed through the report of the 
UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 agenda (UN HLP 2013).   
Through the emphasis on universality, differentiation and transformation, the new 
agenda presents itself as a hybrid between assistance, i.e. common goals with many 
signatories requiring external contributions to realise them (target types 1 and 2 as per Knoll 
et al 2015), and cooperation, which implies collective goals to which all contribute through 
interaction (target type 3). The difference here lies in that while cooperation requires goals 
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to be common, assistance only requires the recipient’s goals to be accepted by the assisting 
party (Siitonen, 1990, p. 6). Successfully tackling collective problems requires concerted 
action at national, regional and global levels that successfully reconciles typically direct and 
short-term interests concerned with the longer-term sustainable development objectives set 
out in the agenda. This process is referred to as Policy Coherence for Sustainable 
Development (PCSD) as one of the targets under the 17th and last SDG. Using a similar design 
as the MDG framework, this final SDG distinguishes itself from the other 16 thematic goals 
through its horizontal focus on the means of implementation, and through its title refers 
directly to the former MDG8 as ‘revitalising the global partnership for development’. Its 
targets follow similar categories as MDG8, namely finance, technology, capacity building and 
trade, yet include a separate heading for ‘systemic issues’ which includes the PCSD target, 
priority for multi-stakeholder partnerships and additional commitments on data, monitoring 
and accountability (UNGA, 2015a). Notwithstanding the agenda’s reference to universality, 
differentiation and transformation, SDG17 appears more of an ‘MDG+’ indicator than a 
strong departure from the MDG framework and similar to the other goals is less operational 
and actionable than the other goals. It also shares the same ambiguity as baked into MDG8: 
a goal that is about more than aid alone and highlights the importance of coherence, but 
where the only specific and time-bound target is linked to ODA.  
It should moreover be acknowledged that the new agenda does not start from a 
blank page, and as such has to relate to existing international relations and commitments. 
While reflecting the international community’s conviction of a need for a fundamentally 
different approach to global development, the agenda also includes key ingredients of the 
previous MDGs framework, which in turn consolidated and reaffirmed earlier commitments. 
These elements include the distinction of the UN members in a group of developing and 
developed countries, unfulfilled ODA commitments by the latter group, as well as the 
tendency to use country income group categories to ‘graduate’ richer developing countries 
from bilateral ODA-financed partnerships despite the new agenda moving away from a focus 
on economic growth. This implies that the implementation of the 2030 Agenda will show 
combined dynamics of reformist approaches with a continuation of current patterns of 
cooperation.  
At the time that UN negotiations for the new agenda gained speed, European 
Commission President Juncker dedicated the year 2015 as ‘the European Year for 
Development’ and emphasized that universality was fundamental to achieving the SDGs, 
which he stressed would apply to all countries in the world (Juncker 2015). At the Addis 
Financing for Development Conference later that same year, the EU Commissioner for 
Development argued that “policy coherence at all levels by all countries should be at the core 
of our new global partnership” (Mimica, 2015). In addition to being a long-standing priority 
of EU development policy, the EU’s emphasis on universality and PCD in the negotiations 
also sought to improve ‘burden sharing’ of development cooperation, also in the light of the 
poor ODA track record of several of its member states. The Commission’s EU negotiation 
position proposal emphasised that “to be successful, it is necessary to implement policies and 
mobilize resources, stepping up contributions of all countries at their level of capabilities” 
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(EC, 2015, p. 3). While expressing strong support for the new agenda, the Commission 
appears to simultaneously support the current status quo. One indication of this is that the 
aforementioned recent EU opinion survey on public support for EU development 
cooperation did not take universality as a starting point but instead presented the main 
objective of EU development cooperation as helping people in developing countries (EC, 
2016d). It can be argued though that if the EU is to succeed in urging non-EU countries to 
take up increased responsibility for global development, it should stick to its part of the 
‘deal’, for which reviewing its own policies constitutes a key component. The next section 
looks into how the EU defines PCD and how the principle of coherence can be 
operationalised in evaluation methodology. 
 
 
Defining and operationalising coherence for evaluation purposes 
Following debates around evidence of negative effects of public policy measures of 
protectionism and export promotion on developing country markets, members of the OECD 
formally acknowledged the effects of policies other than development cooperation on 
developing countries in the early 1990s. The EU stands out from other OECD members by 
having a legal basis for promoting PCD. Article 208 of the Treaty for European Union, in force 
since December 2009, states that the Union “(…) shall take account of the objectives of 
development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect 
developing countries.” Of these development objectives, the primary objective is defined by 
the Treaty as “the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty.” (EU, 2012, p. 
141). This legal commitment is referred to in EU policy discussions as the promotion of 
coherence, and together with the principles of coordination and complementarity is known 
as the Treaty’s ‘three-Cs’ principles of EU development policy (Hoebink, 2004). The act of 
taking into account implies dedicated analysis, with this article focusing on ex-post 
evaluation as per the EU’s position arguing that “all countries should (...) review and assess 
their policies, as appropriate, in order to support the successful implementation of the 
framework” (Council, 2014, p. 5). 
OECD policy discussions clarify that the promotion of PCD involves actions to 
minimise adverse impact of public policies can have on developing countries (i.e. preventing 
contradictions), as well as systematically shaping mutually reinforcing policies across 
government (i.e. creating synergies) (OECD, 2012). This distinction has also been referred to 
as negative and positive coherence (Brown, 2015). The practice of promoting coherence 
should be seen as part of the regular process of policy formulation, refinement and change, 
and can also be associated to the broader goal of improving development policy 
effectiveness. The practice of promoting coherence consequently entails two types of 
activities: (1) strengthening coherence when formulating new policies; (2) resolving 
incoherence when assessing and revising existing policies. The first type of activity entails 
the ‘mainstreaming’ of prioritised horizontal objectives in all areas of an organisation’s work. 
The second type of activity frequently entails managing political trade-offs, which is not 
regarded as part of mainstreaming (Mackie et al., 2007). 
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Although development cooperation debates and policy statements give increasing 
prominence to coherence, it is largely absent in development evaluation standards. The 
term ‘coherence’ is neither included in the OECD/DAC’s Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation 
and Results Based Management, nor is it part of the five key criteria for development 
cooperation evaluation: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability (OECD, 
2002a). The further definition and operationalisation of the concept of coherence in the field 
of development evaluation depends on the context in which it is used. Five levels can be 
distinguished (ECDPM & ICEI, 2005): (1) internal coherence within one area of public policy; 
(2) intra-governmental coherence across all of the policies and actions of an OECD country; 
(3)  inter-governmental coherence, referring to policies across different OECD countries (as 
well as with policies adopted by regional organisations); (4) multilateral coherence, referring 
to policies and actions at the multilateral level; and (5) developing country coherence, 
referring to policies allowing them to take full advantage of the international climate. At 
these five levels, three types of coherence results may be distinguished that an evaluation 
can address: (a) process results: what institutional mechanisms and other process elements 
are in place that can either hinder or facilitate the promotion of coherence?; (b) outputs of 
policies: what changes to the legislative texts of existing policies or new policies are 
anticipated to result in an increase of coherence in terms of desired outcomes?; (c) 
outcomes: what outcomes or impacts can be attributed or otherwise associated to the 
effects produced by these process results and policy outputs. Assessing both process and 
results allows evaluators to see to what extent investing in achieving good process results 
(e.g. inter-ministerial coordination groups, changed screening procedures of new EU policy 
proposals) contributes to policy outputs, and to what extent these affect development 
outcomes (Keijzer & Oppewal 2012, pp. 5-6). 
Given the five levels and the types of results an evaluation may cover, various 
relationships and attribution questions need to be addressed when measuring PCD (King, 
2016, pp. 23-24). Available research tends to be biased towards a unilateral analysis of 
individual EU policies, i.e. how one particular policy (such as agriculture or fisheries) affects 
developing countries in isolation from other policies (ERD, 2013). The policy effects in 
question here tend to be judged against the EU’s development objectives as opposed to 
those of developing country or group of countries concerned. This has frequently been 
complicated by the fact that the EU’s commitments to PCD tend to be process-oriented and 
lack concretisation into clear targets and objectives that would guide evaluation efforts. A 
way forward could involve taking a more dynamic approach towards evaluating PCD geared 
to inform strengthening the joint contribution of policies to a third country’s own 
development objectives. This underlines that evaluating PCD is a challenging undertaking, 
but so is the wider field of development evaluation. The next section looks into the EU’s 
efforts to evaluate PCD.  
 
 
The EU’s performance in evaluating PCD  
514530-L-bw-Keijzer
Processed on: 11-10-2017 PDF page: 117
117 
 
While it had earlier invested in a more institutionalised monitoring system with biennial 
reporting on PCD efforts in the EU by the Commission, based on Commission self-
assessment and questionnaires submitted by member states, in 2012 EU ministers in charge 
of development policy acknowledged that the EU needed to further invest in ‘evidence-
based’ approaches. Doing so would create a basis for “measuring the impact of PCD in a way 
which demonstrates clear development results” and linked to the need to do so to the 
credibility of the EU as a global actor (Council, 2012b). Similar to earlier political statements 
on the matter, the drafting of these Council Conclusions were led by a small number of 
likeminded Member States and were not deemed controversial by others, thus reflecting the 
categories of member state dynamics as developed by Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2014). As 
shown in the above analysis of trends in development evaluation, in the past two decades 
development evaluation debates and institutional changes have mostly focused on 
improving the evaluation of individual interventions and development cooperation 
approaches in relative isolation from other external influences on development outcomes. 
The international evaluation community thus stands at the beginning of a learning curve on 
how to evaluate the effects of policies other than development cooperation on developing 
countries (Picciotto, 2005). There is today little evidence on the effects of specific EU policies 
in specific developing countries. In cases where policy ‘incoherence’ is clearly established, 
there is often a lack of rigorous analysis of how to achieve a change in policy that would 
result in a more positive outcome. This is partly due to the problem of attributing causality 
to specific aspects of EU policy actions in complex development processes that are subject to 
many other influencing factors, including so-called ‘supply-side constraints’ in developing 
countries. It is therefore challenging to be certain that a particular EU policy change will 
necessarily result in positive development outcomes (Brown, 2015; Barry et al., 2010). 
In terms of mandate, the Commission appears comparatively well-placed to evaluate 
PCD, with its Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) 
leading on development cooperation in a wider framework of international cooperation, as 
well as having the explicit role of promoting “coherence between the European Union’s 
development policy and its other internal and external policies” (EC, 2015b). Despite having a 
similarly broad mandate, the European Commission’s Directorate General for Development 
and International Cooperation’s evaluation unit has focused almost exclusively on ODA 
implementation, while its insistence on using a rather rigid standardised evaluation 
methodology has been assessed as limiting innovation (Bossuyt et al., 2014, p. 11). Although 
it has played a key role in pushing the concept of PCD and the case for assessment, DEVCO 
has not been at the forefront of PCD evaluation. Illustrative of this is the fact that the 
Commission’s development evaluations can be found in its website section titled ‘projects 
and results’. The evaluation unit’s programme differentiates between geographic 
evaluations, covering national or regional cooperation programmes, as well as ‘thematic and 
other evaluations’ that can address a range of issues. One of these latter evaluations 
concerns a planned evaluation of PCD efforts that was launched during the summer of 2016, 
a year later than planned (DEVCO, 2016).  
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The evaluation unit’s standard methodology includes definitions for coherence that 
are considered a key evaluation criterion to be applied in all evaluations and provides a basis 
for verifying to what extent its evaluation reports cover PCD (EuropeAid, 2006, p. 49). An 
analysis of recent geographic evaluations indicates that these either do not adequately 
analyse coherence aspects or fail to do so altogether. This is confirmed by an analysis of the 
final evaluation reports of four country evaluations published in 2015, each on average 100 
pages in length: whereas reports on Georgia and Lesotho do not present any analysis on 
coherence, the reports on Timor Leste and Jordan each offer less than half a page of PCD-
related descriptive analysis. This poor result is partly because of the ambitious scope of the 
geographic evaluations, which involve evaluating an entire country or regional portfolio of 
EU development interventions, but also because the EU’s Country Strategy Papers failed to 
offer a basis and direction for PCD evaluation and in fact showed frequent signs of copy-
pasting (Hoebink, 2005).90 When it comes to the ‘thematic evaluations and other’ category, 
these tend to address specific sectors or cross-cutting issues, with the following covered in 
the years 2014 and 2015: budget support, gender equality and women empowerment, 
environment and climate change, and private sector development. 91  These thematic 
evaluations applied a restrictive definition of coherence, with the environment evaluation 
considering coherence of recipient country policies with development cooperation support, 
while the private sector evaluation investigated coherence of EU development cooperation 
programmes with those of member states. None thus looked into the contribution by other 
relevant EU policy areas to the issues concerned.   
Although there is merit in assessing the Commission’s performance, doubts may also 
be raised as to the appropriateness and effectiveness of doing so alone independently, when 
such evaluations may be more suitable to joint evaluation efforts. Such a joint European 
evaluation initiative was made in the period 2004-2008 through the so-called ‘Joint 
Evaluation of the Maastricht Triple-C’, a series of evaluations dedicated to analysing how and 
to what extent the 3Cs had been translated into practice in the decade after they were 
enshrined into the Maastricht Treaty. The evaluation initiative stipulated that the application 
of the principles serve to further EU integration in this area and that they provide means to 
improving the effectiveness of European development cooperation (Hoebink, 2004a). Papers 
commissioned in preparation of the evaluation initiative noted that although all three Cs 
were legally ambiguous concepts, coherence proved the most challenging of all from an 
evaluation perspective, in view of the fact that “(...) the number of topics is numerous, the 
set of policies and strategies is endless, the number of actors very difficult to count” (Ibid., p. 
15). In the end, though, the evaluation offices opted for the choice of not choosing, and the 
resulting PCD-specific evaluation was largely a process evaluation that looked into systems 
and procedures put in place by MS (Mackie et al., 2007), and by scope and methodology 
                                                          
90 Country Strategy Papers were abolished under the 2014-2020 programming cycle, which means 
that future EU evaluations require different anchoring of PCD-related analysis.  
91 Reports are available here: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/80199_en  
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could not look into what difference these process innovations had made in terms of EU 
development effectiveness.  
The overall low track record in evaluating PCD is not an exclusive omission on the 
part of European evaluation offices. In fact, most dedicated PCD-related research by 
independent researchers, think tanks and non-governmental organisations have focused on 
the process of promoting PCD, procedures for integrating development cooperation and 
other policies within a consistent framework. Far less effort has been dedicated to 
evaluating the effects of different EU policies on developing countries (IOB, 2014, pp. 3-4; 
ERD, 2013). One way forward, albeit highly challenging given its scope, would be to invest in 
dedicated empirical research on how EU policies interact with other major factors of 
influence within a specific context, including developing countries’ own policies and 
priorities. This can be seen as being promoted under Agenda 2030, which emphasised the 
need for country-driven evaluations of the implementation of the new agenda, with further 
guidance provided by a recent UN resolution on this topic (UNGA, 2015b).  
 
 
Conclusion 
During the past years the EU and its member states have pushed towards a new global 
development agenda that abandoned the dichotomy between developed and developing 
countries. The universal development agenda that the EU successfully pushed for reflected 
its understanding of what is needed for global sustainable development, yet also served to 
advance its own interests through burden-sharing of international cooperation with 
economically powerful developing countries. Now, with the members of the UN having 
adopted the new ambitious agenda, the EU is challenged to fully internalise the new agenda 
in its policy and operations and encourage more reluctant others to do the same. It has for 
years prided itself for being the largest provider of ODA worldwide, as well as being an 
ambitious actor in the field of PCD. With the first role reducing in relevance under the new 
framework, though remaining crucial for assistance to LDCs and fragile states, it now needs 
to strive towards becoming a more accountable actor in relation to PCD. The development 
evaluation community now finds itself at another watershed moment, in which it faces the 
challenge of moving beyond evaluating ODA-financed development interventions towards a 
stronger focus on how different areas of public policies and different actors contribute to 
global development. As per its role in representing the joint position of the member states, 
as well as its broader assigned role as a norm maker in the field of development policy 
including on PCD, the European Commission can play a key role in leading efforts to this end.  
The evidence presented in this paper shows that current level of investments in PCD 
evaluation in the EU remains minor and most studies remain ‘experimental’ and exploratory 
in nature. Moreover, the European Commission tends to lag behind rather than move ahead 
of those member states strongly committed to this agenda, both in terms of actual 
evaluation investments, but also in terms of institutional development with recent reforms 
in DEVCO having weakened its evaluation function. This presents an overall picture whereby 
the EU Development Commissioner presents ambitious EU positions in international 
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negotiations without backing this up with significant action, while available political energy is 
mainly channelled to consolidate public support for ODA. Countering this would require 
stronger engagement and institutional investment by DG DEVCO, yet more importantly can 
only be facilitated by the Commission’s political leadership as well as by adequate resourcing 
with member state support. That leadership however needs to be supported by a more 
broad-based consensus among member states and a move from more pragmatic dossier-
trading pursuing national interests towards constitutive defining and pursuing European 
development interests through Brussels. The fact that the Commission has not used its right 
of initiative in this area since 2005 suggests that its political thermometer does not detect 
adequate broad-based support across member states to this end. The current situation in 
this specific case indicates that EU development policy in practice today does not yet fully 
conform to the definition of a norm community, although the EU does present itself as such 
in international negotiations.  
Dominant RBM trends, a continued ‘aid-scepticism’ as well as increasing pressure on 
putting EU development budgets at the interest of foreign policy interests thus give rise to 
decision makers’ pressures on evaluators to prove the worth of ODA expenditure. In view of 
this essentially ‘defensive’ approach to evaluation, the challenge placed on the development 
evaluation community in the first DAC Chairman report of several decades ago remains as 
real as ever. For furthering the EU’s efforts to promoting PCD, a key way forward beyond 
evaluation per se would be for the EU to become more open and transparent about the 
conflicts it encounters in reconciling its values and interests. Policies that are judged 
incoherent with development policy emerge through political compromises and economic 
interests, and documenting that they are does not automatically generate the political will to 
change them. It would however help the EU to clarify its ambition in the area of PCD and 
help to manage expectations and facilitate evaluations in informing the EU’s actions to attain 
these.  
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Conclusion: from a redistributive to a regulatory EU development policy? 
 
This dissertation has looked into the emergence, functioning of as well as trade-offs 
between the three roles of the EU as a development cooperation actor: donor, federator 
and norm maker. It addressed the following main research question with a view to 
improving our understanding of change and continuity over time in this field of EU policy: to 
what extent does the EU’s donor role enable or disable its performance as federator and 
norm maker?  
The dissertation set out to examine the extent to which EU development policy is ‘fit 
for purpose’ and what avenues may be explored with a view to increasing its organisational 
effectiveness. In line with its broad scope, both in terms of themes and the time period 
covered, the dissertation facilitates future research inquiry as well as policy discussion on 
the EU as a development policy actor. This exploratory aim was timely and relevant in view 
of the recent adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, emerging effects of 
EU legal changes and institutional reform that entered into force in December 2009, as well 
as broader internal and external systemic challenges facing the legitimacy of the EU as a 
whole. Reflections on how the EU’s development policy should respond in the next years to 
come should be informed by an analysis of how it has evolved over the past decades.  
This concluding chapter starts by summarising the main findings of the five chapters. 
It subsequently presents a comparative analysis of these findings to identify key conclusions 
in relation to the overarching research question. This synthesis serves two purposes: a 
condensed summary of the overall findings and insights generated on the EU as a special 
development actor that this dissertation offers, as well as the identification of new ideas and 
challenges to inform ongoing policy discussions and academic research.  
 
 
1. Key findings of the empirical chapters in relation to the EU’s three roles 
This section sets out the research findings as presented in the five chapters. They have been 
grouped here as per the three overarching topics covered by the five chapters and are 
subsequently analysed in relation to the EU’s three development policy roles.  
 
Part 1: ACP-EU cooperation. Since 2000 the cooperation between the EU and the ACP Group 
of states has been governed through the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. The partnership is 
unrivalled in terms of its thematic scope and number of states involved, but also in its dense 
contractual approach to cooperation managed through an intricate set-up of ACP and joint-
ACP institutions. Chapter one added to existing research that mainly focuses on Brussels-
based stakeholders with an analysis drawing on the existing literature and on stakeholders' 
perceptions of ACP–EU cooperation and ACP institutions.  
The findings observe a social disconnect between, on the one hand, the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement’s institutions and Brussels-based representatives, and, on the other 
hand, the broad-based and multi-stakeholder partnership they are tasked to promote. The 
78 states that are party to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement appear to have largely 
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outsourced the management of the Agreement’s implementation to a select group of 
international experts, diplomats and representatives – their Brussels-based secretariat and 
their national missions to the EU. As a result, many otherwise well-informed stakeholders in 
these countries may know about EPAs or specific EDF-financed programmes, but are 
unaware of the overarching ACP–EU partnership of which they are part. Moreover, while the 
ACP group is regarded as historically relevant, there was little appreciation among consulted 
ACP stakeholders of the Cotonou Agreement’s current value beyond securing EU 
development assistance. Its vast framework for cooperation contrasts with more informal, 
non-legally binding and pragmatic approaches to cooperation which individual ACP countries 
have entered into with emerging countries such as China and Brazil, yet stakeholders 
insisted that the European approach to cooperating, along with the way practices have been 
shaped over decades, is much valued.  
Chapter two continues the focus on EU-ACP cooperation yet concentrates on 
analysing the emergence, evolution and functioning of the ACP contextualise and 
problematises the Group’s stated future ambitions as set out at its 2012 Summit of Heads of 
State and Government in Equatorial Guinea. In the past four decades, the ACP Group 
increased both its membership and organisational structure. When viewed from the 
objectives the Group has set out in the Georgetown Agreement, ACP institutions have over 
the past decades functioned at a suboptimal level and are characterised by a dominant yet 
ineffective Committee of Ambassadors and a subordinated as well as under-resourced 
Secretariat. The low performance of the 79 countries to collectively shoulder their share of 
the Secretariat’s budget, budgeted at 7.5 million euro in 2016 with a similar amount 
provided by the EU, further reflects their low political commitment to the group of states. 
The analysis of the development and functioning of the ACP institutions over the past 
decades illustrates that the ACP states use the Group as a means to securing bilateral 
cooperation benefits from the EU (aid and trade preferences, in recent years mostly aid), as 
opposed to the development of the ACP Group constituting an end in itself. While serving 
the purposes and interests of the ACP states, decreasing cooperation returns have triggered 
EU reforms of an otherwise strongly path-dependent ACP-EU institutional constellation, 
which have in turn affected the ACP Group’s institutions. The chapter concludes that the ACP 
Group’s future is more likely to be shaped by the outcome of the upcoming post-Cotonou 
negotiations with Europe than by its own independent actions. 
 
Part 2: Migration and development policies. The term migration & development policies 
(M&D) broadly refers to the particular area of research and policymaking concerned with 
inter-linkages between migration and development. EU member states have adopted 
overarching M&D policy frameworks at the national level, as well as the EU wide Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility as a guiding framework, yet differ in the extent to which 
they have used these to guide their actions. This sensitive area of public policy serves as a 
useful case study to assessing EU actions in promoting PCD given that, with the 2015 EU 
Valletta Summit on Migration demonstrating that the EU may subscribe to and endorse 
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international statements on sustainable development, yet in practice European views and 
interests in the field of migration differ starkly with those of its neighbouring countries.  
Against this backdrop, chapter three analysed international policy discussions on 
migration and development (M&D) and contrasts these with the actual M&D policies and 
practices of 11 European countries and the European Commission who were among the 
main proponents of this international discourse. Desk research of public documents and 
accompanying information provided the basis for a comparative analysis of their overall 
M&D policies and strategies, and institutional settings for formulating and implementing 
these. The comparison showed that all countries had engaged in M&D in one form or 
another, yet none of them pursued a clear and consistent approach. While stressing the 
developmental potential of migration in international discussions, the migration policies of 
the EU and selected European states predominantly reflect an understanding of migration as 
a problem and show a preoccupation with short-term domestic interests. The M&D policy 
and practice further points towards asymmetry in policy coherence skewed towards 
migration policy. Since 2015, under the Juncker Commission, migration policy has been 
catapulted into the heart of EU politics, yet has not been analysed in detail in this project as 
it draws on information gathered in 2012 and 2013. The recent changes, which included the 
introduction of the EU’s Emergency Trust Fund for Africa in 2015 and the announcement of 
an External Investment Plan which will commence operations in 2016, all represent 
fundamental changes in EU development policy. The fact that the Commission gave these 
initiatives priority over launching the process towards the revision of the EU Consensus on 
Development shows that external crises have hampered the autonomy of the EU’s 
development – and DEVCO as the DG in charge – as well as the long-term orientation of the 
policy area.92   
 
Part 3: Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). The EU Treaties and 2005 European 
Consensus on Development state the EU’s ambition to avoid that public policies undermine 
development objectives and promote synergies between policy areas in terms of their 
development objectives. In order to further operationalise these commitments and create a 
basis for accountability, EU discussions in recent years have particularly addressed two 
means to promote PCD: (1) institutional mechanisms to facilitate taking account of 
development objectives in policy decisions that may affect developing countries and (2) 
approaches and methods to evaluate the effects of public policies in developing countries.  
 Chapter four analysed past discussions and efforts of the EU to promote PCD. Based 
on its analysis of the dynamics between the EU and the member states, a key observation of 
the chapter is that EU debates on PCD have taken a predominantly technocratic focus in 
recent years. The chapter describes how discussions have evolved from a political and issue-
driven agenda to a discussion that promotes a more generalist and horizontal treatment, 
with a major emphasis on institutional arrangements for policymaking. This focus can be 
                                                          
92 This conclusion was drawn in a draft evaluation of the European Development Fund published on 
DEVCO’s website in February 2017 as part of a public consultation (Mokoro, Dai & GeoTEST, 2017).  
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explained by the approach reflecting an area of compromise between willing and resisting 
member states, but also wider New Public Management and Result-Based Management that 
have influenced EU governance since the turn of the millennium. When it comes to actual 
performance, findings show that EU Member States have paid lip service to the importance 
of PCD without translating commitments into more coherent (national and supranational) 
policies. An analysis of ex-ante Impact Assessments prepared for the reform of the EU’s 
agricultural and fisheries policies in 2011–2013 shows how bureaucratic arrangements failed 
to adequately analyse the potential impact of these EU policies on developing countries. The 
conclusion is that successful promotion of PCD is more than just having the right arguments 
and ensuring sufficient technical support, but is first and foremost a political undertaking. 
Broad-based political support for promoting PCD among the EU and its member states 
would create enabling conditions and demand for evidence-based policy research, but not 
the other way around.  
The final and fifth chapter looked into the United Nations 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, as adopted in September 2015. This new global development 
agenda starts from the premise that global development depends equally on domestic policy 
action as on international cooperation. The EU strongly pushed for such a ‘universal’ agenda 
and emphasised the need to review the alignment of existing policies to the new agenda in 
reference to its long-standing commitment to promoting Policy Coherence for Development 
(PCD). Against the backdrop of an analysis of key trend in development evaluation since the 
1980s, the chapter operationalises the concept of PCD for evaluation purposes and assesses 
the EU’s performance in evaluating PCD. The analysis presented indicates that the European 
Commission tends to lag behind rather than move ahead of member states strongly 
committed to this agenda, both in terms of actual evaluation investments, but also in terms 
of institutional development with recent reforms in DEVCO having weakened its evaluation 
function. This presents an overall picture whereby the EU Development Commissioner 
presents ambitious EU positions in international negotiations without backing this up with 
significant action, while available political energy is largely absorbed by the need to defend 
the EU’s ODA budget and consolidate public support for it. Countering this would require 
stronger engagement and institutional investment by DG DEVCO, yet more importantly can 
only be facilitated by the Commission’s political leadership. That leadership needs to be 
enabled by a more broad-based consensus among member states which is presently missing. 
Inclusive decision-making, institutional interests and efforts to improve international 
burden-sharing in development cooperation are identified as explanatory factors for the 
discontinuity that affects the EU’s role as a norm maker. 
 
The EU’s three roles in development policy. The five chapters present various findings on the 
functioning of the European Union as a development cooperation actor, covering key 
elements of its much larger institutional, geographic and thematic remit. The Union’s ‘global 
presence’, as well as its profile as a “delivery agent in areas where size and critical mass are 
of special importance” (EU, 2015, p. 9) are but some characterisations that allude to the 
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strong changes in the policy field since its starting point in the Rome Treaty’s association 
policy.  
Taking the founding treaty of the European project as a starting point, the 
introduction of chapter described the genesis of and key evolutions in the EU’s development 
policy over time and based on this analysis distinguished three distinct EU development 
roles.93 Drawing on the work of Orbie (2012a), three specific roles of EU development policy 
were distinguished and analysed with the aim to better understand their individual 
functioning as well as their interaction. Through this focus, the dissertation sought to 
complement the available academic literature on the topic, which as noted in the 
introductory chapter tends to predominantly focus on individual regions or selected key 
aspects of the policy area. Working definitions of the three roles as applied are presented in 
table 4.    
 
Table 4: The EU’s development policy roles 
Donor EU plans and implements interventions financed through ODA and other 
financial contributions 
 
Federator EU facilitates joint action among European development actors 
 
Norm 
Maker 
EU develops and promotes a distinctly European development policy 
 
Source: definitions adapted from Orbie (2012a, pp. 23-25) 
 
As per their order of appearance, these three roles refer to various responsibilities of the EU 
in development policy: implementation, coordination and policy influence within and 
beyond its borders. Whereas the donor role can be seen as a distributive function, the other 
two roles can be considered as predominantly regulatory (Johnston & McTavish, 2013, p. 
17). Each of these roles is characterised by a specific starting point, which resulted in the EU 
being formally mandated to fulfill it, and in different degrees and ways relate to the various 
actors that contribute to the formulation and promotion of the EU’s development policy. 
The emergence and subsequent evolution of the roles in practice is guided by a unique set of 
institutions, defined as systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social 
interactions” (Hodgson, 2006, p. 2).  
As is discussed below, insights from the field of historical institutionalism guided the 
analysis of the roles and their interrelations, particularly its fundamental observation that 
new institutions are brought into a world in which countless institutions already exist (Hall & 
Taylor 1996, p. 20). By implication, this means that the three roles all ‘compete’ for the 
various EU development policy actors and the interest and resources that they bring, which 
in turn affects how the EU can play these roles in practice and informs perceptions of their 
effectiveness.  
                                                          
93 The term ‘role’ is used here in the sense of an assigned function or task related to EU development 
policy that the EU is legally or otherwise formally mandated to deliver. 
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Relating findings to roles. As a next step in analysing the findings of the five chapters, the 
findings of the five chapters are considered in relation to the combination of EU 
development policy roles to which these relate, as a means to understanding the nature of 
the EU as a development policy actor. Each chapter presented findings that could be used to 
analyse the interrelation between the EU’s roles, as presented in figure 5. As noted in the 
introduction, each of the five chapters covered the interface between two of the EU’s roles.   
 
Figure 5: EU development policy roles and research topics 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
Building on the above summary of the chapter findings, Table 5 presents principal insights 
on the relation between the EU’s development policy roles in relation to the three parts of 
this dissertation.  
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Table 5: Relating the findings to the EU’s development policy roles 
 EU as norm maker EU as donor 
Part 1: ACP-EU 
cooperation 
? EU-ACP started as 
innovative approach, yet 
has gradually been de-
emphasised and 
normalised vis-à-vis EU 
cooperation with non-ACP 
states 
? Means of implementation 
(EDF) and aspects (EPAs) 
better known than the 
overarching cooperation 
framework 
? Four decades of ACP-EU 
cooperation has not been 
successful in moving 
towards supra-national 
cooperation and joint ACP-
EU international action 
? EU-ACP has been key ‘laboratory’ 
for innovation in development 
cooperation approaches, which 
have later been introduced into 
cooperation with other regions 
? EU-ACP cooperation has 
emphasised cooperation with the 
state, and the overarching 
framework hinders rather than 
facilitates cooperation with non-
state actors and the private 
sector 
? EU has provided institutional and 
financial support to the ACP 
Secretariat over four decades, 
with limited results in terms of 
organisation effectiveness and 
financial independence 
 EU as norm maker EU as federator 
Part 2: Migration 
& Development 
? Limited possibilities due to 
legal and political barriers 
to migration policy making 
at the EU level 
? Global Approach to 
Migration may have 
informed policies on M&D 
at the member state level 
? Some member states refer to EU 
M&D policies, albeit with no 
implication to their own 
migration and development 
policy practice 
? Development programmes in the 
field of M&D show lower 
adherence to aid effectiveness 
principles than other areas 
Part 3: Policy 
Coherence for 
Development 
? EU key to furthering 
debates on PCD and 
subsequently informing 
policy development of 
member states 
? Impact assessment show 
potential as an instrument, 
but have not produced 
evidence with 
consequence for policy 
content 
? EU and member states 
jointly promoted PCD 
during negotiations of 
2030 Agenda with key 
focus on assessment  
? EU promoted regular exchange 
among member states on 
institutional approaches to 
promoting PCD 
? EU efforts to monitor member 
state efforts have promoted 
regular though inconsequential 
policy dialogue on PCD 
? EU has not played a leading role 
at either the institutional or 
methodological level in 
evaluating PCD, thus being 
largely unable to inform member 
state joint action 
Source: own elaboration 
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When considering the development and interaction of the EU’s development policy roles, it 
should first and foremost be acknowledged that these three roles gradually emerged and 
evolved over time, both in a pro-active and a reactive manner, as opposed to reflecting an 
‘intelligent design’. Figure 1 presents an overview.  
 
Figure 6: Sequence of introductions of EU role in development policy94 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
As described in the introductory chapter, the history of the EU’s development policy began 
with the inclusion of the overseas countries and territories of some of its founding members 
into the European project. The EU’s donor role thus started in 1957. As a supra-national 
organisation with an essentially regulatory mandate, its association policy’s redistributive 
focus felt out of place and was not to the liking of all member states, as evidenced by the 
financing through the extra-budgetary European Development Fund. It subsequently 
evolved gradually in terms of geographic scope and budgetary size, while given shape largely 
outside the EU treaties by means of separate legal instruments and the international 
agreements with African and subsequently ACP states.  
The geographic reach of the EU’s development policy expanded with its own 
increasing membership, notably through the accession of the United Kingdom in 1973 which 
informed the creation of the ACP Group of States and the conclusion of the first Lomé 
Convention in 1975. This led to the Commission’s first proposal on the harmonisation of the 
Community’s development policy and that of the member states, and through it the 
emergence of its role as a federator in development policy. It has since made efforts to 
promote cooperation at the planning stage (joint programming), at the implementation 
stage (division of labour) and by coordinating a joint EU position in relevant international 
negotiations.  
                                                          
94 An alternative starting point for the EU’s normative role in development policy has been the Treaty 
of Maastricht which defined the objectives for Community-level development policy and the three Cs 
to ensure its effectiveness (see the introductory structure). The choice for 2005 as a starting point is 
that the European Consensus on Development for the first time gave a clear political mandate to the 
Commission as a normative power (‘centre of development best practice’) both towards its own 
members as well as beyond the EU’s borders.  
Maintenance of 
Member State colonies 
in Africa *
The EU as a donor
1957: Rome Treaty 20161963: Yaoundé Convention
The EU as federator
The EU as norm-maker
2005: EU Consensus on 
Development
1972: EU Communication 
on harmonisation
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Parallel to the creation of a legal basis for the development policy of the EU and its 
member states, the EU was forced to react to the long-standing critique on its development 
cooperation practice which surged during the late 1990s following disappointing evaluation 
results as well as under pressure of critical member states. Building on earlier attempts to 
define an overarching development policy, the EU successfully adopted a policy statement at 
the highest political level in 2005, which was signed by the presidents of the Council, the 
Commission and Parliament and dubbed the European Consensus on Development. 
Whereas the Commission had published various statements over time in relation to its own 
policy and priorities, it was the EU Consensus which formally acknowledged its ambition to 
inform the substance of development policies within and beyond Europe –thus 
acknowledging its third role as a norm maker.  
The evolution of the EU’s development policy role, as described in detail in chapter 1, 
shows that the EU is a ‘special animal’95 that derives its authority from its member states, 
yet itself is fundamentally different from a state. One obvious example is that the EU avails 
of a parliament, yet lacks a government, while the EU also lacks the functions of police and 
army as a state’s essential means of coercion.96 The ways in which different actors articulate 
their interests, directly or via their Brussels-based representatives, is also markedly different 
from a state – as is the tradition of the EU institutions to be receptive to inputs from special 
interests during all stages of the legislative cycle, which is also a necessity given the number 
of Commission officials versus the tasks at hand.97  
Throughout the decades the EU’s mandate in development policy remained a 
temporary one, given that it was not anchored in the EU’s treaties but instead located in 
time-bound international agreements with the ACP states as well as under the EU’s multi-
annual financial framework and subsequent EDF rounds. A turning point was the adoption of 
a legal basis for the EU’s development policy in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, an achievement 
which in fact had not been led by the Commission (Hoebink, 2004a). The inclusion of the 
development policy for the European Community created a basis for the subsequent 
incorporation into the so-called Constitutional Treaty as adopted in 2004, which extended 
the existing objectives and key principles of development to both the EU and its member 
states. Following referenda in France, the Netherlands and Ireland, the Constitutional Treaty 
evolved into the Treaty for European Union, which was signed in Lisbon in 2007 and entered 
into force in December 2009. It triggered institutional reforms that are still in the process of 
consolidating, yet most importantly it moved the initiative on the EU’s development policy 
closer to the EU institutions, including by reducing the roles and responsibilities of the 
                                                          
95 In EU-speak the Union is typically referred to with the Latin term ‘sui generis’, i.e. a class of its own.  
96 These examples were drawn from an undated webpage on the Jean Monnet Program’s website 
comparing the 2004 Constitutional Treaty to the constitution of a state: 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/00/000501-02.html  
97 For comparison, the Commission currently employs around 33,000 people whereas the city of 
London alone employed 82,240 people in 2015. Respective sources of these figures: 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/administration_en and 
http://www.centreforcities.org/blog/is-london-shielded-from-civil-service-cuts/   
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rotating EU Council Presidency through the creation of a quasi-permanent one (see Missiroli 
2010).98 These institutional changes also reflect the reality that in a Union of 28 member 
states it is impossible for officials from each state to take the floor on each topic during the 
various Council Working Groups through which they guide and monitor the EU’s 
development policy (Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2014). The EU’s enlargement and legal 
changes is considered to have made it more challenging to find consensus or enforce 
decisions taken, as illustrated by the decision-making in 2015 around the intra-EU 
redistribution of refugees.99  
As per this overview, described in more detail in the introductory chapter, key 
concepts applied in historical institutionalism can helpfully describe and explain the 
emergence and evolution of the EU’s roles in development policy. The creation of the 
association policy, the EDF and the creation of a dedicated institutional setup encompassed 
considerable sunk costs that created associated legacy effects. This for instance explains why 
until today the EU continues to have a development policy rooted in a dichotomy between 
ACP and non-ACP states. The influence of existing institutions on efforts to create new ones 
also becomes apparent, as for instance the required unanimous support of EU member to 
incorporate the EDF into the EU’s budget has so far prevented a key step to resolving this 
dichotomy. In line with insights from historical institutionalism, the changes introduced into 
the EU’s development policy over time were not purely informed by rational design 
considerations, but instead seem to give equal if not more priority to appropriateness as to 
effectiveness. To illustrate this, the EU-ACP partnership has often been presented by 
institutional stakeholders as a ‘unique model’ and the appearance of the partnership on 
paper, and the ambitions parties formally commit to, are seen as more relevant than a more 
rational question as to whether actual cooperation experiences live up to this uniqueness. 
100 
When it comes to explaining change, the EU’s development policy may be considered 
as representing a composite standard of technology.101 EU development policy as a whole 
has been more flexible and adaptive than its component parts, meaning it may 
                                                          
98 Another important change, which was not dealt with in detail in this dissertation, was that the 
Treaty allowed the EU to manage trust funds. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa as launched in 
November is one of the subsequent steps taken, which has allowed for new ways of working, 
including a stronger focus on delegated cooperation through member state development 
cooperation actors.  
99 While outside the context of the topic of this thesis, this case showed that whereas the 
Commission was legally correct in using ‘Qualified Majority Voting’ for its decision on the refugee 
quotas on 22 September 2015 (see Ivanov 2015: 4), the sustained tradition of deciding by consensus 
meant that those member states opposed could claim there was insufficient political support and 
could thus resist implementation.  
100 In the discussions on post-Cotonou that were ongoing when this dissertation was completed, this 
could be seen in frequent comments that the fact that aspects of the ‘acquis’ had not delivered in 
over 15 years meant that it represented strong potential that could be delivered through dedicated 
implementation of all parties.  
101 Please refer to the introductory chapter for a summary of Boas’ (2007) comparison of single 
versus composite standards of technology in relation to key concepts of historical institutionalism.  
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accommodate new content and aims while existing parts may still be considered path-
dependent. The system has continued to generate increasing returns, while changes in its 
component parts can be associated to the concepts of conversion and layering. Conversion 
refers to the reorientation of an existing institution to serve new purposes or reflect new 
power dynamics, in response to internal and/or external dynamics. The concept of layering is 
used to explain evolving changes to political institutions and refers to a process whereby the 
institution changes incrementally through the addition of new rules and structures (Boas 
2007: 45-47). Without seeking to be exhaustive, table 6 presents and clusters key 
institutional changes in EU development policy over the decades.  
 
Table 6 : Institutional changes in EU development policy 
 Layering Conversion Notes 
1963 : first Yaoundé convention  X Reform of association policy to 
govern cooperation with 
independent states 
1975 : first Lomé convention X  UK Accession Treaty prompted 
negotiations and subsequent 
creation of the ACP Group 
1985: policy dialogue / 
conditionality introduced into 
Lomé III 
X  Follow-up to 1977 Council 
Declaration on situation in 
Uganda 
1992: EU development policy 
objectives enshrined in EU 
treaty 
 X Common legal basis for 
development policy, responding 
to increase in cooperation with 
non-ACP countries 
2000: Launch of Economic 
Partnership Agreement 
negotiations 
 X Reform triggered after third 
countries challenged Lomé trade 
regime in WTO 
2004: creation of the Africa 
Peace Facility 
X  Use of Cotonou/EDF legal basis to 
fund African peace and security 
2005: Commission role in 
monitoring EU and member 
state performance: ODA, aid 
effectiveness and policy 
coherence 
X  European Consensus on 
Development created additional 
rules for development policy of 
EU and member states 
2007: the EU’s role in 
facilitating joint EU action in 
development policy 
X  Code of Conduct on Division of 
Labour and subsequent joint 
programming efforts 
2010: creation of the EEAS and 
EU High-Representative for 
Foreign and Security Policy 
 X Mandate for EU development 
policy programming shared 
between Commission and new 
European service 
2015: creation of the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for 
Africa 
X  Treaty for the European Union 
allowed Commission to manage 
trust funds 
Source: own elaboration 
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The composite nature of EU development policy as an institutional framework also explains 
why it has proven resistant to ‘wholesale’ changes by means of formal revision (see Hacker, 
2004). Whereas activities listed on DEVCO’s website seem to bear little in resemblance to 
the colonial ‘association’ policy instituted through the Rome Treaty, several elements of 
what is today referred to as the ‘acquis’ of the ACP-EU partnership have persevered 
throughout the European project’s lifetime. In other words, to an important degree function 
has followed form, or as the 1998 DAC Peer Review put it: “the organisational framework 
has appeared to influence policy, rather than the opposite” (OECD, 1998b, p. 12). As is 
described in the literature on historical institutionalism, the type of changes introduced can 
be explained both by the EU’s historical and systemic constraints and show that the Union’s 
future possibilities and solutions are strongly influenced by what it already is.   
These theoretical concepts are helpful to guiding and framing the analysis of the EU’s 
development policy over time, and raise challenging questions as to whether and how it may 
adapt itself in the future. As per the same ‘first come, first serve’ rule that HI research points 
to, the findings show that the EU’s donor role enjoys an advantageous position vis-à-vis the 
other two roles. In the past and present period this has not been problematic, yet the 
anticipated future in which the relative importance of the donor role would decrease – as 
described in section 3 of this concluding chapter – would raise more fundamental questions 
as regards the continued relevance of the EU’s development policy. As chapter five observes, 
there are strong discontinuities between the EU’s priorities for the future of international 
development policy and its current efforts. As a bridge to the analysis of the changing 
discourse, the next section will further analyse the preferences of various EU actors in 
relation to the three EU development policy roles and the structures through which they 
articulate these.  
  
 
2. Comparing actor dynamics shaping the three EU development policy roles 
The EU’s evolving donor role: The European Union has often been depicted as an economic 
giant as well as a political dwarf. Through analysing the cases of ACP-EU cooperation, 
migration and development and PCD, this dissertation set out to explore whether the same 
characterisation also applies to the EU as a development actor. More precisely, it sought to 
establish to what extent there is evidence to suggest that its performance under its most 
established role of a donor affects its performance as a federator and norm maker. In 2015 
the European Union institutions ranked as the fourth largest ODA donor worldwide (OECD 
2016), yet are also ascribed a strong potential in terms of federating member states and 
norm production as well as diffusion within and beyond the EU’s borders. When it comes to 
the three roles examined here, it is clear that the EU’s donor role is relatively uncontested 
and enjoys broad-based support from the member states that jointly finance it through the 
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EU’s budget and the extra-budgetary EDF.102 Once these inputs are provided, the member 
states are closely involved in the process of managing and monitoring the funds. Compared 
to the multilateral organisations that they co-fund, the member states enjoy a much more 
direct and ‘hands-on’ involvement over EU development cooperation.103  
 The ways in which the EU has articulated its role as a donor has seen important 
changes since the turn of the millennium. As part of its response to its legitimacy threats 
exposed by the fall of the Santer Commission, the EU accompanied the institutional 
consolidation in Brussels with a devolution of responsibilities to its Delegations abroad 
(Frederiksen and Baser, 2004).104 The development cooperation management roles of these 
Delegations had grown in a rather haphazard manner over the decades, long opposed and 
later strongly supported by France as a main operator and driver of the Commission’s 
development policy during its formative decades (Dimier and McGeever, 2006). The 
devolution sought to facilitate decision-making on cooperation priorities between the 
Delegation and the partner country stakeholders, yet this trend was largely counteracted by 
the entering into force of the institutional changes guided by the Treaty on European Union 
which since 2010 have promoted a recentralisation of decisions on EU development 
cooperation priorities (see Herrero et al 2015). 105 Faced with the Union’s increasing 
membership and an ever-expanding geographic and budgetary scope of EU development 
cooperation, the EU resolved to counter its member states’ tendencies to micro-manage the 
EU’s development interventions by restricting the mandate of the EDF and relevant 
development cooperation budget committees to discussing the overall country strategies 
prepared by the EU and the developing country government concerned (Hoebink, 2014b). 
A second key factor to take into account when analysing the EU’s donor role concerns 
its engagement in the so-called ‘aid effectiveness agenda’. As the acquis communautaire 
required countries that joined the EU after 2004 to set up their own policies and structures 
for implementing bilateral development cooperation, the EU’s enlargement process became 
a potential source of aid fragmentation and prompted stronger efforts by Brussels to 
counteract this unintended effect of the acquis. The EU institutions used this normative 
agenda to bolster its own legitimacy as a donor. This new focus and push followed earlier 
discussions in the EU on how to strengthen coordination, with the Maastricht Treaty 
introducing promoting complementarity as the formal aim guiding these efforts (see 
Hoebink, 2004a).106 The efforts were partially informed by the Commission’s own interest to 
                                                          
102 As noted in the introductory chapter, there was a period in the 1990s where this broad-based 
support was no longer a given and when the legitimacy of the EU’s development policy was placed 
under considerable stress (Stochetti 2013: 93). 
103 This distinction does not get adequate acknowledgement in comparative assessment of 
multilateral development organisation that include the EU, such as DFID (2016).  
104 Please refer to chapter 1 of this thesis for a detailed description of these reforms.  
105 Following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, it was decided that the Development Commissioner 
and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy would ‘co-decide’ on the programming of 
EU development policy (Furness 2013).  
106 Delputte and Orbie (2014: 679) note that whereas the EU’s stronger focus on coordination has 
been presented in some literature as an ambitious new step or ‘metamorphosis’ of EU development 
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strengthen the support for innovative approaches to development cooperation such as 
budget support, but also sought to facilitate the learning curve the new member states faced 
in the area that the EU became an important driver of the so-called ‘aid effectiveness 
agenda’. While the essence of the agenda is contained in the Maastricht Treaty’s three-Cs, 
the international push for increasing aid effectiveness gained speed and prominence 
following the adoption of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.107 The peak of the 
EU’s ambition was captured in the EU Consensus on Development adopted towards the end 
of that same year, and which presented additional objectives for the EU at a higher level of 
ambition, including on the increased use of budget support for EU development cooperation 
(EU 2006; see also Delputte and Orbie, 2014).  
On balance, the EU’s enlargement, its institutional reforms that formally shielded 
day-to-day operations from direct member state control, and the EU’s increasing budget all 
contributed to a changing EU donor role. Recent trends such as the introduction of trust 
funds with the Commission acting in a managing role, as well as the blending of loans and 
grants which increases the EU’s own resources, all have an effect of increasing the EU’s 
profile as a development donor in its own right – and by extension its interests in the area. 
Although the EU and its member states have promoted an ambitious position in the 
discussion towards the adoption of the 2030 Agenda that emphasised a universal and 
‘beyond-aid’ future development policy, discussions between the same actors in Brussels 
have strongly focused on devising new approaches to financial cooperation, particularly in 
relation to so-called ‘root causes’  of migration. These trends indicate that inadequate 
support of member states to making a shared competence on development policy work in 
practice does not prevent the EU’s own development cooperation portfolio from expanding 
further. In this context, Bué (2011: 11) predicted a few years earlier that the EU may pursue 
a path of ‘buying Europeanisation’ by means of finding a new thematic niche, creating an 
instrument and inviting member states to join. By using appropriate governance 
arrangements, such new efforts would satisfy a lowest common denominator 
intergovernmental approach for the member states, as well as add to the implementation 
powers and responsibilities of the Commission (Ibid.).        
What prospects for reinforcing the EU’s normative and federative roles? The 
effective articulation of the EU’s other two roles requires more active and broad-based 
interaction between key actors. Whereas the donor role is principally about making the 
Commission work, the other two roles place much stronger expectations on concerted 
member state commitment and action. Contrary to the consensus among member states for 
the donor role, which rests upon a closely balanced equilibrium between the member states’ 
various geographic and thematic priorities as reflected in the budget, the support of 
member states for the EU’s federator and norm maker roles are not a given. Instead, this 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
policy, the term in fact originates from discussions around the Rome Treaty and reflects member 
states’ unwillingness to fully integrate in this policy area.  
107 It should be noted that much of the content of the aid effectiveness agenda, and indeed the 
Three-Cs, were not so much driven by a concern to strengthen aid effectiveness but rather reflected 
an effort to reduce aid inefficiency.  
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performance becomes more vulnerable to actor dynamics both within and beyond the 
development policy field. This is illustrated by the 2007 decision on how to pursue division of 
labour and complementarity between the EU and its member states cooperation 
programmes under the developing country leadership (see Council 2007), which failed to 
generate much progress due to the absence of incentives among all involved to translate 
these into reality (Klingebiel et al 2017). Support to the EU’s donor role seems strong across 
EU member states, with the Union’s global coverage catering to their differing geographical 
interests, whereas in the other two roles member states tend to be more divided on a scale 
ranging from strong proponents to active opposition. While the donor role benefits from the 
compartmentalised EU governance structures that directly inhibit cross-policy action, the 
normative role – and through it the articulation of development policy interests in other 
policies – is directly hampered by it.108 Beyond the ‘development community’, the donor role 
similarly represents the least contested role, while the federative role enters into non-
developmental policy motivations of EU member states and the EU’s normative role 
encounters resistance on so-called ‘beyond-aid’ topics – with this dissertation exploring this 
resistance and low support base in relation to PCD.   
 In addition to its stronger support base, the EU’s role as a donor also precedes the 
other two roles, which emerged more recently and are still in the process of maturing 
further, both in a political and institutional sense. This temporality creates trade-offs for the 
exercising of the federative and normative roles and limits the adaptive potential of the EU 
as a development actor. The vast majority of human resources and political energy invested 
into the institutional setup for EU development policy – including the Commission’s DG 
DEVCO, Council Working Groups and the EP Development Committee – are oriented towards 
managing the donor role. Across the board, and with reference to the dissertation’s main 
question, the findings presented in the chapters suggest that the EU as a development actor 
is hampered in becoming what it would like to be, as a result of what it presently is. The EU’s 
donor role to an important extent ‘cannibalises’ the other two roles, yet a key reason for this 
is that the other two roles have not been equipped with teeth of their own. At the same 
time, the EU is said (and itself says) to derive a large part of its legitimacy as a development 
actor from representing a Union that collective provides most ODA in the world. The donor 
role paradoxically reflects both a battle ground and a comfort zone to the EU’s legitimacy as 
a development policy actor. In recent years this was intensified by EU aid being targeted by 
predominately UK-based think tanks and media platforms, prompting the EU to issue 
rebuttals and blog posts to defend itself – also as per insistence by member states that it 
should.109 Similarly, when visiting national parliaments in EU member states, the EU 
                                                          
108 One example concerns the institutional structure: for instance, new policy priorities conceived in 
the Council’s working party on development do not automatically inform those adopted for specific 
regions in the separate working parties covering the ACP and the European Neighbourhood. 
109 This includes former Dutch Minister for European Affairs and International Cooperation Mr Ben 
Knapen, as reported in this press release: 
https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2011/04/22/european-commission-responds-to-criticism-
of-eu-development-aid  
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development commissioner will focus its inputs on the EU’s donor role, since this is what the 
parliamentarians are most interested in.  
 Finally, the three roles also show important differences in terms of the level of 
member state participation and control. Under the EU’s donor role, EU member states 
exercise considerable control over expenditure and focus through Council working groups 
and budget committees, in the case of the EDF emphasised by its inter-governmental status. 
When it comes to the EU’s norm-making role, with this dissertation focusing largely on its 
efforts to promote PCD, EU member states are relatively distant while the influence of intra-
institutional dynamics in Brussels is greater. This is because some of the most challenging 
PCD dossiers, such as agriculture, trade and fisheries, are Union competences where the EU 
is in the lead. Lack of consensus among EU member states leads to a rather technocratic and 
low-profile approach to promoting the otherwise strongly political aim of PCD, although 
some member states have in the past pushed progress on specific policy dossiers whereas 
others driving the wider PCD agenda shied away from such engagement.110 The same 
‘technocratic reflex’ applies to the EU’s federating role, with the Barroso II Commission 
having opted for a humble ‘piloting’ approach to promoting joint programming and 
increased division of labour with EU member states, after earlier attempts hit the brick wall 
of the member states’ bilateral development cooperation interests. 
 
   
3. EU development policy under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
Looking towards the future, it could be argued that two current trends could lead to either a 
de-emphasising of the EU’s role as a development actor altogether, or to a stronger focus on 
its normative and federating roles.  
The first trend played out during the negotiations of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, which put the EU in a leading position in advancing a universal, differentiated 
and transformative agenda. At the time this dissertation was completed, the Commission 
Vice-President had published EU proposals on its follow-up after much delay, and devoid of 
ambition or bite. Part of the delays were due to immediate concerns in the EU’s 
Neighbourhood, first and foremost the relations with Turkey, yet also strong reservations 
from other DGs in Brussels to commit to adjusting (or even reviewing) their existing policies 
in light of the new agenda (EC, 2016b). By expanding the focus of global development policy 
beyond the previous MDG framework that emphasised ODA expenditure, taking up the new 
agenda would also have implications for the EU’s federating role. This could be seen as going 
beyond ODA-coordination alone to also consider how to make policies on engagement in 
and with developing countries through other financial and non-financial means, and require 
consideration of restructuring existing systems for EU policy preparation and 
                                                          
110 For instance, countries such as France and Germany provided key support to phasing out meat 
export subsidies previously included under the EU’s Common Agriculture Policies. In contrast, those 
member states known to be a driver of the wider ‘institutional’ PCD-agenda were often found 
unwilling to push for outcomes in concrete dossiers. Chapter 4 further investigates differences 
between member state engagement.  
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implementation. The EU has however so far been hesitant to advance concrete proposals to 
this end. 
A second related trend concerns the reducing ‘client base’ of EU development policy, 
with more countries ‘graduating’ from bilateral EU development cooperation and leaving 
behind a core of aid-dependent and often fragile states.111 The new development agenda 
reflects and is informed by fundamental changes in the world global order since the turn of 
the millennium, key among which the abandonment of a binary distinction between 
developed and developing countries. In a recent lecture the Commissioner argued for taking 
further the EU’s approach to differentiated partnerships and also called for increasing 
flexibility in the EU’s cooperation engagement. As he put it: “(...) an increasing number of 
developing countries have become less dependent – or not dependent at all – on aid. Yet they 
are critical in helping to generate the sustainable future we want. We need to engage with 
them through political, economic, scientific, technical and financial cooperation, but also 
through the transfer of know-how, exchange of best practices and mutual learning. When it 
comes to international cooperation in graduated countries it is less about money and more 
about knowledge that we can offer” (Mimica, 2016). This agenda would imply a greater 
focus in EU development on providing development-relevant Global Public Goods (GPGs), 
defined as goods “whose benefits could in principle be consumed by the governments and 
peoples of all states” (International Taskforce on Global Public Goods, 2006). Examples of 
such goods concern clean air and peace, whereas other goals that are not strictly speaking 
GPGs share key dimensions and can only be addressed through collective action, such as 
migration and food security. The EU however faces a steep learning curve in transitioning to 
a ‘post-aid’ development policy which raises serious implications for available human 
resources but also for how and with whom it articulates decisions in different policy domains 
such as agriculture and trade.  
Underperformance in the federative and normative roles currently represents no risk 
to the EU institutions’ resources and mandate for development policy. This is in part due to a 
mismatch between the content of the 2030 Agenda, which the EU strongly negotiated for, 
and dominant perceptions among EU citizens that EU development policy is about ‘helping 
people in developing countries’ and thus remain firmly rooted in the MDG/North-South 
paradigm.112 Beyond the current agenda, the EU’s is most widely perceived as a ‘financial 
cooperation actor’ in the field of development cooperation, which constitutes its main basis 
for accountability and public scrutiny. This means that for the time-being the EU can 
continue its established practice of further shaping its EU development by means of 
‘layering’, i.e. creating new policy without eliminating old ones, and occasionally also 
                                                          
111 The formulation ‘graduated countries’ refers to developing countries that have crossed the 
threshold of Upper Middle Income Countries and under the EU’s current development policy are 
considered no longer eligible for bilateral development cooperation, with the exception of ACP 
countries in this category who still receive a limited budget under the 11th EDF for the period 2014-
2020 (Keijzer et al., 2012).  
112 It should be added that these citizens included the officials who drafted the Eurobarometer survey 
cited in chapter 5, which in turn were likely based on inputs from DEVCO.  
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adopting policy mainly at the symbolical level without any subsequent operational 
changes.113 One example here concerns the name change of the EU Commissioner to being 
mandated for ‘international cooperation and development’, whereas in reality the 
Commissioner remains responsible for its ODA budget and has made little investment to 
expanding his work on ‘international cooperation’. In a generally ‘Eurosceptic’ context, a key 
observation to be made is that underperformance on the donor role would almost 
necessarily imply reputational damage to EU development policy and the project as a whole, 
whereas for the federative and normative role this would certainly not be the case. 
Moreover, the institutional changes enacted under the current EU Treaty in 2009, which 
divided responsibility for development policy between DEVCO and the EEAS (see Furness, 
2013; Tannous, 2013), may have further reinforced the centrality of the donor role.  
The new global agenda would expect the EU to transform its development policy 
from a redistributive one, revolving around its large ODA budget, towards a regulatory one 
in which the EU would be increasingly held accountable for its contributions to global 
development through the full breadth of its policies. Under the current conditions, where 
the donor role is rather on the increase while the other two roles are de-emphasised, it may 
be questioned to what extent the EU is both willing and able to engage in a fundamental 
reform of its development policy and roles to this end. This is related to the continuing 
increasing returns and its ability to take on new roles through layering, as in the case of the 
so-called ‘refugees crisis’ through the set up of the so-called ‘EU Emergency Trust Fund for 
stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in 
Africa’ in November 2015. The same Trust Fund is part of a broader trend in which other EU 
policy areas through Commission initiative, supported and encouraged by member states 
and so far not seriously opposed by the European Parliament, put a claim on the 
development cooperation budget for ‘mutual benefit’ aims. These efforts are guided by the 
recent adoption of the EU’s Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, replacing the 
2003 EU Security Strategy (EEAS, 2016). Whereas the EU’s policy response to the ‘refugee 
crisis’ has been mainly reactive and guided by a largely flawed theory of change that 
increased human mobility could be addressed by targeting concrete ‘root causes of 
migration’ (see EC, 2016a), the area of external migration policy represents an area where 
the EU would have clear value over member states engaging bilaterally. European countries 
of destination along the Mediterranean often lack adequate fiscal space to contribute, while 
the Commission avails of substantial cooperation programmes in Northern African countries 
that could be used as key elements of a broader ‘policy mix’ response with strong potential 
of positive results for migration and development.114   
                                                          
113 The concept of layering was originally proposed by Hacker (2004), and is discussed in more detail 
in the introduction.  
114 A recent OECD publication concludes that interrelations between public policies, migration and 
development depend strongly on the country context and the conditions of implementation of the 
different programmes. In each context, a mix of migration and non-migration context produces 
relevant development outcomes, contrasting with a reality in which public policies are often drawn 
up in silos and do not consider potential implications for other policy areas (OECD, 2017).  
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More fundamental reform would strongly depend on the articulation of interests 
both within the EU institutions and by the member states: it could lead to a better 
connected and embedded EU development policy at the heart of EU external action, with 
both increased agency and urgency, yet it could also lead to more ad-hoc approaches of a 
policy subordinated to foreign policy considerations. The outcome will reflect the EU actors’ 
collective priorities for the policy area, as well as their weighing of short-term versus long-
term considerations. Achieving a beneficial outcome would require a more proactive 
approach from the EU development policy community at large, with the upcoming years 
being key in this regard. As per the findings on the EU’s role as a norm taker, a successful 
more fundamental reform of the EU’s roles in development policy would likely have to 
emerge bottom-up and be supported by a critical mass of different actors. Many of these 
actors however benefit from the current status quo, whereas the specific returns of more 
fundamental change cannot always be anticipated. They would most likely emerge in a 
situation where EU member states have successfully undergone such a fundamental policy 
change themselves, which in turn would depend on to what extent the 2030 Agenda 
develops a political momentum in the same way that the Millennium Development Goals did 
following the 2002 UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey.  
 
 
4. The research agenda ahead 
In October 2014 President Jean-Claude Juncker announced the start of the ‘last chance 
Commission’, a Commission that should be ‘more political’ and bring the European project 
closer to its citizens (Euractiv, 2014). This dissertation has shed further light on the EU’s 
three principal roles in the area of development policy and present plausible findings and 
ideas on to what extent it may deliver on such overall political ambitions in this specific field. 
This dissertation has shown that their continuity and change over time can be explained by 
ideas developed by historical institutionalist scholars. It provides some first tentative findings 
on their interrelations and on this basis can inform further research inquiry and policy 
debate on the next steps in EU development policy. The following five areas are identified as 
key for further research on the EU as a special global development actor. 
 EU enlargement and the inter-institutional balance of power on EU development 
policy: the various Council Working Groups through which diplomats of the 28 member 
states interact with the European Commission and the EEAS to shape EU development policy 
remains a closed shop, which few studies have so far managed to analyse in a systematic 
manner. Available research confirms that 28 is too large a number for all representatives to 
participate actively, which is why member states tend to act depending on the dossier 
concerned and in differing coalitions. When it comes to the EU’s Delegations in developing 
countries, the interaction with those member states represented there is not guided by 
formal meeting structures and rules, but is more ad-hoc and consequently may be more 
context- and personality-dependent. Research should explore specific cases and interrogate 
the dynamics and how the member states affect the shaping of and interaction between the 
EU’s three roles. At the Brussels-level, the analysis should also take the role of the European 
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Parliament into account, which mainly manifests itself in relation to the EU’s budget and the 
legal instruments guiding its use on which it co-legislates with the member states.  
 Case studies on the promotion of PCD: there is notable attention in scholarly 
research about PCD, including in chapters of this dissertation, which largely focus on 
conceptual debates as well as more general reality checks with regard to the relative weight 
of development policy in the EU and approaches to decision-making. A few examples to the 
contrary notwithstanding (e.g. Stroß, 2016), no major research efforts have been made to 
examine to what extent and how development objectives were taken into account in specific 
major legislative initiatives. Such more specific cases should help to complement the existing 
scholarly material with empirical evidence on to what extent PCD has been translated into 
practice in terms of both process and outcome. Comparing cases of areas where 
competences are at the EU level with areas of shared and parallel competence would allow 
revisiting a conclusion from an earlier study finding that most opportunities for promoting 
PCD are at the preparatory stage until the Commission’s publishes its legislative proposal 
(see Egenhofer et al., 2006). 
 Comparing institutional frameworks for policy dialogue: the EU-ACP cooperation 
framework has frequently been depicted by the Commission as ‘unique of its kind’ (see Faia, 
2012), while chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis have contributed to those works demystifying 
the workings of a contractual approach to partnership in a fundamentally asymmetrical 
relationship. These existing analyses tend to be ‘theory-based’ in that they start from the 
cooperation agreement’s text and subsequently venture into an analysis of the working of 
the partnership in practice. This dissertation finds that it is the quality of the relationship 
that determines the use of content of partnership accords, and that it is not the quality of 
the partnership accord that determines the relationship. What would add to this ongoing 
research endeavour would be more ‘bottom-up’ inquiries that describe the nature of 
cooperation between selected ACP and non-ACP countries and further probe into the real 
differences between cooperation in the presence or absence of a legally binding agreement. 
The more descriptive accounts of dialogue that such research could provide would also 
benefit further inquiries as to how established patterns of cooperation could move beyond 
the so-called ‘donor-recipient’ nature and evolve towards a more two-directional 
cooperation process on promoting relevant GPGs.  
 The role of the rotating EU Presidencies in development policy: although the 
rotating Presidency has lost most of its powers under the current EU Treaty that entered 
into force in December 2009, it retains some influence in the field of development policy. 
Although the chairing of the Foreign Affairs Council is now taken care of by the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Presidency has held onto its role 
of chairing the Working Party for Development (CODEV) and so far there has not been 
sufficient support for handing over this task to the EEAS as per its request. Further research 
could look into the positions of different actors in Brussels and the member states on their 
views and positions on this ‘mini arena’ on the shaping of the EU’s development policy. 
 Coordinator or coordinated? Where many EU member states have made cuts to 
their bilateral ODA budgets, the EU’s development cooperation budget remains high and 
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places the EU as the fourth largest donor in the world. It should be noted though that the EU 
has a geographic reach much higher than EU member states, and moreover is active in 
countries where its presence and budget is overshadowed by other member states, or in the 
opposite case is strongly represented where member states operate with highly limited ODA 
portfolios. Further research could compare efforts towards joint programming and 
coordinated EU action in those countries where the EU features as one of the lead donors 
with countries where the EU is one of many donors. This could shed further light on the 
interrelations between the EU’s donor and federating roles.        
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Samenvatting 
Het proces van Europese eenwording verloopt niet eenduidig. De uiteenlopende belangen 
van talloze actoren uit 28 Europese staten worden door even talrijke structuren voor 
besluitvorming, uitvoering en arbitrage geleid, waarmee een weinig lineaire weg vooruit 
wordt gebaand. Dit patroon is ook terug te zien in een weinig in het oog springend 
beleidsterrein als het Europese beleid voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking, dat binnen een 
halve eeuw uitgroeide van een koloniaal fonds tot een van de grootste 
ontwikkelingsfondsen. Het beleidsterrein groeide mee met de geleidelijke uitbreiding van de 
gemeenschap  en overleefde ondermeer de val van de muur en de schandalen van de late 
jaren negentig. In de jaren na de eeuwwisseling won de Europese 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking aan zelfvertrouwen en profiel, waardoor de EU in 2015 
uitgroeide tot de vierde donor ter wereld, met een veel groter budget dan een grote lidstaat 
als Frankrijk.  
 Naast het beheren van de financiële middelen kreeg de Europese Commissie ook het 
mandaat om het beleid van andere spelers te beïnvloeden en het gezamenlijke optreden 
met de 28 lidstaten te bevorderen, die in in tegenstelling tot beleidsterreinen als landbouw 
en handel hun nationale bevoegdheid voor het beleid voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
hebben behouden. Dit geheel aan verantwoordelijkheden en middelen, gecombineerd met 
een wereldwijd netwerk van EU Delegaties, maakt het Europese beleid op het terrein van 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking tot een omvangrijk geheel. Mede hierdoor richt 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek op het terrein van de Europese ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
zich doorgaans op bepaalde aspecten, regio’s, dan wel functies van dit grotere geheel.  
 Dit proefschrift verdiept zich in het ontstaan, functioneren van en wisselwerking 
tussen de drie rollen van de Europese Unie als actor in de ontwikkelingssamenwerking: de 
donerende, federatieve en normatieve rol. De volgende vraag staat daarbij centraal: in 
hoeverre zorgt de donorende rol voor het faciliteren dan wel tegenwerken van de 
federatieve en normatieve rollen? Het uitgangspunt voor het beantwoorden van deze vraag 
is dat recente trends, hervormingen en uitdagingen enkel vanuit een historisch perspectief 
begrepen kunnen worden. Het onderzoek steunt daarbij op inzichten en concepten van het 
historisch institutionalisme en heeft als doel uitspraken te doen over in hoeverre de 
Europese ontwikkelingssamenwerking in de huidige vorm doelmatig en toekomstbestending 
is. Door de gemaakte keuzen en oriëntatie biedt het onderzoek een uitgebreide 
verkennende analyse die toekomstig onderzoek kan informeren en bijdraagt aan het 
bredere debat over de Europese Unie als actor in de ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Het 
onderzoek verschijnt op een moment dat de EU richting geeft aan verschillende 
hervormingen, ondermeer ter bevordering van de nieuwe Agenda 2030 voor Duurzame 
Ontwikkeling, het consolideren van de nieuwe spelers en structuren die door het verdrag 
van Lissabon in gang zijn gezet, maar ook in reactie op de bredere interne en externe crises 
waarmee de Europese Unie geconfronteerd wordt.  
 De drie rollen van de EU hebben betrekking op verschillende verantwoordelijkheden 
van de EU in het beleid voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking: uitvoering, coördinatie en het 
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beïnvloeden van beleid binnen en buiten haar grenzen. Elke rol kan worden herleid tot een 
duidelijk formeel startpunt, waar de Unie een mandaat kreeg om deze rol uit te oefenen. De 
verdere ontwikkeling van deze rollen wordt gestuurd door instituties: systemen van 
gevestigde en dominante sociale regels die vormgeven aan sociale interactie. Een belangrijke 
gevolgtrekking van het historisch institutionalisme is dat nieuwe instituties gecreeërd 
worden in een wereld waar reeds talloze instituties bestaan. Een tweede belangrijk 
uitgangspunt betreft het belang van tijdelijkheid: de timing en volgorde van gebeurtenissen 
geeft vorm aan politieke processen. In deze context betekent het dat de drie rollen 
wedijveren om de aandacht en inzet van de verschillende actoren binnen de Europese 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking, hun interesse en middelen, en daarmee elkaars functioneren 
beïnvloeden. 
 
De vijf hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift, dat cumulatief van opzet is, kijken elk naar de 
interactie tussen twee van de drie rollen. Drie thema’s werden daarbij onderzocht. Het 
eerste thema betreft de samenwerking tussen de EU en de staten in Afrika, het Caribisch 
gebied en de Stille Oceaan (de ACS-landen). Sinds het jaar 2000 wordt de samenwerking 
tussen de EU en deze staten geleid door het Partnerschapsakkoord van Cotonou. Dit 
akkoord is ongeëvenaard vanwege haar brede agenda en het grote aantal deelnemende 
staten, maar ook vanwege de ‘contractuele’ aanpak (zoals in de eerdere akkoorden van 
Lomé) van de samenwerking en een dicht netwerk van ACS en ACS-EU-overlegstructuren.  
Een eerste bevinding is dat er gaandeweg een sociale ontkoppeling is ontstaan tussen de 
overlegstructuren in Brussel en de daar aanwezige vertegenwoordigers, en de verschillende 
actoren die zij vertegenwoordigen. De actoren lijken daarmee hun partnerschap grotendeels 
uitbesteed te hebben aan deze vertegenwoordigers, en zijn weliswaar vaak op de hoogte 
van aspecten van het partnerschap maar niet van het bredere geheel. Om deze redenen is 
en blijft het partnerschap belangrijk voor de donorende rol van de EU, maar heeft het weinig 
invloed op de inspanningen en aanpak van derden.  
 Een nader onderzoek naar het onstaan, ontwikkelen en functioneren van de ACS-
groep is nodig om beter zicht te krijgen op haar samenwerking met de EU. In 1974 riep de 
groep zichzelf in het leven door het Akkoord van Georgetown, enkele maanden nadat de 
staten het eerste Akkoord van Lomé met de Europese Economische Gemeenschap 
afgesloten hadden. In de jaren daarna heeft de groep suboptimaal en weinig onafhankelijk 
gefunctioneerd: aanpassingen aan het Georgetown akkoord werden in het bijzonder 
gemaakt naar aanleiding van nieuwe samenwerkingsakkoorden met de EU. Niettemin 
groeide de ACS-groep door de jaren heen, zowel in het aantal leden als in haar 
organisatorische structuren. Het dagelijks bestuur van de ACS-groep wordt gekenmerkt door 
een dominante maar niet effectieve groep ambassadeurs in Brussel en een zowel 
ondergeschikt als van weinig middelen voorzien secretariaat. De analyse in het tweede 
hoofdstuk toont dat de ACS-staten hun groep met name instrumenteel in hebben ingezet 
om toegang te krijgen tot Europese handelspreferenties en hulpfondsen, in plaats van dat de 
onderlinge samenwerking een doel op zich was. Met name deze doelstellingen betreffende 
de samenwerking binnen en van de ACS-groep zelf is door de staten nooit serieus 
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aangegrepen. Alhoewel men kan constateren dat de ACS-groep daarmee functioneel is 
geweest, heeft de EU vanwege de slechte resultaten organisatorische hervormingen in het 
partnerschap geïntroduceerd. Deze hervormingen hebben op hun beurt uitwerking op de 
‘opbrengsten’ voor ACS-staten uit de partnerschap met Europa, en daarmee op hun politieke 
en financiële commitering aan de ACS groep en haar structuren.  
 Het tweede thema, behandeld in hoofdstuk 3, betreft het beleid voor migratie en 
ontwikkeling van de EU en haar lidstaten, een uiterst relevant terrein dezer dagen om meer 
te leren over de relatie tussen de donerende en normatieve rollen van de Europese Unie. 
Een vergelijking tussen elf Europese staten en de Europese Commissie toont dat zij allen bij 
willen dragen aan de migratie en ontwikkelingsagenda. Er bestaat echter een duidelijke 
discrepantie tussen dit overkoepelende beleid en de praktijk. Waar overkoepelende 
strategiën de positieve bijdrage van migratie aan ontwikkeling vooropstellen, lijken concrete 
beleidsacties en ontwikkelingsprojecten op dit terrein migratie eerder als probleem dan als 
kans te zien. Daarbij staat in de meeste landen die op dit terrein hulp ontvangen, het 
Europese ontwikkelingsbeleid ten dienste van het migratiebeleid in plaats van omgekeerd. 
Deze situatie was reeds waar te nemen in 2012, het jaar waarin de data voor dit hoofdstuk 
werden verzameld, jaren voor de start van de zogeheten ‘migratiecrisis’ in Europa en de 
daaropvolgende maatregelen. Destijds nam een aantal lidstaten weliswaar de ‘Global 
Approach for Migration and Mobility’ als referentiepunt, maar verder was er geen sprake 
van een normatieve rol van de Unie richting het beleid van de lidstaten rondom migratie en 
ontwikkeling. Van een complementaire rol tussen het beleid van de lidstaten en de Unie, 
zoals voorzien in de EU verdragen, was op dit gebied dan ook weinig te zien. Op het gebied 
van migratie en ontwikkeling werd in plaats daarvan veel langs elkaar heen gewerkt en 
weinig afgestemd.  
 Het derde en laatste thema, behandeld in de hoofdstukken 4 en 5, concentreerde 
zich op de normatieve rol van de EU, en betreft de discussie over “beleidscoherentie voor 
ontwikkeling” (Policy Coherence for Development – PCD) in Europese debatten over 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Dit in de EU verdragen verankerde principe toont de ambitie 
van de EU om te vermijden dat acties op andere beleidsterreinen het ontwikkelingsbeleid 
tegenwerken, en dat er waar mogelijk synergieën ten gunste van ontwikkeling worden 
gevormd. Deze beleidsambitie was van oorsprong hoofdzakelijk negatief gemotiveerd, en 
met name ingegeven door zichtbaar negatieve effecten van het gemeenschappelijke 
landbouwbeleid op ontwikkelingslanden. De EU heeft de laatste jaren bij het bevorderen van 
coherentie ingezet op twee processen: (1) discussies rondom ‘institutionele mechanismen’, 
bureaucratisch instrumentarium, die de EU en haar lidstaten ondersteunen bij het 
bevorderen van PCD, en (2) methoden om de effecten van Europees beleid in 
ontwikkelingslanden te evalueren. Het eerste proces weerspiegelt de dominante 
technocratische aanpak van de politieke ambitie die achter de afkorting PCD schuilgaat. De 
overheersende discussie over processen en mechanismen, in plaats van concrete dossiers en 
aspecten zoals productiegekoppelde subsidies, weerspiegelt het management denken dat in 
de EU zijn intrede heeft gedaan. Ook vertegenwoordigt het een meer neutraal terrein waar 
voor- en tegenstanders van PCD onder de Europese lidstaten zich beter kunnen vinden. De 
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acties en discussies rondom het bevorderen van het gebruik van PCD-mechanismen en 
instrumenten tonen echter aan dat de EU en haar lidstaten voornamelijk lippendienst 
bewijzen aan het idee van PCD zonder dit te vertalen naar meer coherent beleid.  
Een analyse van de opkomst van formele evaluatiediensten voor 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking binnen de EU en haar lidstaten biedt tenslotte het kader, in 
hoofdstuk 5, voor een analyse van inspanningen omtrent het evalueren van PCD. Tijdens de 
onderhandelingen van de bovengenoemde Agenda 2030 heeft de EU sterk ingezet op de 
universele aard van deze agenda en het belang van het grondig evalueren van het bestaande 
beleid op basis van doelstelingen voor duurzame ontwikkeling. Vergeleken met de lidstaten 
blijkt de Commissie echter eerder achter dan voorop te lopen bij het verwezenlijken van 
deze ambitie, zowel in termen van evaluatie-inspanningen als in de onafhankelijkheid van 
haar evaluatiefunctie. De ambitieuze standpunten in internationale onderhandelingen over 
coherent optreden blijven daarmee grotendeels zonder invulling, terwijl de beschikbare 
politieke energie voornamelijk opgaat aan het verdedigen van de Europese begroting voor 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking en het consolideren van het maatschappelijk draagvlak 
hiervoor. Oorzaken voor deze discrepantie zijn te vinden in de consensus-gerichte 
besluitvorming, de gebrekkige ‘evaluatiecultuur’ in het Directoraat-Generaal voor 
Ontwikkeling van de Commissie (DG DEVCO), maar ook in het instrumentele gebruik van het 
principe van universaliteit met als doel niet-OESO-staten meer te betrekken bij de 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking. De nadruk van de EU op het evalueren van bestaand beleid en 
de gebrekkige inspanningen hiertoe heeft echter negatieve gevolgen voor de legitieme 
uitvoering van haar normatieve rol. 
 
Theoretische en analytische concepten van het historisch institutionalisme helpen bij het 
verder analyseren van deze bevindingen met betrekking tot de doelstelling en centrale 
onderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift. In de eerste decennia was het Europese 
ontwikkelingsbeleid gekenmerkt door zijn tijdelijke status, aangezien het geen wettelijke 
basis had in de EU verdragen maar in plaats daarvan gestuurd werd door internationale 
verdragen met de ACS-staten. Een keerpunt betrof het verdrag van Maastricht van 1992 die 
de Europese competentie voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking, een competentie die het met 
de lidstaten deelt, formeel vastlegde. Het verdrag definieerde de doelstellingen van het 
Europese ontwikkelingsbeleid, en introduceerde de zogenaamde ‘drie Cs’ als principes om 
het verwezenlijken hiervan te sturen: coherentie, coördinatie en complementariteit. Via een 
aantal tussenstations gaf dit verdrag de basis aan het verdrag van Lissabon dat sinds 
december 2009 richting geeft aan het Europese project. Een belangrijke consequentie van 
deze hervormingen en de uitbreiding van de EU naar 28 lidstaten is dat de Europese 
instellingen aan controle over het ontwikkelingsbeleid hebben gewonnen.  
De creatie van het associatiebeleid in 1957, het daaraan gekoppelde 
intergouvernementele Europees Ontwikkelingsfonds en het bijhorende institutioneel 
raamwerk ging gepaard met hoge initiële kosten (‘sunk costs’). Keuzes in deze vormende 
jaren verklaren waarom het Europese Ontwikkelingsbeleid van vandaag nog altijd een 
onderscheid maakt tussen ACS en niet-ACS staten. Het bestaan van instituties rond deze 
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samenwerking beïnvloedt ook het creëren van nieuwe instituties, bijvoorbeeld vanwege de 
vereiste unanimiteit voor het opnemen van het EOF in de Europese begroting. Een ander 
voorbeeld betreft de grote reserves in ditzelfde fonds, die de creatie van het ‘trust fund’ 
voor Afrika mogelijk maakte. Veel van de doorgevoerde hervormingen werden bovendien 
niet puur door rationale motieven ingegeven, maar hielden minstens evenveel rekening met 
inschattingen over hoe toepasselijk dergelijke hervormingen waren. Het is omwille van deze 
toepasselijkheid dat veel actoren binnen de EU en haar lidstaten blijven hechten aan de 
vorm van dit ACS-EU-partnerschap, ongeacht hoe effectief deze vorm ook is.   
Hoe dan verandering te verklaren in een systeem dat gekenmerkt is door een hoge 
mate van pad-afhankelijkheid? Recent onderzoek binnen het historisch institutionalisme die 
deze schijnbare paradox tussen continuïteit en verandering verkent, biedt een basis om het 
Europese beleid voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking te analyseren als een ‘composite 
technology’ standaard. De som van het Europese ontwikkelingsbeleid als geheel is meer 
flexibel en aanpasbaar dan haar afzonderlijke onderdelen, wat betekent dat het 
beleidsdomein als geheel nieuwe inhoud, richting en doelstellingen kan integreren terwijl de 
bestaande onderdelen padsafhankelijk kunnen blijven. Het beleid als geheel blijft daarmee 
voldoende waarde genereren, terwijl minder fundamentele veranderingen binnen 
afzonderlijke onderdelen verklaard kunnen worden met de concepten conversie en lageren. 
Conversie verwijst naar het heroriënteren van een bestaande institutie om zo nieuwe 
doeleinden na te streven of nieuwe machtsverhoudingen weer te geven, zoals de introductie 
van Economische Partnerschapsakkoorden (EPAs) met het doel om wederkerige 
handelspartnerschappen vorm te geven. Lageren verwijst naar meer incrementele 
aanpassingen aan instituties door middel van het toevoegen van nieuwe regels en 
structuren, zoals de geleidelijke introductie van de politieke dialoog en 
sanctiemogelijkheden binnen het ACS-EU-raamwerk.  
De composiete aard verklaart waarom het Europese ontwikkelingsbeleid 
grootschalige en meer ingrijpende hervormingen langs formele revisies grotendeels heeft 
weerstaan. Verschillende elementen van het zogeheten ‘acquis’ van de ACS-EU-
partnerschap hebben de levensloop van het Europese project doorstaan. Innovatie is 
mogelijk, maar moet zich een weg banen door de bestaande regels, verordeningen en 
besluitvormingscultuur. De discussie over wat men bij een nieuw idee kan verliezen is vaak 
even prominent als wat men ermee kan winnen. De evolutie van de Europese Unie als actor 
in de ontwikkelingssamenwerking kan daarmee worden gekenmerkt als een proces waarbij 
de functie de vorm heeft gevolgd, in plaats van omgekeerd. Een belangrijk gevolg is dat 
toekomstige kansen en mogelijkheden van de EU om een andere of grotere rol te spelen op 
het terrein van ontwikkelingssamenwerking en internationale samenwerking voor een 
belangrijk deel worden gevormd en beïnvloed door wat de EU reeds is. Het theoretische 
inzicht van ‘wie het eerst komt, het eerst maalt’ toont hiermee dat de donerende rol een 
duidelijk voordeel geniet boven de normatieve en federerende rollen. In recente jaren is dit 
gebrek aan evenwicht niet problematisch gebleken, maar gezien de nieuwe – mede door de 
EU aangestuurde – ontwikkelingsagenda die minder steunt op een donerende rol, kan dit 
evenwicht in de komende jaren problematischer worden.  
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Er kunnen wee met elkaar verbonden trends worden onderscheiden die in de toekomst 
kunnen leiden tot ofwel een krimpende rol voor de EU als ontwikkelingsactor, dan wel tot 
een sterkere focus op haar normatieve en federende rol. De eerste trend betreft de hoge 
inzet van de Europese Commissie voor een universele, gedifferentieerde en hervormende 
Agenda 2030. Zowel vanwege externe factoren als vanwege de belangen van invloedrijke 
afzonderlijke Directoraten Generaal, die op hun beurt ontvankelijk zijn voor invloedrijke 
Europese belangengroepen, heeft de EU tot dusverre zelf weinig concrete invulling kunnen 
geven aan deze agenda. De tweede trend betreft het teruglopende ‘klantenbestand’ voor de 
Europese ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Meer en meer ontwikkelingslanden ontgroeien een 
(bilaterale) ontwikkelingshulprelatie, waardoor een kern van hulp-afhankelijke en veelal 
fragiele staten overblijft.  
 Op dit ogenblik leiden de lage federerende en normatieve prestaties van de EU nog 
niet tot risico’s voor het mandaat en daarbij horende middelen van de EU. Dit komt deels 
door de discrepantie tussen de nieuwe agenda en het publieke draagvlak dat met de ‘oude’ 
agenda wordt geconsolideerd. De publieke perceptie van de EU is met name die van een 
actor in de financiële samenwerking, en dit imago van ‘grote donor’ wordt ook door de EU 
zelf proactief gecommuniceerd. Kritische stemmen richtten zich eveneens hoofdzakelijk op 
het gebruik van de financiële middelen, waardoor de politieke energie van de EU voor een 
belangrijk deel opgaat aan het pareren van kritiek op specifieke projecten en aanverwante 
activiteiten. Tenslotte heeft de machtsstrijd tussen de nieuwe buitenlandse dienst (Europese 
dienst voor extern optreden – EEAS) en de Commissie na de verdragswijziging zich voor een 
groot deel gericht op de besteding van het geld. De in 2016 aangenomen EU-strategie voor 
het buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid benadrukt de noodzaak om flexibeler gebruik te maken 
van de beschikbare ontwikkelingsfondsen en ze nadrukkelijker in te zetten ter bevordering 
van Europese belangen. De manier waarop dit de afgelopen jaren is gebeurd, zie het 
migratiedossier, toont dat men zich eerder weg beweegt van de doelstelling om alle 
beleidsterreinen bij te laten dragen aan mondiale duurzame ontwikkeling.   
 
Tenslotte. Vijf terreinen bieden mogelijkheden voor het verder verdiepen van onderzoek 
naar de EU als actor voor mondiale ontwikkeling:  
(1) De invloed van de uitbreiding van de EU op het Europese ontwikkelingsbeleid. Het grote 
aantal lidstaten leidt ertoe dat niet iedere lidstaat zich evenveel engageert op ieder thema. 
Verder onderzoek kan uitwijzen in hoeverre deze interactie wordt gestuurd door regels, 
context-specifiek is dan wel te maken heeft met beschikbare middelen of eerder met 
persoonlijkheden die dit beleid vorm geven.  
(2) In hoeverre worden ontwikkelingsdoelstellingen meegewogen in concrete 
beleidshervormingen in de EU? Vergelijking tussen beleidsterreinen waar de competentie in 
‘Brussel’ ligt en ander beleid waarbij de competentie gedeeld is tussen de Unie en de 
lidstaten kan verder licht werpen op in hoeverre verschillende actoren zich hiertoe inzetten.  
(3) Contractuele partnerschappen in de praktijk. Veel van het bestaande onderzoek 
vergelijkt de ACS-EU partnerschap ‘op papier’ met de Europese samenwerking met niet-ACS 
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staten. Vergelijkend onderzoek gericht op de politieke dialoog in de praktijk kan dit 
onderzoek over de baten van een juridisch bindend raamwerk voor samenwerking verder 
invullen.  
(4) Inter-institutionele verhoudingen in het ontwikkelingsbeleid. Het roterende EU-
voorzitterschap heeft na het Verdrag van Lissabon een groot deel van haar bevoegdheden 
voor het ontwikkelingsbeleid behouden. Er is echter nog weinig onderzoek over hoe het dit 
mandaat wordt uitgevoerd in samenwerking met de relevante Europese instellingen.  
(5) Wie coördineert wie? De bezuinigingen op het bilaterale ontwikkelingsbeleid van veel 
lidstaten geven aanleiding voor onderzoek naar in hoeverre de grootte en reikwijdte van de 
EU op dit terrein invloed heeft op de inspanning om gezamenlijk optreden te bevorderen.  
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